PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002902

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER MARR CO
SUBJECT: PEACE COMMISSIONER RESTREPO AND AMBASSADOR DISCUSS
AUC, ELN, FARC DEVELOPMENTS


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood
Reason: 1.4 (b,d)

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Summary
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1. (C) Peace Commissioner Luis Carlos Restrepo and
Ambassador Wood discussed paramilitary demobilizations; an
AUC proposal to employ demobilized paramilitaries as manual
drug eradicators; prosecutions associated with the Justice
and Peace process; the GOC-ELN exploratory peace talks; and
the FARC during a 90-minute meeting March 30. Restrepo said
the completion of two delayed demobilizations currently
underway would mean the GOC had demobilized virtually all
paramilitaries and their structures; he was "surprised and
pleased" at the extent of the GOC's success. The small
groups of paramilitaries who had not demobilized would face
military action because the GOC would "close the door" on
collective and individual demobilizations. Renegade elements
who returned to drug trafficking or other criminality would
also face attack. The Ambassador and Restrepo agreed that an
AUC plan to employ 20,000 demobilized as manual eradicators
in their former zones of influence was unacceptable because
it would perpetuate AUC structures and chain of command;
Restrepo said he would not move forward on any such proposal
without significant amendments and further Embassy
consultations. The Peace Commissioner said he would give
President Uribe two lists of demobilized at the end of April
or early May. The first would contain the names of about
28,000 demobilized, and the second would be comprised of
about 3,000 of this group who had signed letters agreeing to
be processed under the Justice and Peace law. The Ambassador
and Restrepo agreed that the Fiscalia would require
additional resources to interview the smaller group about
their personal criminal culpability or roles as witnesses to
crimes. Turning to the ELN, Restrepo said the GOC was
considering the guerrilla group's request to meet in Bogota
with Embassy representatives of the G-24. The Ambassador
said the U.S. wanted to be helpful to the process but would
not consider meeting with the ELN under any circumstances
until it agreed to a cease-fire and stopped kidnappings. He
said the U.S. would be willing to attend at Counselor level a
meeting of the diplomatic corps to support the process,
provided it was protocolary only and not substantive.
According to Restrepo, the ELN is still anxious to move the
talks from Cuba to Europe because ELN leaders want access to
the group's substantial finances, apparently located there,
and aims to weaken and eventually eliminate the EU's
designation of the ELN as a terrorist organization. The GOC
would not agree to move the talks without a major ELN
concession, at least a cease-fire. With regard to the FARC,
Restrepo said Uribe had agreed to allow the "international
commission" to meet with the terrorist group. In Restrepo's
view, mid-level FARC guerrillas are increasingly demoralized.
End summary.

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Demobilizations Almost Completed
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2. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador that two recalcitrant
paramilitary blocs (Elmer Cardenas and Los Llanos) had
recently started their demobilizations. When completed, the
AUC demobilization process would end and the GOC would "close
the door" on further collective and individual
demobilizations. The small number of paramilitaries who had
not demobilized would face military and police action.
Restrepo said renegade elements of demobilized groups had
continued narcotrafficking in areas like Narino and Cordoba
Departments; his advice to Uribe was that the GOC must
address this matter soon to prevent it from growing into a
bigger problem. The isolated areas where such paramilitaries
continue to operate have a "history of illegality," lack
police presence, and require both social programs and
"anti-mafia actions," he said. Restrepo said he was
attentive to the possibility that Norte del Valle drug cartel
would commit atrocities to claim "political" status and said
the GOC would not allow it. Overall, Restrepo was "surprised
and pleased" that the GOC has demobilized "virtually all"
paramilitaries and their structures. He was more optimistic
after a positive meeting with demobilized paramilitary
leaders on March 26 in Bogota, where he persuaded them to

reconsider their opposition to J&P processing.

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Castano and Mancuso Make Proposal; Jorge 40 Worried
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3. (C) Restrepo outlined a proposal he said Vicente Castano
and Salvatore Mancuso had made to the GOC to employ 20,000
demobilized paramilitaries in manual eradication activities.
The proposal contemplates deploying the paramilitaries to
areas of their former influence. The plan suggests using
police and military units already stationed in the regions to
provide security to the eradicators. The Ambassador said he
understood the concern for employing the demobilized, the
need to eradicate in demobilized areas, and the GOC's
resource constraints, but he had "profound doubts" because
the proposal could perpetuate the paramilitary leadership
structures, chain of command, and influence in these areas.
Restrepo agreed, saying he would like to have further
discussions with the Embassy about possible amendments to the
proposal. He suggested, for example, deploying the
eradicators to areas outside their former zones of influence.
Restrepo promised to share the proposal with the Embassy and
continue the discussion. Restrepo said Jorge 40 is a worried
man because he had a dispute with other narcotraffickers and
now "saw enemies everywhere."

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Justice and Peace Letters and Lists
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4. (C) According to Restrepo, almost 1,000 paramilitaries,
including Castano, Mancuso, and Hernan Girardo, have signed
letters agreeing to be processed under the Justice and Peace
law (900 of whom are from the North Bloc). He expects up to
3,000 to sign the letters before April 4, when he will meet
again with demobilized paramilitary leaders (this figure
includes up to 1,200 applications Restrepo has received from
prisoners). Restrepo told the Ambassador he had to choose
carefully when to present this list to the Fiscalia because
the GOC could not afford any backsliding in which
paramilitary leaders reject J&P processing.


5. (C) Restrepo expected to give Uribe two lists by the end
of April or early May: a list of the total demobilized, and a
list of those demobilized who had signed J&P letters.
(Restrepo had intended to give Uribe the lists prior to the
March 12 Congressional elections but had to delay to ensure
that Jorge 40's demobilization was included.) He would also
provide evidence to the Fiscalia, such as about 80 cars and
16,000 weapons (stored at 23 locations and supervised by the
armed forces) the paramilitaries had turned over.


6. (C) Signatories of the J&P letters would be subject to
further Fiscalia "version libre" interviews under more
rigorous J&P standards, which permit questions about
atrocities and other grave human rights violations. In
Restrepo's view, the Fiscalia should use regional prosecutors
to interview all paramilitaries who sign such letters to
assess their individual criminal culpability and value as
witnesses. He said he had long regarded the demobilization
"version libre" process as ineffective, because it took place
under the eyes of the paramilitary commanders in the field.
Interviewing the demobilized on the prosecutors' turf outside
the presence of the leaders could be more effective, he said.


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Legal Next Steps
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7. (C) Restrepo said his task would be completed when he
turned over the lists to the Fiscalia, but he would urge
prosecutors to devote more resources to interviewing and
processing cases. "They think they'll handle only 60 cases,"
he said. Restrepo agreed with the Ambassador that the
Fiscalia would need to use the list of up to 3,000 to press
for additional resources. According to Restrepo, the Supreme
Council of the Judiciary was preparing to appoint J&P
magistrates, an essential step that would allow the Fiscalia
to move forward with prosecutions. He noted that extensive
background investigations of magistrate candidates (required
by the Procuraduria) had slowed the process down; the

Ambassador said some candidates had already been rejected in
the screening effort.

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GOC-ELN Exploratory Peace Talks
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8. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador that the ELN had made a
request to the GOC through the civil society guarantors to
meet with Embassy representatives of the G-24. The meeting
would take place during ELN military commander and negotiator
Antonio Garcia's trip to Bogota, approximately April 21-24.
During the trip, Restrepo said Garcia would be surrounded by
a heavy security presence, but his movements would show to
the FARC that it was possible to conduct peace talks in
Colombia. Uribe told Restrepo he did not want to place
obstacles in the path of such discussions. Foreign Minister
Barco said the GOC would do it if necessary, but she said
many countries would have to consult with their capitals
before agreeing to attend and deciding on their level of
representation.


9. (C) The Ambassador said the U.S. wanted to show its
support for the talks, but could not meet with the ELN
bilaterally until the terrorist group agreed to a cease-fire
and stopped kidnappings. U.S. representatives (but not the
Ambassador) could be present at a broader ELN meeting with
the entire diplomatic corps, convoked by the more protocolary
Dean of the diplomatic corps (the Holy See),to show
endorsement of the process. He said he opposed a G-24
meeting because that body had a substantive agenda and might
try to play a role in the talks. Restrepo said the GOC did
not want international involvement beyond the three
"accompanying countries" (Spain, Norway, and Switzerland),
which made him question the wisdom of the G-24 idea. He said
he would further consider the ELN proposal in the light of
the Ambassador's comments.


10. (C) Restrepo told the Ambassador the ELN was still
anxious to move the talks from Cuba to Europe. The ELN's
leaders wanted access to substantial funds they had salted
away in Europe, and were interested in pressing the EU to
weaken and eventually eliminate the ELN's designation as a
terrorist group. The GOC would not agree to move the talks
until the ELN accepted a cease-fire (which could be
characterized as "temporary" for the duration of the peace
process) and stopped kidnappings (a likely corollary of which
would be releasing kidnap victims). He said the
"accompanying countries" had made a proposal to the ELN which
required the ELN to stop kidnapping before future venues for
talks are discussed. The GOC was comfortable with the talks
remaining in Cuba because it had more control over the
process. Restrepo noted that the authoritarian nature of the
Cuban regime limited the ELN's ability to talk to the press
or other potential supporters. Restrepo would travel to Cuba
March 31 to deal with administrative arrangements associated
with the third round of talks starting May 2, and planned to
meet with Fidel Castro. He said neither the GOC nor the ELN
could now walk away from the talks without being blamed, and
it was important to keep talking. Nonetheless, the GOC would
not agree to declare the exploratory phase concluded until
the ELN committed to a cease-fire.


11. (C) The Ambassador passed to Restrepo details of an
attack on a police contingent providing electoral security in
Valle del Cauca on election day, March 12, allegedly carried
out by about 25 ELN guerrillas in three waves over four hours
(no casualties reported). The U.S. had learned of the attack
because the GOC used U.S. anti-narcotics helicopters for
electoral security patrols, and the helicopters had been used
to assist the police defend their positions. The Ambassador
said there were three ways to explain the incident: either
the ELN's electoral truce declaration was not made in good
faith, or a faction of the ELN did not obey it, or the
guerrillas were not in fact ELN. Restrepo said he was not
aware of the incident but would investigate it immediately.

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GOC Agrees to Let International Commission Meet FARC
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12. (C) Restrepo informed the Ambassador that Uribe had
agreed to allow the "international commission" (the

"Technical Exploratory Commission," comprised of
representatives of Spain, France, and Switzerland) to meet
with the FARC. He said mid-level FARC ranks are "very
demoralized."
WOOD