S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON AND OAS PERMREP MAISTO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 002858 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PTER CO SUBJECT: S/CT AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON AND OAS PERMREP MAISTO TALK SECURITY WITH COLOMBIAN VICE MINISTERS Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood. Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d) -------------- SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) On the margins of the 6th Regular Session of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), Coordinator for Counterterrorism Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton and Permanent Representative to the Organization of American States (OAS) John F. Maisto met for an hour with Vice Foreign Ministers Alejandro Borda (multilateral) and Camilo Reyes (bilateral),Vice Defense Minister Hernan Sanin, and the Prosecutor General's International Affairs Director Maria Fernanda Cabal. Crumpton thanked Borda for his strong leadership of the Committee and for continued assistance in containing Venezuelan opposition to the draft Declaration of the CICTE session. Sanin highlighted progress against illicit crop eradication and kidnapping, but pressed for more U.S. assistance, such as nationalization of counter-narcotics aircraft and increased anti-kidnapping resources. He said the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) would keep the American hostages alive due to their high political value. Crumpton said better operational reaction to intelligence information was key in rescuing the hostages. Cabal from the Prosecutor General's Office explained a recent indictment of 35 suspects for their roles in the kidnapping of the three American hostages. The office also requested access to Simon Trinidad to corroborate information in this case. End Summary. -------------- -------------- CRUMPTON PRAISES GOC ROLE IN CICTE, GOC HAILS COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In an hour long meeting on March 23, Crumpton congratulated Borda on his new role as CICTE chair and thanked him for his work as the Committee's vice president. He told Borda that the U.S. would support Colombia in the CICTE and that increased U.S. financial contributions to the Committee were partly due to GOC leadership. Borda stressed the importance of bilateral cooperation with the U.S. and multilateral cooperation within CICTE, highlighting progress made on identification, port, and financial security. Public officials, judges, and federal prosecutors were all involved in this technical cooperation, he said. Borda stated Colombia was also eager to share its expertise with CICTE members. As CICTE president, he said, he would work closely with the secretariat to further enhance multilateral technical cooperation. -------------- -------------- VENEZUELA OPPOSITION TO CICTE SESSION'S DRAFT DECLARATION -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Crumpton described Colombia's leadership as "outstanding" in addressing Venezuela's opposition to the draft Declaration. If Venezuelan opposition continues, the U.S. would defer to Borda's leadership. He said the U.S. is not prepared to compromise and will not allow this to become a public dispute between the U.S. and Venezuela. He also praised Brazil and Mexico for their role in promoting the declaration. Borda agreed that he didn't want a confrontation, but was confident that consensus would prevail. He explained that the vast majority of delegates were in agreement with the Declaration's text. Crumpton also expected consensus, but if this were not possible, another, less desirable option was for Venezuela to obtain footnotes in the document. Maisto said any document "less than optimal" wouldn't serve anyone's interests and it was important that "We are not put at the mercy of Venezuela." -------------- PLAN COLOMBIA AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY -------------- ¶4. (C) Vice Minister Sanin praised bilateral cooperation in the fight against narcotics and terrorism, but pressed for increased aerial and maritime assistance. He expressed his frustration with Section 484 of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) that regulates nationalization of U.S. aerial components, specifically counter-narcotics aircraft. Such regulations were limiting the Colombian military's (COLMIL) ability to fight terrorism due to legal constraints on the aircraft's operational use. Removing these limits would allow COLMIL to expand its ability to pursue high value targets. Sanin said he had met with SECDEF Rumsfeld on this issue earlier this year, and the Pentagon had promised to conduct a legal review on the topic. On eradication, Sanin said manual eradication had better results than aerial methods because coca needs to be sprayed four times to ensure complete eradication. The GOC does not have the ability to do this, he explained. (Comment: We will work with Sanin to improve his understanding of the realities of eradication.) ¶5. (C) Sanin highlighted progress against kidnapping and attributed the decline to President Uribe's Democratic Security policy and U.S. assistance. He explained that kidnappings in Colombia had once numbered over 2,000 in a single year, but so far only 30 in 2006. He highlighted the Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA),which funded the Anti-kidnapping Training School and the Kidnap Case Management System (CIES) database, as "highly effective." He requested increased U.S. technical assistance for the final implementation stage of the CIES. ¶6. (C) Crumpton shared his view that as COLMIL continues operational successes against the FARC, the rebels will likely change their tactics to include more individual kidnappings, assassinations, and car bombs. He praised GOC progress fighting crime, narcotics, and terrorism, noting that other countries could learn a great deal from Colombian achievements in combating both kidnapping and illicit crop cultivation. -------------- U.S. HOSTAGES AND THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE -------------- ¶7. (S) Sanin shared his view that the FARC had a strong interest in keeping its three American hostages alive, calling the hostages "booty of war." He highlighted U.S. and Colombian cooperation in searching for the hostages, explaining that COLMIL always prioritizes the lives of the hostages when planning and carrying out operations. "We always evaluate risks of how any actions may impact their safety." Sanin stated that the FARC holds approximately 50 "political" hostages, including the three Americans. Crumpton said the U.S. wanted a return of all hostages and stressed the need for effective operational responses to intelligence information in achieving this. He referred to this nexus as "sensor and shooter," calling it "complex but doable." Crumpton lamented that COLMIL had often missed "hitting FARC leadership by just hours," noting that American hostages and FARC leaders are often co-located. -------------- ANDEAN REGION AND THE FARC -------------- ¶8. (C) Crumpton asked whether the Andean region was prepared to battle the FARC, in terms of law enforcement, military, and intelligence capabilities, as well as political will. Sanin replied, "That's our same question." Reyes explained the importance of developing lasting cooperation with Colombia's neighbors by strengthening "democratic institutions similar to our own." He said the GOC enjoyed good cooperation with foreign authorities on its borders and asserted that the GOC was seeking increased cooperation from local authorities deeper in foreign territories. Reyes added that internal politics of neighboring countries were paramount to expanding cooperation. He pointed out that political trends could have positive or negative results, stating that recent events in Ecuador had actually strengthened the GOE as various trade associations came out in support of President Palacios. Sanin explained that in spite of "good relations" between the GOC and its neighbors, "In some situations, Venezuela and Ecuador are aiding the insurgents through complacency. They ignore the FARC with the hope that the problem will just go away." Sanin added, "This is a subregional fight, not just a Colombian one." -------------- -------------- CRIMINAL CASES ABOUT AMERICAN HOSTAGES AND SIMON TRINIDAD -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The Prosecutor General's International Affairs Director Cabal explained that the Prosecutor General had recently indicted some 35 people on aggravated kidnapping and homicide charges, for their role in the kidnapping of the three U.S. hostages and murder of their companions. Only one of those indicted had been detained, however. Cabal explained that among the 35 indictees were FARC leaders, "intellectual authors" who "gave the kidnap and execution order." They include Pedro Antonio Marin aka Tirofijo, Jorge Briceno Suarez aka Mono Jojoy, Luis Edgar Devia Silva aka Raul Reyes, Guillermo Leon Saenz aka Alfonso Cano, Noel Mata Mata aka Efrain Guzman, Luciano Marin Arango aka Ivan Marquez, Rodrigo Londono Echeverry aka Timoleon Jimenez, and Fidel Cassallas. ¶10. (C) Cabal explained that the GOC "unconditionally" supports the trial in the U.S. against Simon Trinidad, but requested that the U.S. allow Colombian prosecutors access to him to corroborate information on the American hostage case. ¶11. (U) Ambassadors Crumpton and Maisto cleared this message. WOOD