URIBE'S ELECTORAL STRENGTH CONFIRMED BY RESULTS OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002295 SIPDIS SIPDIS SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2021 TAGS: PGOV PREL ETRD KJUS CO SUBJECT: URIBE'S ELECTORAL STRENGTH CONFIRMED BY RESULTS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons: 1.4 B & D. ¶1. (C) Summary: President Uribe handily attained majorities in both houses of Congress in elections on March 12, reaffirming his commanding position heading into the Presidential elections on May 28. Prospects are excellent for eventual Congressional passage of the FTA and maintaining continued support for extradition. Horacio Serpa and Carlos Gaviria won the Liberal and Polo Presidential primaries on the same day. Parties considered sympathetic to paramilitary interests attained between 10 and 15 percent of the overall Senate vote, but some of the key spokespeople were defeated and the number of seats they will be allocated is minimal. Turnout on March 12 was similar to 2002 Congressional voting, around 41 percent, with the exception of a higher percentage of spoiled ballots on this occasion. Electoral organization was excellent and security measures strong (septel). End Summary. OVERALL NUMBERS -------------- ¶2. (U) Just over 11 million Colombians voted for 102 Senate and 166 House members on March 12. The new Congress will take office on July 20, and the next President on August 7. Voting was largely peaceful and orderly, with only a handful of reports of disruptions (septel). Turnout -- close to 41 percent -- was similar to 2002 elections. Owing to complicated new voting procedures, the number of nullified votes (just over 1 million) far outpaced the number in 2002 (340,000). ¶3. (SBU) The three leading pro-Uribe parties -- National Unity (U),Conservatives (PCC),and Radical Change (CR) -- won clear majorities in both houses. The U and the opposition Liberals (PLC) are poised to hold pluralities in the Senate and House, respectively. The projected breakdown by chamber is as follows (we only note the leading five parties in each case): SENATE: U - 20, PCC - 18, PLC - 17, CR - 15, Polo - 11 HOUSE: PLC - 33, U - 28, PCC - 27, CR - 21, Polo - 9 Several other pro-Uribe parties won a handful of seats in each chamber. Uribe should command a majority of between 65 and 70 in the Senate and between 86 and 100 in the House. The House numbers are more in flux as two small parties, which will be given 13 seats, might not work as full GOC allies in an Uribe II Administration. THE WINNERS -------------- ¶4. (C) President Uribe was the clear victor. Horacio Serpa won the PLC Presidential primary with 48 percent of the vote to Rafael Pardo's 24 percent. Two-time (1998 and 2002) failed Presidential nominee Serpa appears unlikely to seriously challenge Uribe on May 28. The same holds true for leftist Senator Carlos Gaviria, who won the Polo nomination over the more moderate Antonio Navarro Wolff, 53 to 47 percent. ¶5. (C) Other "winners" included: --German Vargas Lleras, Head of CR, who attained over 215,000 individual votes for Senate, some 80,000 more than his next closest rival, the Polo's Gustavo Petro. In addition, CR's overall Congressional vote total was quite respectable, in spite of playing a distant second fiddle to the U, President Uribe's new party. --Juan Manuel Santos, Head of U, who carried a nascent party to a surprising victory in the Senate races. --The Petro wing of the Polo, as Petro was the second highest individual vote getter (135,000) for Senate and his ally Gaviria pulled off the upset in the party's Presidential primary. THE LOSERS -------------- ¶6. (C) While the Polo will significantly increase its presence in the Congress (more or less doubling in both houses),the party has drifted further left and cannot hope to challenge Uribe on May 28. Despite regular polling auguring for victory in both houses of Congress, the Liberals made a disappointing showing in the nation-wide Senate race (third place overall),but came in first in the more local and idiosyncratic House. And, as with Gaviria, Serpa does not appear to have any chance of challenging Uribe for President. Former Bogota mayors Enrique Penalosa and Antanus Mockus were also major losers, as both individuals' eponymous parties failed to reach the vote threshold to attain seats in the Senate. CR AND PCC: RELIABLE ALLIES? -------------- ¶7. (C) The PCC will control roughly 18 percent of the Senate and 16 percent of the House. While the party is publicly pro-Uribe, it has not supported numerous GOC Congressional initiatives during the Uribe Administration, particularly on fiscal issues. Uribe II might continue to face resistance on related issues. Meanwhile, Uribe and CR leader Vargas Lleras maintain an often tense relationship, and the latter's loyalty to Uribe may wane somewhat after May 28. Vargas Lleras clearly has his sights on the Presidency in 2010 and may attempt to move more into his own limelight. PARAMILITARY ISSUES -------------- ¶8. (C) We will continue to study and report on the complicated issue of how the voting numbers reveal the electoral strength of the paramilitaries. Four parties often associated with paramilitary interests -- Citizen Convergence, Colombia Alive, Democratic Colombia, and Let Moreno Play -- attained on the order of 1.2 million Senate votes. Four of the five sitting members of Congress expelled from the U and CR parties in January attained seats in Congress. However, the three most publicly pro-paramilitary members of Congress -- Carlos Moreno de Caro, Rocio Arias, and Eleonora Pineda -- lost their seats. U.S. INTERESTS -------------- ¶9. (C) An Uribe II Administration will count on the necessary majorities to pass the FTA in Congress, in spite of considerable public skepticism. In a similar vein, with Uribe and the leading pro-Uribe parties publicly advocating the importance of the U.S. extradition relationship, we foresee little danger of modification of the Constitution to prohibit extradition, something members of Congress sympathetic to the paramilitaries have occasionally threatened. WOOD