Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BOGOTA1987
2006-03-06 19:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

RE-EMERGING PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED IN

Tags:  KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0025
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1987/01 0651901
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061901Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2817
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6596
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7275
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ MAR LIMA 3322
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8831
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3957
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3477
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001987 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: RE-EMERGING PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED IN
OAS REPORT


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001987

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: RE-EMERGING PARAMILITARY ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED IN
OAS REPORT


Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The OAS Mission in Colombia released on March 1 its
sixth quarterly report, which focused on new and ongoing
paramilitary activity in areas where these blocs have
demobilized. The OAS also voiced concerns regarding the
handling of paramilitary armament and cited the need for
continued support to the monitoring mission. Although the
Embassy cannot verify all of the report's conclusions,
Embassy applauds this important contribution to the
demobilization process. Embassy urges continued support for
the OAS mission and GOC authorities as they seek to address
the monumental task of reintegrating thousands of demobilized
combatants. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Paramilitary Activity Re-emerging
--------------


2. (SBU) The Sixth Quarterly Report of the Secretary General
to the Permanent Council on the Mission to Support the Peace
Process in Colombia, which was published March 1, indicates
paramilitary activity in areas west and south of the country
has resumed, and in some cases, at the same level as before
demobilization. The report cites three categories of renewed
paramilitary activity:

--Regrouping of demobilized combatants into criminal gangs:
Most common in the western and southwestern parts of the
country where guerrilla activity is low and government
security presence is weak, these groups have re-emerged under
the leadership and control of mid-level demobilized
combatants. These groups are assuming control of criminal
activities, such as extortion, social cleansing, and levies
on drug production, that were once controlled by the groups
based there. The OAS Mission is concerned competition
between these groups for control of illegal activities in
this area could provoke turf wars.

--Groups who have not demobilized, but who belong to blocs
that have demobilized: These groups, located primarily in
Cordoba, Meta, Sucre, and Bolivar Departments continue to
pursue criminal activities in their areas of influence. In

Cordoba, for example, a group of 60-80 paramilitary fighters
have been holding meetings with locals advising them of their
intention to control the area. This group has also conducted
a census to determine the community's capacity for coca base
production.

--Emergence of new armed players: These groups have emerged
most prominently in areas with consolidated illegal
economies, and provide an opportunity to demobilized fighters
who can not find employment in the legal economy. Groups in
Narino and Valle de Cauca Departments, for example, are
actively recruiting from the demobilized population. Groups
in Antioquia, Norte de Santander, and Narino share the same
or similar names, but it is unclear what connection may exist
between these groups.

--------------
Concerns Over Disarmament
--------------


3. (C) The OAS report also notes its concerns over
paramilitary disarmament, in particular the destruction of
weapons the demobilized handed over at demobilization. (A
member of the Colombian Interagency Antiterrorism Analysis
Group*which has been charged with monitoring the disarmament
process*told poloffs last month that the GOC is still
developing a policy for the destruction of these weapons.
Until then, these weapons are being stored at military bases
near the demobilization sites.) The OAS report notes that a

former paramilitary commander in Meta sold some of his
weapons to a dissident commander from another bloc and hid
another unknown amount of weapons in a cache for a group of
about 200 non-demobilized combatants.

--------------
Resources Key to Successful Monitoring
--------------


4. (U) The report notes that the success of the peace process
depends on paying adequate attention to the communities
affected by violence and to the reintegration of demobilized
combatants. The OAS report begins by acknowledging the
international support the Mission has received and listing
out some of the countries that have promised support in the
future. The OAS Mission plans to open 10 regional offices in
areas where demobilizations have taken place and to increase
its staff to more than 100 Mission officers. According to
OAS officials, the political counselor of the Canadian
Embassy in Caracas will soon join the Mission as political
adviser to director Sergio Caramagna. The Mission is counting
on the formalization of verbal commitments from countries
interested in participating in the program to realize that
goal.

--------------
Comment
--------------


5. (C) The Embassy cannot verify the OAS charges, but gives
them credence. In total, the OAS report indicates fewer than
1,000 violations in the program that now has demobilized some
22,000 paramilitaries and is still developing its internal
monitoring system. These groups no longer have a national
structure, they can no longer assume police or military
passivity, and the Colombian anti-narcotics efforts, with
U.S. support, are increasingly successful, cutting into their
operations.


7. (C) While the local media has addressed some of the issues
raised in the report, its publication gives the charges
greater weight and helps answer critics who have faulted the
OAS for not highlighting the challenges the GOC faces with
the demobilization process. END COMMENT.
WOOD