Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BOGOTA1666
2006-02-23 16:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bogota
Cable title:  

FARC INTERLOCUTOR SAYS HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE

Tags:  KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #1666/01 0541636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231636Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2521
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6579
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 7219
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ FEB LIMA 3294
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA 8796
RUEHQT/AMEMBASSY QUITO 3908
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 3461
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHEHOND/DIRONDCP WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001666 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: FARC INTERLOCUTOR SAYS HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE
DIALOGUE MORE LIKELY AFTER ELECTION


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001666

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2015
TAGS: KJUS PGOV PREL PTER CO
SUBJECT: FARC INTERLOCUTOR SAYS HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE
DIALOGUE MORE LIKELY AFTER ELECTION


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker.
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Communist Party leader and FARC interlocutor Carlos
Lozano told Embassy officials February 21 that the prospect
of an humanitarian exchange dialogue between the GOC and the
FARC will improve after the May presidential elections. He
believes the recent death of a FARC hostage in southern
Colombia highlighted to the insurgents the political cost of
holding hostages and will likely push both sides to discuss a
humanitarian exchange. Lozano was less optimistic about
peace talks between the GOC and the FARC. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
PROSPECTS FOR PRE-ELECTION HUMANITARIAN EXCHANGE DIM
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Lozano discussed the obstacles to a near-term meeting
between the FARC and the international commission. France,
Spain, and Switzerland are still interested in meeting with
the FARC, but the French are particularly adamant that Bogota
be advised before any meeting takes place, a condition the
FARC has refused to accept. While the French assured FARC
interlocutors that none of the logistical details of such a
meeting would be revealed, the FARC fears the location of
their key players could be exposed. FARC interlocutors cited
the arrest of Southern Bloc finance officer "Sonia" and an
attack against Secretariat member Raul Reyes*both of which
they claim occurred on the heels of meetings between FARC
leaders and politicians and religious leaders*as examples to
support their concerns.


3. (C) Lozano said French Foreign Minister Phillipe
Douste-Blazy pulled him aside during a January 26 breakfast
meeting to solicit his help in breaking this impasse with the
FARC. The foreign minister requested Lozano convey three
points to his FARC interlocutors:

-- France, Spain, and Switzerland are still interested in
meeting with FARC leadership;

-- France would like proof-of-life for the hostages;

-- France would like a gesture of political will from the

FARC. (Lozano said the French felt they had made every effort
to move the process forward, and had not seen a similar
effort from the FARC.)


4. (C) Lozano in early February met with a FARC
representative to convey these points. While the
representative lacked the authority to respond officially he
reiterated the FARC,s demand for a secret meeting with the
Europeans, rejecting France,s request that Bogota be
notified beforehand. He said the FARC was in the process of
acquiring proof-of-life for the hostages, but that the exact
form of proof-of-life would vary according to the location of
the hostages. Lozano said the interlocutor made no comment
regarding the possibility of a FARC demonstration of
political will, but Lozano encouraged him to think about what
they might want in exchange for the hostages.


5. (C) Lozano expects the FARC will offer a small
demonstration of political will before the election,
particularly in light of Guevara,s death. Whatever action
the FARC undertakes would be something neutral that Uribe
could not use to his political advantage. Lozano mentioned
that Guevara,s family wants his remains returned to them,
and while this would be a near-impossible feat, the FARC
could attempt to do this as a gesture of good will. Lozano
also believes that proof-of-life, particularly of hostages
for whom no proof-of-life has been revealed recently, may be
in the offing. Lozano also voiced the possibility of a very
small hostage release, most likely of sick government

security forces. Lozano cited an unnamed military hostage
who has a tumor as a good candidate. Lozano doubts Ingrid
Betancourt would be released because French attention to her
situation has made her a very valuable hostage for the FARC.

-------------- --------------
GROWING HOSTAGE BURDEN LIKELY TO PROMPT DIALOGUE OVER TIME
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Lozano said the political dimension the humanitarian
exchange has taken is an impediment to further progress
before the election. The FARC is highly unlikely to
undertake any action that could strengthen Uribe and has
hardened its line against a humanitarian exchange or peace
talks as a result. However, Lozano believes the FARC will be
compelled to talk to whichever president is elected as a
result of the growing political costs of holding hostages.
Lozano assessed Guevara,s death in captivity as painting the
FARC in a more negative light. As time passes, the
likelihood that a hostage will fall terminally ill or suffer
an accident increases and places the FARC in a worse position
politically. Lozano also believes that once the election has
passed, foreign and domestic social pressure on both the FARC
and the GOC could prompt them to move forward on an exchange
agreement.


7. (C) While the prospects for a humanitarian exchange may
improve after the election, Lozano did not hold out much hope
for peace talks. He viewed the February 21 FARC communiqu
demanding the demilitarization of Caqueta and Putumayo for
peace talks as a rhetorical piece and a demand that no
government could ever accept.
DRUCKER