THE POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO: AN ALTERNATIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 001328 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2106 TAGS: PGOV PINR CO SUBJECT: THE POLO DEMOCRATICO ALTERNATIVO: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE LIBERALS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. Milton K. Drucker Reason: 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The battle for the soul of the Polo Democratico Alternativo (PDA) is underway and its first shots will be fired in March 12 primaries and Congressional elections, followed by the May 28 presidential election. Personality conflicts within the PDA mask real ideological disputes that could have a significant bearing on the party's influence in Colombian politics. If populist House member Gustavo Petro becomes the Polo's chief spokesperson after 2006 elections, as appears likely, he would take the party further left and give the Liberals under former president Cesar Gaviria additional breathing room to modernize and shake off the outdated and lethargic image associated with its likely 2006 presidential candidate, Horacio Serpa. Both the Polo and the Liberals see themselves as heading a left coalition to challenge for the presidency in 2010. End summary. -------------- -------------- Internal Fights Exposed as Election Season Heats Up -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Colombia's largest leftist political party, the Polo Democratico Alternativo, exposed internal infighting to public view in the last several weeks with its principal figures jockeying for power and position as election season got underway. Former Foreign Minister Maria Emma Mejia, who enjoys high popularity ratings, announced she was backing out of the Polo campaign entirely despite having been on the cusp of leading the party's Senate campaign. She criticized what she said was the party's leftist drift. Other prominent Polo figures told us Mejia had declined to run only because she lost an internal Polo vote by 10-6 to populist leftist rival (and former M-19 guerrilla member) Gustavo Petro and did not want to take second place on the Polo's Senate list. Petro and former Peace Commissioner Daniel Garcia-Pena told us that Bogota Mayor Lucho Garzon, who was one of Mejia's biggest supporters, overplayed his hand with an "all or nothing" approach. They said Garzon was so fixated on blocking Petro's rise in the party that he insisted -- to the point of alienating Polo leaders -- that Mejia must head up the Senate campaign. (Polo Secretary General Bruno Diaz echoed this in a February 2 meeting with poloffs.) The Polo eventually chose Petro as its Senate standard-bearer. ¶3. (C) The Polo's negative publicity continued when its presumed presidential candidate, Antonio Navarro Wolff, unexpectedly said he was stepping down in advance of the party's March 12 primary in favor of rival Carlos Gaviria, widely considered to be more leftist than Navarro, but who trailed Navarro by a significant margin in primary polls. Navarro explained that he was disillusioned with the infighting and wanted to promote party unity. He did not mention that Gaviria had been catching up in the polls and had much more enthusiastic grass roots campaign workers. Navarro also failed to note media reports to the effect that he had taken money some years ago from the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers, narcotics traffickers currently awaiting trial in the U.S. Navarro's negative poll numbers are high. ¶4. (C) The Polo's apparent confusion was heightened when its leaders called on Navarro to return to the fray and contest the March 12 primary. For his part, Navarro said he was undecided and needed more time to think. Polo president Samuel Moreno subsequently responded to a journalist's question about who was in charge of the party by saying that both he and Petro had a "consultative arrangement" and neither was in charge. On February 6, Navarro announced that he was returning to the race. -------------- -------------- Behind the Scenes: Battle Over Direction, Influences -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Polo's surface machinations among leading personalities -- real as they are -- cannot disguise the ideological battle underway whose resolution will determine the party's direction and influence. One aspect of this battle remains intensely personal, with the highly ambitious Petro already openly declaring that he would like to be president in 2010. Observers expect moderate left of center figures, such as Bogota Mayor Garzon, Valle Governor Angelino Garzon (both Polo leaders),and independent Medellin Mayor Sergio Fajardo, to test the 2010 presidential waters as well. ¶6. (C) Petro is widely seen as a populist figure who would take the party in a more confrontational, Chavez-like direction, while the other leading figures are viewed as pragmatists. The two Garzons (not related) and Fajardo are respected, if not well liked, in the business community and have done creditable jobs administering their local entities. (Mejia is the quintessential moderate pragmatist, but she is not a formal Polo member and seems to have been burned by her initial foray into Polo politics.) Petro was at pains in recent weeks to make soothing noises about the need for unity in a party that was new and formed from various leftist strands with different traditions, but his populist political project is not far from the surface. Polo Presidential hopeful Carlos Gaviria is at best a transitional figure in Petro's scenario. They are ideological allies but Petro regards himself as more capable than Gaviria of leading a united left going into 2010. While Gaviria is well liked across the political spectrum, his popularity with the public is limited. Likewise, Navarro is not a long term threat to Petro. Navarro has lost two presidential races and voters have strong opinions about the former M-19 guerrilla: they either like him (a small minority) or they strongly dislike him (most voters). -------------- Which Party Will Lead Left in 2010? -------------- ¶7. (C) The person who succeeds in becoming the Polo's chief spokesperson and presidential candidate during an Uribe second term will be faced with ensuring the party becomes the principal anti-Uribe opposition and positions itself to take advantage of the Colombian electorate's presumed exhaustion with Uribe by 2010. The party's success will run up hard against former president Cesar Gaviria's effort to do exactly the same for the Liberal Party he leads. At this point, about 30 percent of Colombians identify with the Liberal Party, with another 15 percent leaning towards the party, far higher numbers than the Polo enjoys. Gaviria also has the advantage of a larger number of well known candidates and significant media support for the party's platform. Cesar Gaviria has told us that he wants to position the Liberals as a social democratic party that addresses the social needs of ordinary Colombians. He argues that the Polo is too "extreme" to capture the majority of progressive voters. -------------- Early Indications Coming Soon -------------- ¶8. (C) The first test of strength between the Liberals and the PDA will be in March (Polo and Liberal primaries and Congressional elections),followed by the May 28 presidential contest. Liberal leader Cesar Gaviria told us he hopes for about 30 Senate seats in March, while Polo principals have said the party is aiming for about 12. The fact that the Polo will certainly win fewer legislative seats than the Liberals does not mean that the Polo's presidential candidate will inevitably get fewer votes in May than the Liberal standard bearer. The Liberals appear likely to select Horacio Serpa as their candidate for president in a March 12 primary, despite Serpa's two-time loser status and his poor poll ratings. It is conceivable the Polo candidate for president could defeat the Liberal candidate (and even possible that an independent candidate like former Bogota Mayor Antanas Mockus would defeat both and come second to Uribe). If Uribe fails to get more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round and is pushed to a second round (which still looks unlikely),the second-highest vote getter will go head-to-head with the president three weeks later. Any result for the Liberals except a strong second place finish to Uribe will be seen here as a defeat for the party and will strengthen the Polo. -------------- Left Radicalized? -------------- ¶9. (C) If Petro ends up becoming the Polo's chief spokesperson and presumptive presidential candidate for 2010, it is likely that he would radicalize the Polo further and damage its prospects of having any lasting influence in Colombian politics. A Petro-led left would have to walk a fine line between saying that only it could deal with the FARC, and demonstrating that it was not appeasing the guerrillas (whose support is around 2 percent in the polls). ¶10. (C) The left's causes are not necessarily doomed, however. A Polo whose main figure was someone like Mejia or one of the Garzons could play a prominent role in defining the opposition's agenda for 2010 (social issues, and making peace because the FARC would not deal with Uribe). The Liberals under a rejuvenated Rafael Pardo or Cecilia Lopez could challenge for power in 2010 if the electorate has had enough of Uribismo. DRUCKER