POSSIBLE FARC THREAT TO EMBASSY BOGOTA

S E C R E T BOGOTA 010785


TERREP

STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/WHA, DS/DSS/ITA AND WHA/AND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: PTER
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FARC THREAT TO EMBASSY BOGOTA

REF: (A) TD-314/81681-06 (B) RSO SPOT REPORTS 11/22
AND 11/27 (C) TD-314/83602-06

Classified By: RSO Robert Hartung; Reason 1.4 (c,d)



1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: Embassy Bogota is in receipt of
information concerning a possible attack by the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) against the American Embassy
compound, allegedly being coordinated by elements of the
FARC's Antonio Narino Urban Front (RUAN). Biographic details
of the sources of the information are contained in REF A and

C. Source information indicates that the planning for the
attack may be complete, and that it is planned for prior to
December 15, 2006. RSO and SIMO continue to meet and debrief
a series of informants with claimed knowledge of the RUAN
attack plans and are jointly coordinating with Government of
Colombia (GOC) investigative and intelligence entities in an
effort to identify and disrupt the RUAN operation. RSO has
augmented post's security with both Embassy and host
government assets. RSO and SIMO have briefed the senior
levels of the Colombian National Police and the Department of
Administrative Security (DAS). Post will report additional
details as they develop. END SUMMERY.


2. (S/NF) On November 17, 2006, Embassy Bogota learned of an
alleged RUAN plan as first reported in REF A. RSO and SIMO
have subsequently met and debriefed the original source of
the information and two subsources, recently demobilized RUAN
members with intimate knowledge of RUAN operational planning.
The original source was polygraphed by a U.S. Government
polygrapher and showed no indication of deception in basic
questioning regarding his knowledge of the attack plan.
Details of these debriefings were forwarded via REF B and C.
The source(s) have stated that to their knowledge RUAN has
conducted surveillance of the embassy compound and the
surrounding area for at least the last several months and
have discussed three potential attack scenarios. The first
and most preferred scenario would be a standoff canister or
motor attack against the compound utilizing a commercial
truck or a municipal garbage truck. The second scenario
would be to detonate an improvised explosive device in a taxi
being driven by an unwitting driver (VBIED) in front of one
of the two compound vehicle entrances. The third option
would be small arms fire directed at employees entering and
exiting the compound. The source(s) reiterated that the
preferred option would be the stand off mortar/canister
attack which is known to be fairly effective from a distance
of 300 meters, although past FARC attacks via this method
have been limited in accuracy. The source(s) stated that the
RUAN has discussed the preference to stage a canister/mortar
attack in the early morning hours between 0300 and 0400 due
to the perceived reduction in security alertness at the
embassy during these hours.


3. (S/NF) RSO and SIMO have met with and will continue to
work with appropriate officials from the GOC police and
intelligence services to further identify the RUAN members
allegedly involved in the plan in an effort to disrupt the
attack. RSO and SIMO have briefed senior levels of the CNP
and the DAS concerning this threat information.


4. (S/NF) RSO and SIMO are scheduled to meet with a third
subsource on the afternoon of November 28, 2006. This
subsource is an active member of RUAN with reported access to
the highest levels of the organization and who purportedly is
willing to cooperate with U.S. Government officials to
identify and disrupt this alleged plan. (Biographic details
of this subsource are contained in REF C). RSO and SIMO plan
to polygraph this source as well.


5. (C) RSO has increased the number, hours, frequency and
coverage of the embassy perimeter and immediate vicinity of
post surveillance detection teams, local guards and mobile
patrols. Additional armed positions have been established at
each of the compound access points and greater scrutiny of
approaching vehicles has been implemented. Colombian Police
intelligence have implemented additional surveillance of
suspect attack/launch areas and the uniformed Colombian
police presence around the perimeter have been appropriately
briefed to maintain enhanced vigilance. RSO will again meet
with Colombian Police to asses security coverage on the
morning of November 29, 2006. Further, RSO is conducting a
thorough review of all SIMAS database entries and will share
this information with the CNP and cooperating sources in an
attempt to exploit this information.


6. (U) Embassy Bogota will report additional information as
it develops.


WOOD