U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 010317 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ECON ETRD SNAR CO SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 25 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT URIBE Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood Reason: 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (U) October 25, 2006; 5:00 pm. ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Under Secretary Nicholas Burns Ambassador William Wood Assistant Secretary Thomas Shannon Assistant Secretary Patterson HeideBronke John Creamer (notetaker) Colombia President Alvaro Uribe Minster of Defense Juan Manuel Santos Minister of Foreign Affairs Maria Consuelo Araujo Ambassador Carolina Barco Presidential Communications Director Jorge Eastman ¶3. (C) Summary: U/S Burns praised Colombia,s progress on security, economic development and human rights, and reiterated the U.S. commitment to continue substantial bilateral aid. Still, he cautioned that further GOC progress on human rights would be needed to maintain U.S. congressional support for Plan Colombia. Uribe welcomed Burns, proposal that the GOC and the U.S. produce a Plan Colombia Consolidation Plan by early January that would outline a joint U.S.-GOC strategy for the next five years. He understood congressional concerns on human rights, and would work to improve Colombia,s human rights record. The two also discussed the status of the bilateral free trade agreement and the Andean Trade Preferences Act, bilateral security cooperation, the U.S. hostages held by the FARC, counternarcotics programs, and regional issues. End Summary ¶4. (C) U/S Burns said his visit followed up President Uribe,s September 19 meeting with Secretary Rice. He praisedColombia,s progress on security, economic development and human rights, and reiterated the U.S. commitment to continue substantial bilateral support. The Administration would request that Congress maintain current aid levels over the next two years, seek Congressional ratification of the bilateral free trade agreement, and ask Congress to extend the Andean Trade Preferences Act for Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru. He said it is key to build on Plan Colombia,s success and noted that he had asked A/S Shannon to work with the GOC on a Plan Colombia Consolidation Plan. The document should be completed by early January and should lay out a joint U.S.-GOC strategy for the next five years. The Administration and the GOC could then present it jointly to the U.S. Congress. ¶5. (C) U/S Burns said there is strong potential for increased bilateral security cooperation. The U.S. is committed to providing Colombia with technological help to fight the FARC, and is also interested in deepening our security ties through joint exercises, doctrine, training and exchanges. He urged Defense Minister Santos and Foreign Minister Araujo to visit Washington to discuss an enhanced security relationship. Burns thanked Uribe for the GOC,s cooperation in trying to free the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC, and urged that they be included in any possible humanitarian exchange. ¶6. (C) U/S Burns said he consistently encourages U.S. Congressmen to visit Colombia. Those that do so are almost always impressed by what they see. Still, he cautioned that some members of the U.S. Congress are concerned by what they perceive as the GOC,s failure to make more progress on human rights*as evidenced by the GOC,s inability to resolve outstanding human rights cases such as Mapiripan and San Jose delApartado. Moreover, some members consider the Justice and Peace Law to be too lenient and want tough implementation against paramilitary leaders. He said the GOC must address these concerns to maintain bipartisan congressional support for U.S. assistance to Colombia. U.S. Congress, the FTA and APTA ¶7. (C) Uribe welcomed Congressional visits and said Senator Harry Reid of Nevada will reportedly visit Colombia in December. He said the GOC hopes the U.S. Congress will approve the FTA before yearend. If it does not, it is important for Colombia that Congress act in the first quarter of 2007. He noted that the GOC had made major concessions in the FTA negotiations, including beef and intellectual property rights. He had personally explained to the Colombian people that these politically difficult concessions BOGOTA 00010317 002 OF 003 were necessary to conclude the deal. ¶8. (C) Uribe said that if the U.S. Congress does not ratify the FTA in 2006, an extension of the ATPA is critical to avoid&disastrous social consequences8 in Colombia. Given the political instability in the Andes, it would be useful if the U.S. granted an extension to all of the current beneficiaries, including Ecuador and Bolivia. U.S. announcement of its intention to extend ATPA before the November 26 second round of presidential elections in Ecuador could help pro-free trade candidate Alvaro Noboa. Still, he cautioned that the U.S. should clarify that any extension would only be temporary and would be designed to give the countries time to conclude an FTA. This would create an incentive for Ecuador and Bolivia to pursue free trade deals with the U.S. while not disadvantaging Colombia or Peru for having already done so. Security Cooperation ¶9. (C) Uribe said the GOC wants to deepen security cooperation and welcomed the invitation to send Santos and Araujo to Washington to discuss this issue. Santos said he had presented a draft agreement to Defense Secretary Rumsfeld at the Defense Ministerial of the Americas in Managua. The GOC hopes this draft would enable the GOC and U.S. to do anything that they want in the security area while not requiring approval by either country's Congress. Uribe underscored that it is important that any security accord not need Congressional ratification. U.S. Hostages and Humanitarian Accord 10 (C) Uribe said the GOC would insist that the U.S. hostages be included in any humanitarian exchange with the FARC. The GOC would consult with the U.S. on any GOC-FARC negotiations and would not consider a deal that separated the U.S. hostages from the Colombians held by the group. He clarified, however, that at the moment*prompted by the October 19 FARC car bomb at the National Military University*GOC efforts to start humanitarian talks with the FARC are off. ¶11. (C) Uribe explained that after his election in May, he had consciously moderated his rhetoric toward the FARC in an attempt to create conditions for talks with the group. It is now clear, however, that the only way to deal with the FARC is to defeat them militarily. He said the three countries accompanying the FARC process*Spain, France and Switzerland*had urged him to reconsider his decision to break off contacts with the group. He would not do so unless the FARC stopped its terrorist attacks. Uribe stressed that his decision to end overtures to the FARC enjoyed popular support. His attempt to reach out to the FARC had highlighted the group,s intransigence and &relegitimized8 his democratic security policy. ¶12. (C) Uribe said the GOC needs U.S. help to locate the U.S. hostages and to mount a rescue attempt.Without U.S. assistance, a rescue effort would be impossible. He assured U/S Burns that the GOC would not try to rescue the U.S. hostages without full coordination with the U.S. Santos confirmed that the standing order to the Colombian military is that any operation to rescue the hostages must be "dual key." ELN ¶13. (C) Uribe said there were some advances in the fourth round of talks with the ELN. For the first time, it appears the ELN accepts the need to put in place a ceasefire. He noted that his omission of the ELN from his October 20 speech suspending efforts to talk to the FARC about a humanitarian exchange and calling for the arrest of paramilitary leader Vicente Castano was aimed at encouraging the ELN to continue peace talks. Human Rights ¶14. (C) Uribe said he understood U.S. congressional concerns on human rights and the Justice and Peace Law (JPL). He must be prudent in his efforts to advance the resolution of individual cases, because he must respect the independence of the Prosecutor General,s Office (Fiscalia). Still, Uribe said he calls the Prosecutor General every day to urge progress on human rights cases. Ambassador Barco also works directly with the Fiscalia on key cases. ¶15. (C) Uribe said most of the concerns raised by human rights groups regarding the JPL were addressed in the implementing decree. Most key paramilitary leaders are in GOC custody: the Prosecutor General will hear the first JPL confession of a paramilitary*Salvador Mancuso*within 15 BOGOTA 00010317 003 OF 003 days. Uribe said GOC security forces are looking to detain those paramilitary leaders, such as Vicente Castano, that are still at large. If the GOC arrests these individuals, they will not be eligible for JPL benefits and will be subject to extradition. Counternarcotics ¶16. (C) Uribe said that without clear progress on counternarcotics, it would be impossible to sustain political support for Plan Colombia. The GOC and the U.S. need to agree on the baseline amount of coca in the country and to revise their counternarcotics efforts accordingly. Santos said the GOC and the U.S. will set up a high-level commission to look at the coca issue and to report back by December. Ambassador Barco urged the group to consider alternative measures of success beyond the number of coca hectares sprayed. Uribe asked for U.S support in developing a strategy for Colombia,s Pacific Coast, which has seen a sharp increase in coca production and terrorist activities. A/S Patterson agreed to work with the GOC on this issue. UNSC Seat ¶17. (C) Uribe said the GOC is committed to Guatemala, and will not lead an effort to identify a compromise candidate. The GOC will follow Guatemala,s lead. Venezuela and Bolivia 18 (C) Uribe said that when he met with Venezuelan President Chavez a month ago, Chavez had voiced concern about the impact of rising crime on his reelection campaign. Hence, Chavez had asked for GOC cooperation to combat criminal activity along the border. Santos said that in a follow-up meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart, the GOV had promised to cooperate with the GOC to combat narcotrafficking and kidnapping. Since then, the GOV has handed over two importantnarcotraffickers and one mid-level terrorist. Still, the GOV has not yet responded to a GOC request that it detain a high-value terrorist leader. 19 (C) Asked for the U.S. assessment of the Venezuelan presidential elections, A/S Shannon said opposition candidate Manuel Rosales is running a smart campaign. Still, Chavez has perfected his control of Venezuela,s electoral machinery, and will likely win on December 3. Chavez, main vulnerability is that he must win by a substantial margin to maintain his regional mystique. To achieve this, he may need to resort to fraud. In this context, it is important that international observers, such as the OAS and the European Union, be present and have adequate mandate. ¶20. (C) Uribe said he was not following events in Bolivia closely, and asked for the U.S view. Shannon said the political situation in La Paz is difficult. Cuban and Venezuelan influence is strong, and President Morales has made serious political mistakes. Still, the U.S. continues to stress our desire to work with Morales*despite an increase in coca production. Shannon said we hope Brazil will take a more active role in Bolivia after the second round of Brazilian elections on October 29. ¶21. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Burns. WOOD =======================CABLE ENDS============================