U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 25 LUNCH MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 010114 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 TAGS: KJUS PGOV PHUM PREL PTER CO SUBJECT: U/S BURNS' OCTOBER 25 LUNCH MEETING WITH COLOMBIAN OPINION MAKERS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker Reason: 1.5 (b,d) ¶1. (U) October 25, 2006; 1400PM. ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. Under Secretary Burns A/S for WHA Thomas P. Shannon Ambassador William B. Wood Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mary Lee Warren DCM Milton Drucker Daniel Tomlinson, NSC Attorney Advisor Patricia Prugh, L Political Counselor John Creamer P Special Assistant HeideBronke Political Officer Stacy Pearce (notetaker) COLOMBIA RhettDoumitt, AFL-CIO Solidarity Center Alvaro Forero, Forero Associates Mauricio Garcia, CINEP Sergio Jaramillo Caro, Ideas forPeaceFoundation Jorge Alberto JulianLondono de la Cuesta, Gallup Colombia/Invamer Ltda. Rodrigo Saiz Silva, AKIRIS de Colombia Enrique Santos, Director of El Tiempo newspaper and a member of the family that owns the paper. Miguel Silva, Gravitas Ltda. Leon Valencia, New Rainbow Foundation -------------- Summary -------------- ¶3. (C) U/S Burns reiterated U.S. support for Plan Colombia Consolidation with key opinion makers, but said some in the U.S. Congress and human rights NGOs advocated stronger punishment for demobilized paramilitaries. Colombian attendees differed on top priorities: some said Colombia's greatest challenge was bringing ex-paramilitaries to justice; others insisted Colombians' highest priorities were citizen security and economic growth. The opinion makers voiced concern that the GOC would divert new tax revenues from programs required to consolidate recent security gains toward matching Venezuela's on-going arms-build-up. WHA A/S Shannon said it would be a mistake for Colombia to play into Chavez's hands. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Continued Support for Plan Colombia and U.S. Concerns -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) In a lunch with Colombian opinion makers, U/S Burns said the U.S. was looking to extend Plan Colombia, support the Justice and Peace Law, and cooperate on defense. The GOC needed to improve its human rights record, with a focus on investigating and punishing security personnel involved in human rights abuses. U/S Burns noted some in the U.S. Congress and human rights groups were critical of the GOC's peace process with recently demobilized paramilitary groups, saying the GOC was too light on justice compared with experiences in Bosnia, Rwanda and elsewhere. U.S. human rights groups told him ex-combatants would not be punished for their crimes and complained conditions of confinement for ex-paramilitaries were too luxurious. -------------- Colombians Differ on Justice -------------- ¶5. (C) Sergio Jaramillo (soon to be Vice Minister of Defense) said there was room for improvement with the Justice and Peace Law but stressed that the paramilitary process had sharply reduced the number of atrocities. Many Colombians were alive today thanks to the process. Jesuit priest Mauricio Garcia voiced concern that many paramilitaries had not, in fact, demobilized in much of the country and were continuingnarcotrafficking activities. He said the GOC needed to focus not only on strengthening the military but on improving living conditions and creating economic opportunities for the country's poor majority if lasting peace was to be achieved. ¶6. (C) Pollster Jorge Londono said justice ranked well below security and economic growth as key citizen priorities in public opinion polls. He said that in 1999 60% of Colombians thought the FARC would defeat the GOC, a figure which had dropped to 20%. Confidence in all government institutions BOGOTA 00010114 002 OF 002 was on the rise, with the exception of the justice system. He said 70% of Colombians feel safer today than a year ago, and 80% support the Justice and Peace Law. Most Colombians polled consistently say they give more importance to achieving lasting peace than to bringing terrorists to justice. Consultant Miguel Silva cautioned, however, that achieving a durable peace would be impossible withouQending impunity for human rights abusers. -------------- State Security and Colombia's Regional Role -------------- ¶7. (C) El Tiempo editor-in-chief Enrique Santos said it was important for the GOC to link the fight against narcotrafficking to overall state security. The GOC had been able to defeat the Medellin and Cali cartels only after the Colombian people had understood that the violence generated bynarcotraffickers threatened them all. Many Colombians remembered the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by Pablo Escobar, and feared the FARC might do the same. A/S Shannon said the U.S. was committed to helping Colombia win its fight againstnarco-terrorism. -------------- Venezuela Arms Buildup -------------- ¶8. (C) Santos supported a GOC proposal to boost wealth taxes but voiced concern that the GOC would use the increased revenues to fund an arms race with Venezuela instead of programs to consolidate recent internal security gains. Shannon said it would be a strategic mistake for the GOC to engage in a regional arms race. He added it would play into Venezuela's hands and result in less money for important security, economic, and social programs in Colombia. Shannon concluded it was important for the GOC to focus on the real issues facing Colombia (security and economic growth); Venezuela's arms build-up required a regional diplomatic response, not a military approach. ¶9. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Burns. DRUCKER