U/S BURNS OCTOBER 25 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 010113 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER CO SUBJECT: U/S BURNS OCTOBER 25 MEETING WITH DEFENSE MINISTER SANTOS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Milton K. Drucker Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) October 25, 2006, 10:30-12:00 a.m., Ministry of Foreign Affairs ¶2. (U) Participants: U.S. U/S Burns A/S for WHA Thomas P. Shannon PM PDAS Stephen Mull Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mary Lee Warren Daniel Tomlinson, NSC Patricia Prugh, Attorney Advisor - L Ambassador William B. Wood Political Counselor John Creamer Political Officer Cassandra Carraway (notetaker) COLOMBIA Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, Foreign Minister Maria Consuelo Araujo Ambassador Carolina Barco Vice Defense Minister Juan Carlos Pinzon Vice Defense Minister Hernan Sanin Vice Admiral Guillermo Barrera, Colombian Navy Commander General Jorge Ballesteros, Colombian Airforce Commander Colombian National Police officials Andres Davila, National Planning Department -------------- Summary -------------- ¶3. (C) Defense Minister Santos briefed U/S Burns on the GOC's review of its Democratic Security policy and bilateral cooperation. He stressed Colombia's desire to be a U.S. strategic security partner, and he underscored his commitment to improving the GOC's human rights record. Santos said Colombia aimed to be poppy-free by year end, and he offered continued GOC counterdrug guidance to Afghanistan and other U.S. allies. On Plan Colombia, he advocated a closer coupling of the war on drugs with the war on terror. He also suggested the need to develop more flexible indicators to measure counternarcotics progress than hectares sprayed. Burns assured Santos of U.S. support for Plan Colombia follow-on. End Summary. -------------- Strategic Partnership -------------- ¶4. (C) Santos stressed Colombia's desire to be the U.S. strategic partner in the hemisphere. The GOC is interested in concluding a formal defense cooperation agreement with the U.S., but would prefer that such an accord not require congressional ratification. The GOC would be glad to consider providing the U.S. access to an air base should Ecuador terminate U.S. access at Manta, but Santos warned about "politicizing" such an arrangement. Burns assured that the U.S. would respect GOC sensitivities and would develop a framework to meet both countries' needs. Burns said the U.S. wanted a "symbiotic" relationship, including joint exercises, training, and war college exchanges, as well as a possible shared air facility or "cooperative security location" (CSL). Burns suggested it would be useful for Santos and Foreign Minister Araujo to visit Washington to follow-up on a security cooperation accord. They agreed to do so. -------------- Review of Security and Cooperation -------------- ¶5. (C) The Minister reviewed Colombia's advance of the last four years on security, social/economic development, and the war against narco-terrorism. He highlighted the reduced capacity of terrorist groups to launch offensive attacks, expanded COLMIL control of territory, and a sharp fall in the number of terrorist due to demobilization and attrition. Santos explained the Colombian military's goal was to defeat the FARC or to weaken it to such an extent that it accepted negotiations on the GOC's terms. Although weakened and hungry, the FARC was still alive and able to adapt. He said the military was close to achieving its goal," but was not there yet." ¶6. (C) Looking ahead, Santos said the GOC was updating its Democratic Security policy and was working with the U.S. to define the next phase of Plan Colombia. Key areas under review were: a possible "reengineering" of the fight against drugs, possible nationalization of Plan Colombia components, financing of military expenditure through a new "wealth tax," and boosting investment in social programs to expand state presence. He said the GOC also needed additional U.S. assistance, including precision guided munitions and improved radar. Responding to Santos' matrix of 25 strategic priorities, Burns praised the "soup-to-nuts" review and likened its transformational goals to those of the U.S. Secretary of Defense and NATO. SIPDIS -------------- Counter-Heroin Goal; Support to Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (C) On the counternarcotics front, Minister Santos said results were positive. He cited two Colombian Navy operations last week that netted 17 tons of coca as an illustration of the progress on interdiction but also the scale of the problem. With respect to heroin, Santos announced a GOC goal to clear Colombia of poppy fields by Christmas. Ambassador Wood explained how midyear increases in U.S. coca spray targets had been predicated on the GOC's taking over the heroin fight; with its goal to be poppy-free by year-end the GOC had more than met its commitment. ¶8. (C) Foreign Minister Araujo raised Colombian counterdrug support to Afghanistan. Santos affirmed GOC willingness to help Central American and Caribbean countries in the same way. Burns concurred, saying he had advised the Afghans to see Colombia as a tutor. Ambassador Wood said the Afghan team was brought to Colombia to study the entire menu of Colombian counterdrug measures (intelligence, legislation, law enforcement, customs and border patrol, spraying, eradication, seizures, and extradition). Santos suggested this comprehensive experience was something the GOC could export. -------------- "Flexibility" in Fighting Drugs and Terror -------------- ¶9. (C) Santos advocated a "comprehensive" counternarcotics approach more closely coupled with counterterrorism. With a slide equating "Terrorism = FARC = Drug Trafficking," he said maps of drug trade and terrorist activity closely overlapped. Hence, GOC strategy should concentrate not just on spraying coca fields but also on breaking the illegal groups which protect them. Arguing for greater flexibility in methods and measures, Santos said that "focusing solely on hectares sprayed as a measure of success could be self-defeating." The GOC believed existing resources could be applied more effectively. Ambassador Wood said there was a great deal of uncertainty about coca botany and spray strategies; both merited further study and discussion. -------------- Human Rights Progress -------------- ¶10. (C) Santos stressed the armed forces' human rights programs and military justice reform. He explained that recent initiatives were not just procedural but also fundamental cultural changes. As a result, while military personnel numbers grew 35 percent and operations volume had nearly tripled over the last four years, the number of abuse claims had fallen by 50 percent. Santos acknowledged that further reforms were needed, not only to regain the credibility of military justice but also to reverse the "snowballing" burden of cases taken to international courts. He said it was his dream that when he left the ministry in two or three years, human rights would no longer be an issue within the Armed Forces. Santos rejected GOC responsibility for deaths of union leaders and journalists, attributing those to illegal groups, and reviewed GOC protection programs union leaders, journalist, and human rights activists. -------------- Burns: Constructive Criticism -------------- ¶11. (C) Responding to the Minister's briefing, Burns spoke of the close U.S.-GOC friendship, mutual interest in strategic partnership, and continuing bipartisan U.S. support for Colombia. In that context, he indicated two problem areas for Colombia to address: - alleged human rights abuses: Burns urged that cases be investigated and prosecuted, with the guilty incarcerated, so that the Colombian military could better defend itself against its detractors. - Justice and Peace Law: Burns acknowledged the law was controversial, but reiterated U.S. support. He said demobilization of 43,000 persons was historic, but contradictions in its implementation left the GOC open to criticism. It was key that the GOC implement the law in a transparent, effective manner. -------------- U.S. Support Commitments -------------- ¶12. (C) With respect to the ongoing Plan Colombia review, Burns said the administration would recommend to Congress continued funding at current levels over the next two years. To ensure continued assistance beyond that period, the U.S. and GOC needed to produce a Plan Colombia Consolidation document that outlined our joint goals, strategies and resource commitment in the years ahead. Burns said the immediate priority was for the U.S. and GOC to agree on strategies and budget numbers for the next 5-6 years to present to the U.S. Congress in January. In this regard, he said, Santos' presentation would help make Colombia's case. Burns recognized the Colombian military's aircraft needs, and he offered to try to accelerate delivery of precision guided munitions (PGMs). -------------- U.S. Hostages -------------- ¶13. (C) After reminding the Minister of the high priority the USG placed on the freedom of the three U.S. hostages held by the FARC, Burns thanked the Minister for Colombia's efforts to liberate them. ¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by U/S Burns. DRUCKER