COUP OR DEMONSTRATION? OPPOSITION MAKING BIG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000496

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM KG
SUBJECT: COUP OR DEMONSTRATION? OPPOSITION MAKING BIG
PLANS FOR APRIL 29

REF: BISHKEK 01379

Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) On April 12, President of the local NGO Coalition
for Democracy and Civil Society Edil Baisalov detailed to
PolOff plans for a major demonstration in Bishkek on April

29. According to Baisalov, at an April 12 meeting of the
demonstration's main organizers, opposition parliamentarians
revealed plans to use the demonstration to force President
Bakiyev to either enter into dialogue with the opposition or
else resign from office. According to Baisalov, opposition
leaders have already decided who will fill the positions of
President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, should
Bakiyev be forced from office. Baisalov said that
influential parliamentarian Kubatbek Baibolov stressed that
"no buildings will be stormed or taken over." Baisalov's
account closely dovetails with a version given to PolOff on
April 7 by International Republican Institute (IRI) Country
Director Jeff Lilley (strictly protect) following his meeting
with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission on April

7. In a chance April 13 meeting with the Ambassador,
parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov also confirmed the plans for
April 29, but suggested that the demonstrators would be
prepared to try to forcibly seize the President's office.
END SUMMARY.

THE BEGINNINGS OF A PLOT
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2. (C) On April 7, IRI Country Director Jeff Lilley
(strictly protect) told PolOff that he had been summoned to
the office of CEC Chairman Turgunaly Abdraimov for an "urgent
meeting." During the meeting Abdraimov told Lilley that he
and others "were fed up with Bakiyev." He alleged that
Bakiyev's son Maksim had used Ryspek Akmatbayev to kill
Bayaman Erkinbayev (reftel b) and others, and was flying to
Moscow every week with bags of cash, delivered to Maksim from
the local electric monopoly (and thoroughly corrupt)
Severelectro.


3. (C) Abdraimov then detailed to Lilley plans to "confront
Bakiyev at the end of April with a list of demands." The CEC
Chair said that he, Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism
Almaz Atambayev, the Governor of Chui Oblast Turgunbek
Kumurzaev, parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov and others
would demand that Bakiyev cut his ties to organized crime,
fire unspecified people in the government, and move to attack
corruption. According to Lilley, Abdraimov did not directly
say but strongly implied that if Bakiyev did not agree to the
demands, he would be removed from power and replaced by
either Almaz Atambayev or former Speaker of Parliament
Omurbek Tekebayev.

DEMONSTRATION OR COUP D'ETAT?
--------------


4. (SBU) On April 8, the Coalition, joined by numerous other
NGOs and political parties, staged a peaceful march and rally
in Bishkek in support of law and order and constitutional
reform. At a peaceful April 8 procession and rally in
Bishkek, Baisalov told the crowd that the demonstrations will
continue until President Bakiyev "fulfills his campaign
promises." Immediately after the April 8 rally, the
Coalition announced plans to organize an even larger
demonstration for April 29. Baisalov's stated goal of the
protest is to pressure President Bakiyev to live up to his
campaign pledges, particularly fighting corruption and
supporting constitutional reform.


5. (C) Baisalov said at the April 12 meeting to plan for
April 29, a group of deputies from Bishkek and surrounding
suburbs vowed to bus at least 10,000 supporters to Bishkek's
central square on April 29. There the demonstrators would
erect yurts and stay on the square until President Bakiyev

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agrees to enter a dialogue with opposition leaders.
Demonstrators will demand that Bakiyev fire unspecified
officials and move forward on reforms.


6. (C) Baisalov said that only after he pressed the
parliamentarians at the meeting for more information, did
they reveal that it had been decided that should Bakiyev
resign or be forced from office, former Speaker of Parliament
Omurbek Tekebayev would be installed as President, Almaz
Atambayev as Prime Minister, and Kubatbek Baibolov as Speaker
of Parliament. Prime Minister Kulov appears to be out of the
picture. Baisalov said that the opposition members present
at the meeting seemed to have decided that, should Bakiyev be
toppled, the next president should be a southerner as well.
Baisalov said that a number of influential deputies from the
south, including Doronbek Satybaldiev and Ishkak Masaliyev
were also present. Baisalov said that the plans for April 29
were by no means a secret, and that plans were openly
discussed in front of everyone else in the room.


7. (C) Baisalov cautioned that he himself does not support
any plans to remove Bakiyev from power. Baisalov said he
doesn't object to Bakiyev as president, and simply wants
Bakiyev to follow through on his own campaign promises to
root out corruption and pursue real constitutional reform.

INFLUENTIAL PARLIAMENTARIAN CONFIRMS PLANS
--------------


8. (C) During a chance meeting on April 13 while visiting
injured civil society leader Edil Baisalov in the hospital
(septel),parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov confirmed to
Ambassador all of the details for the April 29 demonstration.
Accompanied by three very large, gun-toting bodyguards,
Eshimkanov said that he had even discussed the plans with
Deputy Head of the SNB (and brother of President Bakiyev)
Janyshbek Bakiyev. Eshimkanov claimed he told Bakiyev that
if their demands are not met "protestors will remain on the
square and might even storm the White House." According to
Eshimkanov, Janyshbek Bakiyev laughed at this, at which
Eshimkanov replied that he wasn't joking. Eshimkanov said
organizers will have no problem bringing 10,000 demonstrators
onto the square and claimed that President Bakiyev, being in
the "heart of opposition territory," could not control
Bishkek. Eshimkanov said he had already met with senior
people in the Interior and Defense ministries, and that they
would refuse to open fire on demonstrators.

COMMENT: DEJA COUP ALL OVER AGAIN?
--------------


9. (C) The planning for April 29 is eerily reminiscent of
opposition plans to "peacefully occupy" Bishkek's central
square on March 24, 2005. In the days leading up to March
24, two opposition figures appealed to PolOff for money to
feed and house demonstrators. In the event, the "peaceful
occupation" turned into the overthrow of President Akayev
when demonstrators seized the Kyrgyz White House. But this
time, there is a major difference ) in 2005, no one among
the opposition anticipated or planned to overthrow President
Akayev. This time, it seems that some in the opposition are
already measuring for drapes in the White House, a full two
weeks before the date of the demonstration.


10. (C) It is clear that opposition figures are making no
secret of their plans. They openly discuss them in large

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meetings, with foreigners, and even with President Bakiyev's
family. What is not clear, however, is how much support
these opposition figures really have and how many people they
can put on the streets. Although the chief organizers of the
April 29 demonstration are wealthy and powerful, with bases
of support in and around Bishkek, they have in the past
overestimated the numbers of people they can bring out onto
the streets. Nevertheless, Almaz Atambayev brought thousands
of anti-Akayev demonstrators onto the central square on March

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24, 2005, and they played a key role in beating back the
stick-wielding goons the Akayev government had bussed in to
defend the White House.


11. (C) Also unclear is what will be the reaction of the
government. While Bakiyev has made clear that he will use
force to defend the White House, it is an open question
whether the security forces, particularly the MVD and Defense
Ministry, will support Bakiyev and use force to disperse or
crush a large demonstration. It is also uncertain which, if
any, business and/or political elites would come to his
defense should the opposition put thousands of people on the
streets. Bakiyev's base of support is the south, a good
ten-hour drive from Bishkek, and he lacks any real popular
support in the north, particularly Bishkek. It is also
possible that, should push come to shove, few in the
government would rally to his defense.


12. (C) What Bakiyev and his increasingly small inner circle
are left with, then, is to compromise with the opposition and
meet some of its demands. It is unknown whether Bakiyev
would be willing to do this, and he has certainly not shown
any flexibility in the past. Melis Eshimkanov predicted that
Bakiyev would fiercely resist any effort to force him to the
table for discussions with the opposition.


13. (C) A more dangerous possibility is that Bakiyev could
turn to organized crime figures, such as Ryspek Akmatbayev,
to do what government forces cannot or will not do.
President Akayev did just this on several occasions, using
mob-provided thugs to pummel opposition demonstrators on
March 23 and 24, 2005. However, in that confrontation the
Akmatbayev and Bayaman Erkinbayev thugs who were supporting
Bakiyev won the day.
YOVANOVITCH