COUP OR DEMONSTRATION? OPPOSITION MAKING BIG

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 000496 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KCRM PHUM KG SUBJECT: COUP OR DEMONSTRATION? OPPOSITION MAKING BIG PLANS FOR APRIL 29 REF: BISHKEK 01379 Classified By: Ambassador Marie L. Yovanovitch, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) On April 12, President of the local NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society Edil Baisalov detailed to PolOff plans for a major demonstration in Bishkek on April ¶29. According to Baisalov, at an April 12 meeting of the demonstration's main organizers, opposition parliamentarians revealed plans to use the demonstration to force President Bakiyev to either enter into dialogue with the opposition or else resign from office. According to Baisalov, opposition leaders have already decided who will fill the positions of President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament, should Bakiyev be forced from office. Baisalov said that influential parliamentarian Kubatbek Baibolov stressed that "no buildings will be stormed or taken over." Baisalov's account closely dovetails with a version given to PolOff on April 7 by International Republican Institute (IRI) Country Director Jeff Lilley (strictly protect) following his meeting with the Chairman of the Central Election Commission on April ¶7. In a chance April 13 meeting with the Ambassador, parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov also confirmed the plans for April 29, but suggested that the demonstrators would be prepared to try to forcibly seize the President's office. END SUMMARY. THE BEGINNINGS OF A PLOT -------------- ¶2. (C) On April 7, IRI Country Director Jeff Lilley (strictly protect) told PolOff that he had been summoned to the office of CEC Chairman Turgunaly Abdraimov for an "urgent meeting." During the meeting Abdraimov told Lilley that he and others "were fed up with Bakiyev." He alleged that Bakiyev's son Maksim had used Ryspek Akmatbayev to kill Bayaman Erkinbayev (reftel b) and others, and was flying to Moscow every week with bags of cash, delivered to Maksim from the local electric monopoly (and thoroughly corrupt) Severelectro. ¶3. (C) Abdraimov then detailed to Lilley plans to "confront Bakiyev at the end of April with a list of demands." The CEC Chair said that he, Minister of Trade, Industry and Tourism Almaz Atambayev, the Governor of Chui Oblast Turgunbek Kumurzaev, parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov and others would demand that Bakiyev cut his ties to organized crime, fire unspecified people in the government, and move to attack corruption. According to Lilley, Abdraimov did not directly say but strongly implied that if Bakiyev did not agree to the demands, he would be removed from power and replaced by either Almaz Atambayev or former Speaker of Parliament Omurbek Tekebayev. DEMONSTRATION OR COUP D'ETAT? -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On April 8, the Coalition, joined by numerous other NGOs and political parties, staged a peaceful march and rally in Bishkek in support of law and order and constitutional reform. At a peaceful April 8 procession and rally in Bishkek, Baisalov told the crowd that the demonstrations will continue until President Bakiyev "fulfills his campaign promises." Immediately after the April 8 rally, the Coalition announced plans to organize an even larger demonstration for April 29. Baisalov's stated goal of the protest is to pressure President Bakiyev to live up to his campaign pledges, particularly fighting corruption and supporting constitutional reform. ¶5. (C) Baisalov said at the April 12 meeting to plan for April 29, a group of deputies from Bishkek and surrounding suburbs vowed to bus at least 10,000 supporters to Bishkek's central square on April 29. There the demonstrators would erect yurts and stay on the square until President Bakiyev BISHKEK 00000496 002 OF 003 agrees to enter a dialogue with opposition leaders. Demonstrators will demand that Bakiyev fire unspecified officials and move forward on reforms. ¶6. (C) Baisalov said that only after he pressed the parliamentarians at the meeting for more information, did they reveal that it had been decided that should Bakiyev resign or be forced from office, former Speaker of Parliament Omurbek Tekebayev would be installed as President, Almaz Atambayev as Prime Minister, and Kubatbek Baibolov as Speaker of Parliament. Prime Minister Kulov appears to be out of the picture. Baisalov said that the opposition members present at the meeting seemed to have decided that, should Bakiyev be toppled, the next president should be a southerner as well. Baisalov said that a number of influential deputies from the south, including Doronbek Satybaldiev and Ishkak Masaliyev were also present. Baisalov said that the plans for April 29 were by no means a secret, and that plans were openly discussed in front of everyone else in the room. ¶7. (C) Baisalov cautioned that he himself does not support any plans to remove Bakiyev from power. Baisalov said he doesn't object to Bakiyev as president, and simply wants Bakiyev to follow through on his own campaign promises to root out corruption and pursue real constitutional reform. INFLUENTIAL PARLIAMENTARIAN CONFIRMS PLANS -------------- ¶8. (C) During a chance meeting on April 13 while visiting injured civil society leader Edil Baisalov in the hospital (septel),parliamentarian Melis Eshimkanov confirmed to Ambassador all of the details for the April 29 demonstration. Accompanied by three very large, gun-toting bodyguards, Eshimkanov said that he had even discussed the plans with Deputy Head of the SNB (and brother of President Bakiyev) Janyshbek Bakiyev. Eshimkanov claimed he told Bakiyev that if their demands are not met "protestors will remain on the square and might even storm the White House." According to Eshimkanov, Janyshbek Bakiyev laughed at this, at which Eshimkanov replied that he wasn't joking. Eshimkanov said organizers will have no problem bringing 10,000 demonstrators onto the square and claimed that President Bakiyev, being in the "heart of opposition territory," could not control Bishkek. Eshimkanov said he had already met with senior people in the Interior and Defense ministries, and that they would refuse to open fire on demonstrators. COMMENT: DEJA COUP ALL OVER AGAIN? -------------- ¶9. (C) The planning for April 29 is eerily reminiscent of opposition plans to "peacefully occupy" Bishkek's central square on March 24, 2005. In the days leading up to March 24, two opposition figures appealed to PolOff for money to feed and house demonstrators. In the event, the "peaceful occupation" turned into the overthrow of President Akayev when demonstrators seized the Kyrgyz White House. But this time, there is a major difference ) in 2005, no one among the opposition anticipated or planned to overthrow President Akayev. This time, it seems that some in the opposition are already measuring for drapes in the White House, a full two weeks before the date of the demonstration. ¶10. (C) It is clear that opposition figures are making no secret of their plans. They openly discuss them in large SIPDIS meetings, with foreigners, and even with President Bakiyev's family. What is not clear, however, is how much support these opposition figures really have and how many people they can put on the streets. Although the chief organizers of the April 29 demonstration are wealthy and powerful, with bases of support in and around Bishkek, they have in the past overestimated the numbers of people they can bring out onto the streets. Nevertheless, Almaz Atambayev brought thousands of anti-Akayev demonstrators onto the central square on March BISHKEK 00000496 003 OF 003 24, 2005, and they played a key role in beating back the stick-wielding goons the Akayev government had bussed in to defend the White House. ¶11. (C) Also unclear is what will be the reaction of the government. While Bakiyev has made clear that he will use force to defend the White House, it is an open question whether the security forces, particularly the MVD and Defense Ministry, will support Bakiyev and use force to disperse or crush a large demonstration. It is also uncertain which, if any, business and/or political elites would come to his defense should the opposition put thousands of people on the streets. Bakiyev's base of support is the south, a good ten-hour drive from Bishkek, and he lacks any real popular support in the north, particularly Bishkek. It is also possible that, should push come to shove, few in the government would rally to his defense. ¶12. (C) What Bakiyev and his increasingly small inner circle are left with, then, is to compromise with the opposition and meet some of its demands. It is unknown whether Bakiyev would be willing to do this, and he has certainly not shown any flexibility in the past. Melis Eshimkanov predicted that Bakiyev would fiercely resist any effort to force him to the table for discussions with the opposition. ¶13. (C) A more dangerous possibility is that Bakiyev could turn to organized crime figures, such as Ryspek Akmatbayev, to do what government forces cannot or will not do. President Akayev did just this on several occasions, using mob-provided thugs to pummel opposition demonstrators on March 23 and 24, 2005. However, in that confrontation the Akmatbayev and Bayaman Erkinbayev thugs who were supporting Bakiyev won the day. YOVANOVITCH