Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1723
2006-12-06 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:  

ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF

Tags:  ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG 
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VZCZCXRO7918
OO RUEHDBU
DE RUEHEK #1723/01 3401503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061503Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8659
INFO RUEHAH/AMEMBASSY ASHGABAT IMMEDIATE 4249
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 1651
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 1403
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0285
RUEHNT/AMEMBASSY TASHKENT IMMEDIATE 0866
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001723 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF
OPERATIONS AT USAID OFFICE IN OSH, KYRGYZSTAN

REF: BISHKEK 1621

Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BISHKEK 001723 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016 TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST RECOMMENDING RESUMPTION OF OPERATIONS AT USAID OFFICE IN OSH, KYRGYZSTAN REF: BISHKEK 1621 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) This cable contains an Action Request; see para 8 below. ¶2. (C) On November 16, 2006, the USAID office in Osh, Kyrgyz Republic temporarily suspended operations due to a perceived security threat. The perceived threat centered around the recovery of a stolen diplomatic vehicle that reappeared in Osh. The vehicle was stolen in Bishkek from the spouse of the USAID country director, but was found a few days later in the parking lot of the USAID office in Osh (Reftel). Due to an increased local police (MVD) presence in and around the USAID office in Osh, the USAID city director decided to suspend temporarily operations and close the Osh office. In addition, the USAID city director was scheduled to depart post for R&R travel and would not return until December 9. Coupled with the Thanksgiving holiday, and the hope that the investigation into the case would yield further information regarding the vehicle's ppearance in Osh, the decision was made to continue the suspension of operations in Osh through the holiday period. The USAID employees in Osh have indicated that they do not feel threatened and expressed a desire to return to work. ¶3. (C) During the three weeks that USAID operations have been suspended in Osh, the increased MVD presence has ceased with the removal of the stolen diplomatic vehicle to an MVD compound. An FBI evidence collection team has recovered evidence, in cooperation with the MVD, from the vehicle. The MVD is working to locate the individual identified as having driven the stolen vehicle to Osh, but to date the search continues. Initial concerns that a commercial firm that has been located in the same building as the USAID office for the past two years may have been involved in a car smuggling ring have not been substantiated, but the bona fides of the firm remain uncertain. During the intervening three weeks since operations were suspended, no direct or indirect information has been received to suggest that the physical integrity of the office, or the personal safety of its employees is at risk. ¶4. (C) In consultation with DS, CA, USAID, and other represented agencies, Post requests the Department's concurrence to resume operations and reopen the USAID office in Osh. Absent a specific threat to the office in Osh, the consensus of the EAC is that continued suspension of operations is no longer necessary. ¶5. (C) The Emergency Action Committee met on December 6 (septel) and recommends resuming operations at the USAID office in Osh, under the following conditions: ¶A. Ensure that all three (3) local police (MVD) on the USAID floor, at the front entrance, and in the booth of the parking lot are armed (currently, only the MVD guard in the parking lot is armed); ¶B. Encourage and assist the MVD to continue to investigate the appearance of the vehicle in Osh and the circumstances surrounding the theft of the vehicle in Bishkek, including checking the bona fides of the commercial firm located in the USAID building; ¶C. Explore ways to close or restrict parking in the adjacent parking lot; ¶D. Seek DS funding to fund security upgrades, such as enabling record capabilities to existing CCTV; ¶E. Request DS send a Threat Assessment team to Bishkek and Osh. In Osh, the team should examine the building and assess the threat in light of numerous events surrounding this, and previous security cases in Kyrgyzstan. ¶6. (C) Post recommends Item A in para 5 as a pre-condition to resuming operations; RSO believes that we could secure MVD agreement to arm the two guards during the week of December 11-15, at which time we propose proceeding with resumption of operations. This would also allow the USAID city director, who returns from R&R on December 9, to have a few days to assess the situation prior to resumption of operations. ¶7. (C) Post recommends pursuing items B-E concurrently with BISHKEK 00001723 002 OF 002 the resumption of operations. Post will contact MVD re investigating the appearance of the vehicle in Osh and the activities of the commercial firm located in the USAID building, and will contact the landlord regarding closing or restricting parking in the adjacent lot. Post will request additional DS funding, and the DS Threat Assessment Team visit, via septel. ¶8. (C) Action Request: Post requests that th Department approve the resumption of operations of the USAID Osh office under the conditions outlined above. YOVANOVITCH

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