EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001602 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT) SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN DS/IP/SPC DON WEINBERG DS.IP/NEA-SA F SCOTT GALLO ASTANA FOR LEGATT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016 TAGS: ASEC CASC PGOV PINR PREL KG SUBJECT: EAC MEETING RE ABDUCTION OF USAID OFFICER'S SPOUSE BISHKEK 00001602 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Marie L. Yovanovitch for reasons 1.4 (d) & (g) ¶1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Bishkek Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on November 13. Present at the meeting were: AMB, DCM, POL/ECON, POL/RA, MSG, PAS, MGT, DAO, SAO, CONS, USAID, MED, INL, CLO, RLA, USAID, RSO, Peace Corps, U.S. Treasury Representative, and Manas Air Force Base representatives. ¶2. (C) RSO summarized the events of the past two days, describing the abduction of Gulnura Abduldayeva, the spouse of USAID Country Director, Cliff Brown, at gunpoint at approximately 1530 on Saturday, November 11, 2006. It appears that the spouse was specifically targeted because of her relationship with her husband, who is the USAID Country Director. The three Kyrgyz abductors, reportedly in their early 20's, specifically stated that her husband owed their boss $300,000. It appears that they had been surveilling her and when she exited a downtown hair salon and entered her vehicle, they forced their way into her diplomatic licensed vehicle, commandeered it, tied her hands and feet and forced her into the back seat and onto the floor. They drove to Tunguch, a remote location southwest of downtown Bishkek, where they tossed her into a ditch and drove away in her vehicle. A young child came by and was able to unfasten the rope binding her feet, enabling her to walk to a nearby field where workers untied her hands and offered her a cell phone to call her husband. ¶3. (C) The abductors stated that they knew where she lives, naming the address (only partially correct),and her husband's position, and that he owed their boss $300,000. When they approached the area where they deposited her in the ditch, one of the abductors commented that their boss was in the area because they had passed the boss's car. The abductors kept the spouse's keys (vehicle, apartment and commissary warehouse) and purse, which contained her identification, embassy security badge, cell phone, and wallet. ¶4. (C) The husband phoned the RSO at approximately 1700, who alerted the A/RSO and the DCM. The DCM informed the Ambassador. At this point, only preliminary information regarding the incident was available. The RSO accompanied the victim and her husband to the two district police stations whose jurisdiction was involved, to file a claim and answer several hours of police questions. At approximately 2330, the police took the victim back to the field where she was released, and recovered the belt and rope used to bind her. The police released the victim at approximately 0200 on November 12. At RSO's recommendation, the couple spent the evening at the DCM's residence. ¶5. (C) RSO informed the EAC that the incident appeared to be focused exclusively on the USAID couple, and at no point was there any indication of a threat to other Americans in the community. The RSO reported on security measures implemented to protect the USAID couple, including: staying at the DCM's residence; changing the locks on their apartment the morning of November 12 and initiating change of key for the building on November 13. In addition, and until there are further developments in the case, on November 12 RSO, assigned surveillance detection team members to monitor the apartment building; on November 12 the RSO assigned 24-hour Embassy and 24-hour SNB armed MVD guards to the apartment building. On November 13 the RSO coordinated the assignment of an MVD body guard to the USAID Director and his spouse and provided an armored Embassy vehicle for them to travel in at all times. In addition, on the morning of November 12 the Embassy activated the emergency phone tree to notify all Embassy employees of the incident. ¶6. (C) USAID officer Country Director reported that he had held a USAID staff meeting prior to the EAC meeting and in discussing the abduction with his staff, was reminded that approximately three months ago, USAID had made a decision to discontinue a water and energy project in southern Kyrgyzstan near Osh. The former chairman of the board of directors for this project had called and requested a meeting with the USAID Country Director, but he referred the issue back to the local organization responsible for the project. In that phone call the former chairman, Toktaim Umetalieva, was very upset and stated that USAID owed her project $300,000. The USAID Country representative Director agreed to accompany RSO to revisit the local police to share this new information BISHKEK 00001602 002.2 OF 003 later on November 13. ¶7. (C) The EAC discussed the option of sending the USAID Director and spouse out of the country until the perpetrators are apprehended and the matter resolved; the effect their leaving the country might have on resolution of the case; and the location of other NGO implementers involved in the discontinued project that may also be at risk. The EAC concluded there was no information suggesting a threat to the wider American community that would warrant issuing a Warden Message. ¶8. (C) As of the time of the EAC meeting, news of the abduction had not been reported on local news outlets. The Ambassador asked the PA officer to draft an Embassy response, which was shared with Washington, for use in case this news is publicized. The incident has since been briefly reported by a local wire service, citing local police sources. ¶9. (C) Some members of the EAC expressed discomfort with the way and timeliness that decisions were made regarding notification of Embassy personnel, especially the notification of the four other embassy personnel who live in the same apartment building as the USAID couple, since building security was compromised with the loss of the couple's keys. The health unit was not contacted to assist with a medical and psychological evaluation, including referral for additional resources available to victims of such events. The MGT officer suggested including a core EAC committee in the decision-making process, as this would offer a broader base of information to draw from. The Ambassador agreed to consider these suggestions. ¶10. (C) MGT officer reminded the EAC that there have been several threatening incidents between embassy personnel and other inhabitants of the apartment building where the USAID couple live. The Ambassador asked MGT officer to evaluate the overall security of this apartment building and determine whether its should remain in the Embassy housing pool. Later in the day, RSO was informed of possible surveillance of the apartment building. As a result, RSO coordinated placement of two marked MVD vehicles at the building's entrance beginning the afternoon of November 13. The Embassy offered all Embassy employees resident in the building the option of moving to either a local hotel or to a residence in the community. None of the Embassy employees in the apartment building decided to leave the building, but the offer remains open to them. ¶11. (C) It was noted that this attack indicates that diplomatic license plates did not deter the perpetrators, and that we need to put the Kyrgyz government on notice that we take this incident very seriously. EAC members asked if the FBI will be involved in the investigation, and commented that if they were, it would send a very effective message to Kyrgyzstan that these attacks against Embassy personnel are viewed very seriously by the U.S. government. RSO contacted Astana Legatt on November 13 to inform him of the incident involving an "internationally protected person" for consideration of a possible FBI role in the investigation. The Ambassador spoke with MVD Minister Suvanaliev on November 13, who responded positively to all of the Embassy's requests. The Ambassador also spoke with Acting FM Sarbayev, who also pledged full GOK cooperation. ¶12. (C) ARSO recommended that EAC consider whether or not it is safe for the couple to remain at post; additionally, RSO recommended that EAC consider whether the apartment building remains safe for other embassy personnel (four employees and two dependents) housed at that location. The EAC determined that all necessary support will be given to accommodate the couple. ¶13. (C) The Ambassador reminded committee members that Kyrgyzstan is considered a high threat post, which is one of the components making this a hardship differential post. She urged all employees to be alert and cautious, and asked RSO to distribute a reminder to all embassy personnel regarding vehicle safety and security awareness. RSO distributed the security reminder later on November 13. ¶14. (SBU) The RSO, DCM and Ambassador will monitor this situation over the next few days and will convene another EAC Committee meeting later in the week, if deemed necessary. BISHKEK 00001602 003.2 OF 003 YOVANOVITCH