KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BISHKEK 001517 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZSTAN: DAS FEIGENBAUM'S MEETINGS WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS BISHKEK 00001517 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum and Ambassador Yovanovitch met former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and MP Omurbek Tekebayev October 17 to discuss their plans for a mass protest against the government on November 2. Atambayev and Tekebayev, leaders of the "For Reforms" opposition movement, accused President Bakiyev of creating the current crisis by monopolizing power and criminalizing the government. They said they would try to persuade the government to make concessions on reform over the next two weeks, but failing that, the goal of the protest would be to force Bakiyev and his government from office. In a separate meeting on October 18, former Ambassador to the U.S. Roza Otunbayeva characterized November 2 as the "second part" of the country's revolution. Unfortunately, the country got the "wrong leader" in 2005, and it was now necessary to force him to compromise or resign, but Otunbayeva also worried that the protest could exacerbate north-south splits in the country. In both meetings, DAS Feigenbaum urged that any protest action be non-violent, that protest and response be legal and constitutional, and that any reform process must be open, transparent, and accepted by the people. END SUMMARY. Making a Case against Bakiyev -------------- ¶2. (C) DAS Feigenbaum and Ambassador Yovanovitch met October 17 with former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev and former Speaker and current MP Omurbek Tekebayev. Atambayev and Tekebayev are leaders of the opposition "For Reforms" movement, which is organizing a mass anti-government protest on November 2. Tekebayev said the current crisis had brought the country to a historical moment, ready for the "next stage" of its development. The concentration of political power in the hands of President Bakiyev had led to a usurpation of the role of parliament, as well as to abuses by those surrounding the president, resulting in a monopoly of economic power, corruption, and a merger of criminal and government authority. Tekebayev said the key to solving the current crisis was to allow free and equal competition in politics, economics, and the mass media. If the opposition could force the government to make concessions on ;constitutional reform, Tekebayev said, then the country would move to a parliamentary form of government ("more suitable to our current stage of development"),which would prevent any group from having a monopoly on power. ¶3. (C) Asked if the current dispute was over policy differences or simply was an intra-elite struggle for power, Atambayev averred that the November 2 protest was not a struggle for office. Atambayev claimed that Bakiyev earlier had offered him the post of prime minister, but he had not wanted to work for a "government of bandits." Bakiyev's family had embezzled the property stolen by (former President) Akayev's family, rather than returning it to the state, and Bakiyev's brother Janesh was behind the planting of heroin in Tekebayev's luggage in September -- an act which the President continued to cover up, according to Atambayev. Bakiyev's policies were producing a north-south split in the country, as well as heightening ethnic tensions between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Bakiyev had reneged on his promises of reform and was ready "to commit any crime" to stay in power. Tekebayev added that law had lost its meaning under Bakiyev. Atambayev said that merely changing presidents would not be enough; the opposition, therefore, wanted a new constitution that would protect from authoritarian rule. Planning for November 2 -------------- ¶4. (C) Atambayev said that the opposition had decided to go forward with the mass protest on November 2 because no one BISHKEK 00001517 002.2 OF 003 trusted Bakiyev's written or spoken pledges. The protest was a "last chance" for the country that would force Bakiyev either to reform or to resign. If the opposition delayed action until the spring, Atambayev feared that the government would use the time to put the opposition leaders "behind bars, one by one." ¶5. (C) Asked what would happen on November 2, Atambayev acknowledged that there could be bloodshed. He claimed that Bakiyev's son, Maxim, had delivered threats to MPs from the south, and that Janesh Bakiyev had opened an office in Bishkek to direct the MVD and SNB in using force against the rally. Atambayev also predicted, however, that a large number of law enforcement personnel would join the protesters in demanding that the government resign. DAS Feigenbaum registered his concerns that there be no violence at the protest, and that protest and response be conducted legally and constitutionally. ¶6. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked why the opposition expected Bakiyev to resign in the face of a protest, and Atambayev replied that it was clear that Bakiyev would have to reform or resign. Atambayev said he had spoken to the President's Chief of Staff Abdyldayev, and there was still some chance of compromise. Atambayev claimed Bakiyev had said that he would agree to constitutional reform, as long as Kulov were not Prime Minister, and he added that Kulov hoped for reform without Bakiyev as President. But if Bakiyev refused to accede to the opposition's demands, then he would "have" to resign, because he had lost support throughout the country. Atambayev added that Prime Minister Kulov would also have to resign, having "missed his time," unless he took "extraordinary steps" within the week. And Then What? -------------- ¶7. (C) Atambayev said that once Bakiyev and Kulov were driven from power, the parliament would adopt within a few days a new constitution based on the June 2005 draft. DAS Feigenbaum asked whether there was a difference between the current impasse and the March 2005 protests that drove an elected president from office by extra-constitutional means, and Atambayev said that putting Bakiyev in power had been a mistake. Tekebayev said that, unfortunately, they would have to violate the constitution a second time to save the country, but this time they would not make the mistake of waiting to enact reforms. DAS Feigenbaum said that who runs the country and what type of constitution are matters for the Kyrgyz to decide, but we were concerned that any process be lawful, open, transparent, non-violent, and accepted by the Kyrgyz people. Otunbayeva: Nothing Has Changed -------------- ¶8. (C) In an October 18 meeting, former Ambassador to the United States and "For Reforms" supporter Roza Otunbayeva told DAS Feigenbaum and the Ambassador that November 2 would be the "second part" of Kyrgyzstan's revolution. The country got the "wrong leader" in March 2005, and nothing changed. As with Akayev, all of the big industries -- vodka, cigarettes, cell phones -- were in Bakiyev's hands or the hands of his close associates. Bakiyev had no interest in changing the constitution, she said, because he liked "Akayev's mandate." If certain reforms were undertaken -- transferring the SNB, tax, and customs from the President to the government; calling back Bakiyev's brothers from diplomatic service; finishing the Aksy investigation; and properly sending a draft constitution to Parliament -- then there would be no need for the November 2 protest. But there was no sign of compromise from the President, just the offer of jobs to buy off the opposition's leadership. BISHKEK 00001517 003.2 OF 003 ¶9. (C) Asked why she had decided to support "For Reforms," Otunbayeva said she realized that "there was no other way." Otunbayeva accused Bakiyev of completely mismanaging the government, creating tensions in the law enforcement agencies by filling the high jobs with the "southern cadres," and provoking religious fundamentalism by addressing "our believers" with guns. Otunbayeva added that there was a "poor design" of presidential power, as Bakiyev had poor relations with Prime Minister Kulov, State Secretary Madumarov, and Chief of Staff Abdyldayev. In any event, the opposition had to act, because the people blamed them for bringing Bakiyev to power ("It was Beknazarov's fault," she said),and she would use her constitutional right to "go to the street and protest." November 2 would be the "second stage" of the revolution. ¶10. (C) DAS Feigenbaum asked how broad was For Reforms' following, and Otunbayeva replied that movement included few or no ethnic Russians, and she raised concerns that southerners might resent the push to remove Bakiyev -- the first southerner to lead Kyrgyzstan. The Ambassador asked how long For Reforms was prepared to carry on the protest, and Otunbayeva said they were committed to stay, that they had bought tents, flashlights, and other supplies, and that they were working on the scenario for round-the-clock protests. Otunbayeva said that whether the event would be peaceful depended on the government, and there were troubling signs: the head of the state railroad was preparing detention facilities, and pro-government employees from the electric company were being organized. Otunbayeva also worried that some groups might use the protest to settle other scores, such as Chui Oblast residents going against "squatters" from the south. Again, DAS Feigenbaum stressed that any protest be lawful, constitutional, and non-violent. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Atambayev, Tekebayev, and Otunbayeva were very clear as they detailed their criticisms of President Bakiyev and his administration, and as they made the case for urgent reforms. They could not explain as clearly why Bakiyev, having been elected last year, would resign in the face of the opposition's protests, and they had little idea what they would do if he did. The talk of possible violence was disturbing, and we will continue to urge government and opposition interlocutors that both sides act with restraint, and that any protest action be lawful and non-violent. END COMMENT. YOVANOVITCH