KYRGYZ OPPOSITION MOVING AHEAD WITH NOVEMBER 2

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BISHKEK 001506 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL KG SUBJECT: KYRGYZ OPPOSITION MOVING AHEAD WITH NOVEMBER 2 REF: A. BISHKEK 1423 ¶B. BISHKEK 1333 ¶C. BISHKEK 1316 ¶D. BISHKEK 796 ¶E. BISHKEK 626 BISHKEK 00001506 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: DCM Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Kyrgyz opposition, led by the "For Reforms" movement, is moving ahead with plans for a mass rally against the government in Bishkek on November 2. Opposition leaders say that they will protest in front of the Kyrgyz White House for an "indefinite" period, until President Bakiyev either accedes to their demands for reform or resigns. Talks between the President and opposition on October 21 broke down in a dispute over logistics, though opposition leaders tell us there is still a (small) chance for compromise at a second effort to hold a meeting October ¶27. President Bakiyev will also speak in Parliament on October 30 about the current political situation and his proposal for constitutional reform. But a week away from the planned rally, the rhetoric remains sharp, and neither side appears to be backing down. Protest organizers have secured tents and other supplies, and the law enforcement agencies are planning for crowd control. ¶2. (C) In the run-up to similar protests last April (Ref E) and May (Ref D),heated rhetoric and the fear of violence continued right up to the time of the rallies, both of which were brief and ended peacefully. This time, however, organizers claim to be better prepared to continue their protest. We are concerned that events could slip out of control if adequate preparations are not made to assure that the rally -- and the reaction to it -- remain non-violent. Again this time, we are reaching out to all parties -- government, opposition, and law enforcement -- to push for continued dialogue on needed reform, and to deliver a message that any protest should remain lawful and non-violent. We are also coordinating with like-minded embassies in Bishkek to deliver a consistent message ahead of November 2. Post will hold an EAC October 30 to assess the security risks. END SUMMARY. ¶3. (C) A week away from the opposition's planned November 2 protest, we have been meeting with government officials, protest organizers, law enforcement and security officials, and other embassies to assess the situation. We have heard a range of views about what may happen on November 2, and a range of estimates about how many protesters will show up (anywhere from 7000 to 35,000). In meetings with DAS Feigenbaum October 17 and 18, protest organizers Almaz Atambayev and MP Omurbek Tekebayev blamed President Bakiyev for provoking the current crisis by monopolizing power and criminalizing the government, and said they thought the government might use force against the rally (septel). Ministry of Interior officials have said that they were prepared for the rally, but they would not order force against the protesters. Everyone seems to agree that the situation is fluid. Prime Minster Kulov -------------- ¶4. (C) Prime Minister Kulov told the Ambassador October 25 that the current political situation was unpredictable. The Parliament and opposition politicians had been scared into action by the matryoshka scandal (Ref C),which they saw as a "shot across the bow" by the government, but they but they had articulated clear goals. The real question was power. The opposition pushed for constitutional reform; he agreed, and that is why he had submitted a draft constitution for consideration. The opposition also had wanted him to denounce President Bakiyev, and this he would not do. He characterized For Reforms leaders MP Azimbek Beknazarov as BISHKEK 00001506 002.2 OF 004 "dangerous," Almaz Atambayev as a "revolutionary," and MP Melis Eshimkanov as relatively "more sober." Kulov said he told President Bakiyev that the north-south divide was the most serious issue facing the country, but the problem could be fixed through constitutional reform that limited concentration of power. ¶5. (C) Asked whether he thought the demonstration would remain peaceful, Kulov said did not exclude the possibility of a "provocation," but was hopeful that it could be avoided. While the protesters did not need permission to stage their rally, erecting tents and yurts on the main square without permission could create problems. He said he had counseled the President and the Mayor of Bishkek not to organize any counter demonstrations ("anti-meeting"). He said he also warned the opposition that if November 2 led to "anarchy," the government might turn to the CSTO for consultations. Kulov was hopeful that the appearance of Bakiyev and the government at Parliament on October 30 could help defuse the situation. SNB Chairman Sutalinov -------------- ¶6. (C) SNB Chairman Maj. Gen. Murat Sutalinov told the Ambassador October 26 said he was taking the November 2 protest very seriously, and was concerned that there could be trouble. He said that there "definitely" would be no permission granted to erect yurts and tents, and if the protesters did so, that would be reason for the police to move in. He thought that up to 7000 protesters might show up, many of them paid to be there. He also thought that the opposition might not be able to control the masses, and that those coming from outside Bishkek might start looting. He was scathing about the opposition leaders ("brigands and agitators"),and he added that a "cycle of revolution" would not be good for the country. That said, he pledged that his forces would not take "the first mis-step." Deputy Interior Minister Suvanaliyev -------------- ¶7. (C) Deputy Interior Minister Maj. Gen. Omurbek Suvanaliyev spoke frankly and was strongly supportive of the demonstrators, critical of Bakiyev, and expressed high hopes that PM Kulov would emerge as the arbiter of compromise. He told the DCM October 26 that, following the Aksy events of 2002 (in which six civilian protesters were killed, and low-level militia felt they were blamed),the militia would "never" fire on the public. Suvanaliyev claimed there was a consensus "at the highest levels" not to use force against the demonstrators. For example, Suvanaliyev said he personally will order that the militia not be armed. Their job will be to maintain order and, he added, "to protect the protesters." He downplayed the risk of a provocation by third parties, but he was concerned that after three or four days on the square, some protesters might try to storm the White House over the weekend of November 4-5. In that event, he could not guarantee how the presidential security service and National Guard, who will be protecting the White House, might react. He predicted the opposition could easily put 30,000 people on the streets on November 2. MP Melis Eshimkanov -------------- ¶8. (C) Opposition MP and For Reforms leader Melis Eshimkanov told us October 25 that the situation was in deadlock, with the opposition and government speaking different languages. He said that Bakiyev had failed to fulfill his promises on reform, and that he had brought the country to the situation in which it was "without law." The matryoshka scandal (Ref C) had exhausted the patience of the opposition, and Bakiyev had brushed off their efforts at negotiation. Eshimkanov BISHKEK 00001506 003.2 OF 004 estimated that 15,000 -- but maybe as many as 35,000 -- would turn out on November 2. For Reforms had raised money to provide food and shelter, but people would be coming out of principle. Eshimkanov said that rally would be lawful, and they would not storm the White House. While they were prepared to carry on indefinitely, Eshimkanov thought that the situation would resolve itself within 2-3 days, as the opposition had two trump cards. First, Prime Minister Kulov had promised that he would support the November 2 rally if the President did not make serious compromises. Second, Eshimkanov estimated that up to 60 percent of the law enforcement, defense, and security personnel were "fed up" with the present government. Eshimkanov said that For Reforms was discussing security arrangements with law enforcement officials and local business owners, but he worried that some "extremists" might take advantage of the situation to cause trouble. Eshimkanov said that the opposition also planned to rally at the state television studios, demanding airtime to address the nation, and he thought that a clash there was possible. MP Temir Sariyev -------------- ¶9. (C) For Reforms leader MP Temir Sariyev told us October 26 that Bakiyev was not just stalling reforms, he was aggressively putting pressure on those who disagreed with him, including politicians and the media. Sariyev urged the international community to speak out in favor of constitutional reform and media freedom. Sariyev said that Bakiyev's appearance in Parliament on October 30 offered a chance to convince him to undertake reforms, but if it turned out to be just a "monologue," then the rally would go forward. Sariyev predicted that up to 30,000 from different regions, but mainly the north, would turn out on November 2. For Reforms planned to ask for television time to convey their demands to the nation. Sariyev said they were concerned about possible provocations and planned looting, but they were meeting with local business owners and were organizing security patrols to help maintain order during the rally. Sariyev said that contrary to rumors being spread by the government, For Reforms had no plans to seize the White House and it would keep the protest peaceful. MP Alisher Sabirov -------------- ¶10. (C) Independent MP Alisher Sabirov predicted that each For Reforms leader would be able to turn out about 1000 people from his district, for a total crowd of 8-10,000 on November 2. He said the opposition was preparing for a drawn-out rally, as it has collected approximately 1000 sleeping bags and a large number of tents. He thought that people were getting worried about the demonstration (some, according to Sabirov, were arming themselves in case the demonstration got out of hand),but Sabirov was confident that nothing would happen on November 2. Much like the run up to April 29, he believed that both sides would concede to some of each other's "demands," and move on from there. Unlike last spring, Sabirov thought that the preparations for November 2 were disorganized and lack the finances needed to "motivate" people to appear on Ala-too Square. Sabirov said the authorities were doing what they could to ease the situation, such as trying to meet with opposition leaders. Sabirov said that the constant threat of removing the current government from power is destabilizing. He thought that the country should focus more upon the economy and social welfare of the people. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Although the situation remains fluid in the run-up to November 2, it appears likely there will be several thousand BISHKEK 00001506 004.2 OF 004 demonstrators from around the country who will stay through the weekend, hoping to at least force concessions on reform from Bakiyev. The Ministry of Interior is not preparing the police for a violent confrontation; many in the opposition say the police are on their side. While other security organizations more loyal to Bakiyev may be tempted to provoke violence, their options are limited in that they lack sufficient numbers to deal with large crowds. Some demonstrators may also seek a confrontation, and there exists a risk that a small incident could spin out of control and lead to violence. While we judge this risk to be small at this time, this is a country where the politics is anything but predictable. YOVANOVITCH