Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BISHKEK1450
2006-10-13 11:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bishkek
Cable title:
BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM
VZCZCXRO8403 OO RUEHDBU DE RUEHEK #1450/01 2861102 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 131102Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BISHKEK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8308 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1737 RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 1243 RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0319 RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE 2147 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1534 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 001450
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA DAS EVAN FEIGENBAUM
DEPT ALSO FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KPAO KG
SUBJECT: BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423
B. BISHKEK 1333
C. BISHKEK 1316
D. BISHKEK 1196
E. BISHKEK 1195
BISHKEK 00001450 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 001450
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA DAS EVAN FEIGENBAUM
DEPT ALSO FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KPAO KG
SUBJECT: BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423
B. BISHKEK 1333
C. BISHKEK 1316
D. BISHKEK 1196
E. BISHKEK 1195
BISHKEK 00001450 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. SUMMARY: Your visit offers an opportunity to move our
democracy and civil society agenda forward. Following the
downturn in our relations this summer, and building on A/S
Boucher's August visit, the Kyrgyz are now indicating they
may have gone too far, and want to repair relations. Moving
ahead, however, will not be easy. The current domestic
political atmosphere is confrontational, with government
reforms seemingly stalled and the opposition threatening to
take to the streets. And there are tensions in the south,
where the government has been quick to use force against
suspected extremists, and slow to address economic and social
problems. END SUMMARY.
Overview: At a Better Point, but . . .
--------------
2. (C) Embassy Bishkek warmly welcomes your October 17-21
visit to Kyrgyzstan. In early August, we were at a difficult
point in our relationship with Kyrgyzstan. After years of
strong bilateral cooperation, Kyrgyz Government officials
seemed to have developed a suspicion of the United States and
our intentions here. Official news outlets had run stories
critical of the Embassy and USG programs. The MFA had
expelled two Embassy diplomats. And the security services
had detained and harassed Embassy local staff. Much of this
downturn in the relationship was attributable to false
information being generated by the Kyrgyz National Security
Service (SNB) (and, we suspect, being fed to them by the
Russian Federal Security Service),and Kyrgyz officials --
even those who said they wanted a good relationship with the
United States -- were at a loss to explain how to improve
things.
2. (C) The August 10-11 visit to Bishkek by Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher
SIPDIS
helped to change the tone of the relationship and lay out a
path forward. In his meetings with President Bakiyev and
other senior officials (Refs D and E),A/S Boucher urged the
Kyrgyz to demonstrate commitment to a better relationship by
taking the following immediate steps: provide legal
authority for the operation of the Embassy's Surveillance
Detection Team; make clear the GOKG's support for the
American University in Central Asia (AUCA) and reinstate the
license for its law faculty; make a public show of support
for the Coalition Air Base at Manas and for U.S.-Kyrgyz
cooperation in the war on terrorism with a presidential visit
to the Base for the September 11 memorial event; and move
forward quickly with promised democratic reform, including
specifying the process and timetable for adopting a new
constitution.
3. (C) Two months later, we are at a better point in the
bilateral relationship. We have made progress in getting the
Surveillance Detection Team up and running again; the MOU
that would regularize its operation is ready to be signed.
President Bakiyev led a senior Kyrgyz Government delegation
to the Manas Air Base for the September 11 ceremony and
publicly re-affirmed Kyrgyzstan's commitment to the war on
terrorism. AUCA regained the license for its law faculty,
although its long-term status remains uncertain. President
Bakiyev sent three drafts of a new constitution to the
Parliament for hearings, although he has not set a clear
process for adopting a new constitution. There remain
difficult bilateral issues, and the current political and
security environment is uncertain. But there are signs that
BISHKEK 00001450 002.2 OF 005
some in the Kyrgyz leadership realize that they may have gone
too far last summer in straining the relationship and want
now to repair the damage.
4. (C) Your visit can capitalize on this GOKG reassessment,
pushing forward on a number of key issues and setting out
markers for future cooperation. Among the important issues
will be:
Stalled Constitutional Reform
--------------
5. (SBU) The constitutional reform process has stalled, and
there has been no clear process established for consideration
of proposals or adoption of a new constitution. One of
President Bakiyev's 2005 campaign promises was that he would
propose a new constitution, one that limited the authority of
the executive and included better checks and balances between
the branches of government. Since that time, several drafts
have been prepared. A Constitutional Council produced a
draft in June 2005. Various political leaders, including MP
Alisher Sabirov and recently Prime Minister Felix Kulov, have
put forward drafts or suggested amendments. In August 2006,
a constitutional working group, appointed by the President
and headed by opposition MP Azimbek Beknazarov, proposed
three drafts for a presidential, parliamentary, and mixed
form of government.
6. (C) The three August 2006 drafts were reviewed in
September by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, and
while it found important improvements with respect to human
rights and the independence of the judiciary, it concluded
that none of the three was satisfactory in terms of balance
and separation of powers. President Bakiyev nevertheless has
sent the three drafts to Parliament for consideration, and
Parliament is scheduled to hold hearings beginning in early
November. Many in the political opposition, however, believe
that sending the current unsatisfactory drafts to Parliament
was a stalling tactic, and they have demanded that the
President send the June 2005 draft to Parliament. Parliament
lacks the authority to change drafts submitted by the
President, and Bakiyev, they say, does not want to go forward
with any reform process that could end up weakening his
authority.
The Opposition's Planned Protest
--------------
7. (C) After a relatively quiet summer, the political
opposition seems re-energized. Spurred on by recent events
-- the scandal surrounding the planting of drugs on former
Speaker and opposition MP Omurbek Tekebayev (Ref C); security
crackdowns against alleged extremists in the south; and
attacks on the press, including the physical attack on
independent Piramida TV -- the opposition, led by the "For
Reforms" movement, is planning to take to the streets in a
mass demonstration on November 2. They believe that the
Bakiyev administration has had enough time to address the
various demands put forward at rallies last spring, at the
September 17 Kurultai (Ref B),and most recently in a
resolution in Parliament, and they say they will demand that
the tandem of President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov
resign if the government does not implement real reforms by
the end of October.
8. (C) Leaders of the opposition group "For Reforms,"
including former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev, have told us
that they plan to negotiate with the government over the next
month, but it is not clear that they have a strategy --
beyond mass demonstration -- that would force out Bakiyev and
Kulov. Many in the opposition sincerely believe that the
current administration is repeating the excesses of the
Akayev regime and that a change in leadership is warranted,
BISHKEK 00001450 003.2 OF 005
but are more cautious about the idea of yet another
"revolution."
AUCA: A Short-term Solution
--------------
9. (SBU) The American University in Central Asia (AUCA) is a
private institution in Bishkek that prides itself on its
American-style curriculum, academic integrity, and quality of
education. Many courses are taught in English by Western
academics, and the student body is drawn from throughout
Central Asia. For Kyrgyzstan, this university is a great
experiment. As a liberal arts institution, it is not
designed to fit into the traditional Kyrgyz education model.
10. (SBU) After its founding in 1998, AUCA benefited from
political support from former President Akayev and his
family. However, after the March 2005 events, AUCA has found
itself under increasing pressure. In April 2006, the
Ministry of Education declared during a countrywide
re-evaluation of law and medical faculties that AUCA would be
forbidden from enrolling new law students and would have its
law program re-evaluated in a year. Following strong Embassy
support and much negotiating by AUCA, the law faculty was
allowed to enroll its freshman class this fall. However, as
a result of this compromise, all AUCA faculties will be
re-evaluated by the Ministry of Education in April 2007.
AUCA President Hurwitz will be looking to you for promises of
continued U.S. political support to the university. While
the short-term problem has been solved, and students are
studying again, the larger issue of general accreditation for
AUCA can be expected to become extremely contentious in the
beginning of the coming year.
Manas Air Base
--------------
11. (C) In August, we were concerned that, despite the
successful conclusion of a new agreement for the Coalition
Air Base at Manas, some in the government were trying to
unravel the agreement or complicate Base operations. Since
that time, President Bakiyev led a Kyrgyz Government
delegation to the September 11 ceremony at the Base, and
there he publicly re-affirmed his government's commitment to
the base and to the war on terrorism. We have also seen
excellent cooperation from the Ministry of Transport and from
the airport authorities in the investigation of the causes of
the collision of a U.S. fuel tanker with a Kyrgyz airliner.
While negotiations last summer were often difficult, we
believe that the agreement reached was fair to both sides,
and the first payment under the new agreement of USD 4.35
million will be made October 18 -- a move which will please
the Kyrgyz. The October 11 Federal Register Notice that the
U.S. is allocating USD 2.05 million for helicopters for
Kyrgyzstan received wide coverage. While opposition to the
Base has not disappeared, we believe that the Base is now on
sounder footing with the government.
MCA Threshold: Eagerly Anticipated
--------------
12. (C) Kyrgyz officials, from President Bakiyev on down, are
anxious for approval of Kyrgyzstan's Millennium Challenge
Account Threshold Country Plan. The Kyrgyz proposal's three
components would target the effectiveness of the judicial
system, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, and more
effective criminal prosecutions. While we expect the MCC
Board to consider Kyrgyzstan's Plan in November, we remain
concerned about the government's commitment to make needed
reforms. Kyrgyzstan can help generate a positive Board
decision by taking concrete steps to demonstrate the will to
fight corruption and improve the rule of law.
BISHKEK 00001450 004.2 OF 005
The South: Potential Hot Spot
--------------
13. (C) Kyrgyz Government officials and other observers are
concerned about the situation in the south. Widespread
poverty, ethnic rivalries, religious extremism, drug
trafficking, armed incursions last spring, and a heavy-handed
crackdown by the security services against perceived
extremists have all contributed to tensions in the region.
Government officials in the south say that the situation is
under control at present, but they believe that resolving the
region's many tensions will depend on continued economic
development. To date, the government has been quick to use
force against suspected extremists, but has not put forward
any long-term strategy to address social and economic issues.
HIPC: Unpopular and Misunderstood
--------------
14. (C) Participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (HIPC) would, in our assessment, result in a
significant reduction of Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt burden,
lowering average annual debt service payments by USD 20
million according to the World Bank. Despite these obvious
benefits, many oppose participation, with the critics saying
that they do not want Kyrgyzstan to be seen as an "African
country," unable to pay its debts. Foreign Minister
Jekshenkulov continues publicly to oppose Kyrgyzstan's
participation in the initiative, and the For Reforms movement
came out strongly against HIPC at an October 12 forum.
However, President Bakiyev has said that he would support
Kyrgyzstan joining HIPC, as long as the terms were
acceptable. We understand that Bakiyev does not want to
include energy, hydro, or mining within the conditionalities
of a HIPC agreement, but such an exemption would be a
non-starter for the IMF and World Bank.
Suggested Points to Make
--------------
15. (C) In your meetings with government, political, civil
society representatives, and press in Bishkek and in Osh, you
may wish to draw on the following points:
--We are grateful for President Bakiyev's, and the
government's, renewed commitment to Coalition Air Base at
Manas and to the war on terrorism. The first payment under
the new agreement will be made shortly.
--We urge that all parties work constructively on
constitutional reform. We urge that any new constitution
provide for protection of human rights, the independence of
the judiciary, and a separation and balance of powers between
the president, prime minister, and parliament.
--We urge the government and the political opposition to take
constructive steps to implement needed reforms and
anti-corruption measures. Ultimatums and confrontation are
not helpful to implement real reforms.
--AUCA represents a great experiment that enhances
Kyrgyzstan's reputation in education. As a liberal arts
institution, however, AUCA is not designed to fit into the
traditional Kyrgyz education model. We are concerned by
those who are questioning AUCA, and we would look to the
Kyrgyz Government -- including the Ministry of Education --
to support AUCA's status as a liberal arts university.
--In our view, the HIPC Initiative would bring substantial
benefits to Kyrgyzstan in terms of a reduced debt burden,
allowing for increased spending on anti-poverty measures.
While we are willing to assist in getting Kyrgyzstan into the
program, it is ultimately Kyrgyzstan's decision whether or
BISHKEK 00001450 005.2 OF 005
not to join.
--We are committed to supporting programs to improve the
effectiveness of the judicial system, fighting corruption in
the law enforcement agencies, and making more effective
criminal prosecutions. We expect a decision to be made on
the Threshold Country Plan in early November, but Millennium
Challenge Account financing is tied to the political will to
improve governance. The Kyrgyz Government can help generate
a positive decision by taking steps now to fight corruption
and support rule of law.
--We are concerned by the security situation in the south of
Kyrgyzstan. We have provided substantial support to the
Ministry of Defense, the Border Guards, and the Drug Control
Agency. However, addressing the social and economic needs of
the people is also essential. What initiatives is the
government taking to address these issues?
Conclusion
--------------
16. (C) The Kyrgyz appear to want to improve the bilateral
relationship. With the opposition threatening to take to the
streets, and with the administration often paralyzed by its
own mistakes, it is difficult for the government to move
ahead on reforms in the current climate. Your visit can help
focus the government and opposition on the need to find a way
to move forward, while reassuring those who doubt U.S.
intentions that our interests lie in helping Kyrgyzstan
develop a strong, independent, and stable society.
LITZENBERGER
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR SCA DAS EVAN FEIGENBAUM
DEPT ALSO FOR SCA/CEN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM ECON KPAO KG
SUBJECT: BISHKEK SCENESETTER FOR SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM
REF: A. BISHKEK 1423
B. BISHKEK 1333
C. BISHKEK 1316
D. BISHKEK 1196
E. BISHKEK 1195
BISHKEK 00001450 001.2 OF 005
Classified By: CDA Lee Litzenberger, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. SUMMARY: Your visit offers an opportunity to move our
democracy and civil society agenda forward. Following the
downturn in our relations this summer, and building on A/S
Boucher's August visit, the Kyrgyz are now indicating they
may have gone too far, and want to repair relations. Moving
ahead, however, will not be easy. The current domestic
political atmosphere is confrontational, with government
reforms seemingly stalled and the opposition threatening to
take to the streets. And there are tensions in the south,
where the government has been quick to use force against
suspected extremists, and slow to address economic and social
problems. END SUMMARY.
Overview: At a Better Point, but . . .
--------------
2. (C) Embassy Bishkek warmly welcomes your October 17-21
visit to Kyrgyzstan. In early August, we were at a difficult
point in our relationship with Kyrgyzstan. After years of
strong bilateral cooperation, Kyrgyz Government officials
seemed to have developed a suspicion of the United States and
our intentions here. Official news outlets had run stories
critical of the Embassy and USG programs. The MFA had
expelled two Embassy diplomats. And the security services
had detained and harassed Embassy local staff. Much of this
downturn in the relationship was attributable to false
information being generated by the Kyrgyz National Security
Service (SNB) (and, we suspect, being fed to them by the
Russian Federal Security Service),and Kyrgyz officials --
even those who said they wanted a good relationship with the
United States -- were at a loss to explain how to improve
things.
2. (C) The August 10-11 visit to Bishkek by Assistant
Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher
SIPDIS
helped to change the tone of the relationship and lay out a
path forward. In his meetings with President Bakiyev and
other senior officials (Refs D and E),A/S Boucher urged the
Kyrgyz to demonstrate commitment to a better relationship by
taking the following immediate steps: provide legal
authority for the operation of the Embassy's Surveillance
Detection Team; make clear the GOKG's support for the
American University in Central Asia (AUCA) and reinstate the
license for its law faculty; make a public show of support
for the Coalition Air Base at Manas and for U.S.-Kyrgyz
cooperation in the war on terrorism with a presidential visit
to the Base for the September 11 memorial event; and move
forward quickly with promised democratic reform, including
specifying the process and timetable for adopting a new
constitution.
3. (C) Two months later, we are at a better point in the
bilateral relationship. We have made progress in getting the
Surveillance Detection Team up and running again; the MOU
that would regularize its operation is ready to be signed.
President Bakiyev led a senior Kyrgyz Government delegation
to the Manas Air Base for the September 11 ceremony and
publicly re-affirmed Kyrgyzstan's commitment to the war on
terrorism. AUCA regained the license for its law faculty,
although its long-term status remains uncertain. President
Bakiyev sent three drafts of a new constitution to the
Parliament for hearings, although he has not set a clear
process for adopting a new constitution. There remain
difficult bilateral issues, and the current political and
security environment is uncertain. But there are signs that
BISHKEK 00001450 002.2 OF 005
some in the Kyrgyz leadership realize that they may have gone
too far last summer in straining the relationship and want
now to repair the damage.
4. (C) Your visit can capitalize on this GOKG reassessment,
pushing forward on a number of key issues and setting out
markers for future cooperation. Among the important issues
will be:
Stalled Constitutional Reform
--------------
5. (SBU) The constitutional reform process has stalled, and
there has been no clear process established for consideration
of proposals or adoption of a new constitution. One of
President Bakiyev's 2005 campaign promises was that he would
propose a new constitution, one that limited the authority of
the executive and included better checks and balances between
the branches of government. Since that time, several drafts
have been prepared. A Constitutional Council produced a
draft in June 2005. Various political leaders, including MP
Alisher Sabirov and recently Prime Minister Felix Kulov, have
put forward drafts or suggested amendments. In August 2006,
a constitutional working group, appointed by the President
and headed by opposition MP Azimbek Beknazarov, proposed
three drafts for a presidential, parliamentary, and mixed
form of government.
6. (C) The three August 2006 drafts were reviewed in
September by the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, and
while it found important improvements with respect to human
rights and the independence of the judiciary, it concluded
that none of the three was satisfactory in terms of balance
and separation of powers. President Bakiyev nevertheless has
sent the three drafts to Parliament for consideration, and
Parliament is scheduled to hold hearings beginning in early
November. Many in the political opposition, however, believe
that sending the current unsatisfactory drafts to Parliament
was a stalling tactic, and they have demanded that the
President send the June 2005 draft to Parliament. Parliament
lacks the authority to change drafts submitted by the
President, and Bakiyev, they say, does not want to go forward
with any reform process that could end up weakening his
authority.
The Opposition's Planned Protest
--------------
7. (C) After a relatively quiet summer, the political
opposition seems re-energized. Spurred on by recent events
-- the scandal surrounding the planting of drugs on former
Speaker and opposition MP Omurbek Tekebayev (Ref C); security
crackdowns against alleged extremists in the south; and
attacks on the press, including the physical attack on
independent Piramida TV -- the opposition, led by the "For
Reforms" movement, is planning to take to the streets in a
mass demonstration on November 2. They believe that the
Bakiyev administration has had enough time to address the
various demands put forward at rallies last spring, at the
September 17 Kurultai (Ref B),and most recently in a
resolution in Parliament, and they say they will demand that
the tandem of President Bakiyev and Prime Minister Kulov
resign if the government does not implement real reforms by
the end of October.
8. (C) Leaders of the opposition group "For Reforms,"
including former Trade Minister Almaz Atambayev, have told us
that they plan to negotiate with the government over the next
month, but it is not clear that they have a strategy --
beyond mass demonstration -- that would force out Bakiyev and
Kulov. Many in the opposition sincerely believe that the
current administration is repeating the excesses of the
Akayev regime and that a change in leadership is warranted,
BISHKEK 00001450 003.2 OF 005
but are more cautious about the idea of yet another
"revolution."
AUCA: A Short-term Solution
--------------
9. (SBU) The American University in Central Asia (AUCA) is a
private institution in Bishkek that prides itself on its
American-style curriculum, academic integrity, and quality of
education. Many courses are taught in English by Western
academics, and the student body is drawn from throughout
Central Asia. For Kyrgyzstan, this university is a great
experiment. As a liberal arts institution, it is not
designed to fit into the traditional Kyrgyz education model.
10. (SBU) After its founding in 1998, AUCA benefited from
political support from former President Akayev and his
family. However, after the March 2005 events, AUCA has found
itself under increasing pressure. In April 2006, the
Ministry of Education declared during a countrywide
re-evaluation of law and medical faculties that AUCA would be
forbidden from enrolling new law students and would have its
law program re-evaluated in a year. Following strong Embassy
support and much negotiating by AUCA, the law faculty was
allowed to enroll its freshman class this fall. However, as
a result of this compromise, all AUCA faculties will be
re-evaluated by the Ministry of Education in April 2007.
AUCA President Hurwitz will be looking to you for promises of
continued U.S. political support to the university. While
the short-term problem has been solved, and students are
studying again, the larger issue of general accreditation for
AUCA can be expected to become extremely contentious in the
beginning of the coming year.
Manas Air Base
--------------
11. (C) In August, we were concerned that, despite the
successful conclusion of a new agreement for the Coalition
Air Base at Manas, some in the government were trying to
unravel the agreement or complicate Base operations. Since
that time, President Bakiyev led a Kyrgyz Government
delegation to the September 11 ceremony at the Base, and
there he publicly re-affirmed his government's commitment to
the base and to the war on terrorism. We have also seen
excellent cooperation from the Ministry of Transport and from
the airport authorities in the investigation of the causes of
the collision of a U.S. fuel tanker with a Kyrgyz airliner.
While negotiations last summer were often difficult, we
believe that the agreement reached was fair to both sides,
and the first payment under the new agreement of USD 4.35
million will be made October 18 -- a move which will please
the Kyrgyz. The October 11 Federal Register Notice that the
U.S. is allocating USD 2.05 million for helicopters for
Kyrgyzstan received wide coverage. While opposition to the
Base has not disappeared, we believe that the Base is now on
sounder footing with the government.
MCA Threshold: Eagerly Anticipated
--------------
12. (C) Kyrgyz officials, from President Bakiyev on down, are
anxious for approval of Kyrgyzstan's Millennium Challenge
Account Threshold Country Plan. The Kyrgyz proposal's three
components would target the effectiveness of the judicial
system, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, and more
effective criminal prosecutions. While we expect the MCC
Board to consider Kyrgyzstan's Plan in November, we remain
concerned about the government's commitment to make needed
reforms. Kyrgyzstan can help generate a positive Board
decision by taking concrete steps to demonstrate the will to
fight corruption and improve the rule of law.
BISHKEK 00001450 004.2 OF 005
The South: Potential Hot Spot
--------------
13. (C) Kyrgyz Government officials and other observers are
concerned about the situation in the south. Widespread
poverty, ethnic rivalries, religious extremism, drug
trafficking, armed incursions last spring, and a heavy-handed
crackdown by the security services against perceived
extremists have all contributed to tensions in the region.
Government officials in the south say that the situation is
under control at present, but they believe that resolving the
region's many tensions will depend on continued economic
development. To date, the government has been quick to use
force against suspected extremists, but has not put forward
any long-term strategy to address social and economic issues.
HIPC: Unpopular and Misunderstood
--------------
14. (C) Participation in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
Initiative (HIPC) would, in our assessment, result in a
significant reduction of Kyrgyzstan's foreign debt burden,
lowering average annual debt service payments by USD 20
million according to the World Bank. Despite these obvious
benefits, many oppose participation, with the critics saying
that they do not want Kyrgyzstan to be seen as an "African
country," unable to pay its debts. Foreign Minister
Jekshenkulov continues publicly to oppose Kyrgyzstan's
participation in the initiative, and the For Reforms movement
came out strongly against HIPC at an October 12 forum.
However, President Bakiyev has said that he would support
Kyrgyzstan joining HIPC, as long as the terms were
acceptable. We understand that Bakiyev does not want to
include energy, hydro, or mining within the conditionalities
of a HIPC agreement, but such an exemption would be a
non-starter for the IMF and World Bank.
Suggested Points to Make
--------------
15. (C) In your meetings with government, political, civil
society representatives, and press in Bishkek and in Osh, you
may wish to draw on the following points:
--We are grateful for President Bakiyev's, and the
government's, renewed commitment to Coalition Air Base at
Manas and to the war on terrorism. The first payment under
the new agreement will be made shortly.
--We urge that all parties work constructively on
constitutional reform. We urge that any new constitution
provide for protection of human rights, the independence of
the judiciary, and a separation and balance of powers between
the president, prime minister, and parliament.
--We urge the government and the political opposition to take
constructive steps to implement needed reforms and
anti-corruption measures. Ultimatums and confrontation are
not helpful to implement real reforms.
--AUCA represents a great experiment that enhances
Kyrgyzstan's reputation in education. As a liberal arts
institution, however, AUCA is not designed to fit into the
traditional Kyrgyz education model. We are concerned by
those who are questioning AUCA, and we would look to the
Kyrgyz Government -- including the Ministry of Education --
to support AUCA's status as a liberal arts university.
--In our view, the HIPC Initiative would bring substantial
benefits to Kyrgyzstan in terms of a reduced debt burden,
allowing for increased spending on anti-poverty measures.
While we are willing to assist in getting Kyrgyzstan into the
program, it is ultimately Kyrgyzstan's decision whether or
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not to join.
--We are committed to supporting programs to improve the
effectiveness of the judicial system, fighting corruption in
the law enforcement agencies, and making more effective
criminal prosecutions. We expect a decision to be made on
the Threshold Country Plan in early November, but Millennium
Challenge Account financing is tied to the political will to
improve governance. The Kyrgyz Government can help generate
a positive decision by taking steps now to fight corruption
and support rule of law.
--We are concerned by the security situation in the south of
Kyrgyzstan. We have provided substantial support to the
Ministry of Defense, the Border Guards, and the Drug Control
Agency. However, addressing the social and economic needs of
the people is also essential. What initiatives is the
government taking to address these issues?
Conclusion
--------------
16. (C) The Kyrgyz appear to want to improve the bilateral
relationship. With the opposition threatening to take to the
streets, and with the administration often paralyzed by its
own mistakes, it is difficult for the government to move
ahead on reforms in the current climate. Your visit can help
focus the government and opposition on the need to find a way
to move forward, while reassuring those who doubt U.S.
intentions that our interests lie in helping Kyrgyzstan
develop a strong, independent, and stable society.
LITZENBERGER