BOUCHER AND BAKIYEV: BOTH PLEDGING TO MOVE FORWARD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BISHKEK 001196 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR SCA/FO, SCA/CEN E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG EINV MARR KG SUBJECT: BOUCHER AND BAKIYEV: BOTH PLEDGING TO MOVE FORWARD REF: BISHKEK 1195 BISHKEK 00001196 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: Amb. Marie L. Yovanovitch, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an August 11 meeting with Assistant Secretary for South and Central Affairs Richard Boucher, SIPDIS President Bakiyev turned straight to investment issues, urging U.S. involvement in major hydro-electric projects. Surprising everyone with an about-face, Bakiyev said that the Kyrgyz Government would not exercise its right to supply 50% of the fuel to the Manas Air Base. The President also expressed concern about rising extremism in southern Kyrgyzstan. A/S Boucher responded that after years of good bilateral cooperation, the recent strains in the relationship had come as a surprise to the U.S. He urged the President not to let false information come between the two countries again. Boucher also urged Bakiyev to make a public display of support for Manas Airbase by attending an event there on September 11 (which Bakiyev agreed to) and to increase Kyrgyz attention to regional integration. Bakiyev downplayed the recent strains and pledged that would be a "stable, reliable partner." Throughout the meeting, Bakiyev said many of the right things about cooperation and moving forward, but his words also demonstrated that his decisions are subject to change and review, resulting in confusion and uncertainty. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) On August 11, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Richard Boucher met with President Bakiyev. Ambassador Yovanovitch and Senior Advisor Hayden accompanied Boucher. Foreign Minister Jekshenkulov and Foreign Policy Advisor Ibragimov accompanied Bakiyev. The Assistant Secretary's other meetings in Bishkek were reported reftel. SIPDIS -------------- -------------- IN SEARCH OF U.S. INVESTORS FOR KAMBARATA 1 and 2 -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The President welcomed A/S Boucher and noted that the bilateral relationship had been a good one for the past 15 years and that Kyrgyzstan appreciates the assistance the U.S. provides. He turned straight to business issues, noting that a number of large business projects are on the horizon, such as Kambarata 1 and 2, that might be of interest to U.S. investors. He said that when there are close economic ties, all other questions in the bilateral relationship are more easily resolved. He noted the Kazakhs and the Russians are interested in Kambarata 1 and 2, but they are dragging out the talks. Moreover, they should be working together, as the project may prove too big for a single investor; it would be good if the U.S. were involved too. The President noted that since Kambarata 1 and 2 are not part of the Cascade, it would be easier to finalize the legal aspects with parliament, which he expects to do in the fall. On economic issues, the President said that economic growth is good, tax and customs revenues are flowing to the budget, and the fight against corruption has been successful. Morale in Kyrgyzstan is high, according to the President, but he concluded that the American presence in this area should be stronger. -------------- - KYRGYZSTAN NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN FUEL CONTRACT -------------- - ¶4. (C) Bakiyev noted that the bilateral relationship is strong in other areas as well and said the recently concluded base agreement had provided a good result. "I understand the threats we face. From the beginning, I knew we could do it," he said. He added that "some politicians" had given the impression that Kyrgyzstan did not want the Base, but he, the President, had always been committed to the Base, as no country can fight terrorism alone. Later in the meeting, Bakiyev said that the July agreement that Kyrgyzstan would be granted the right to provide 50% of the fuel could become a problem, because he cannot guarantee Kyrgyz performance. The BISHKEK 00001196 002.2 OF 005 President said that no Kyrgyz company has the capacity, and since fuel supply is a military issue, not a political issue, it should be treated as such. Certain bureaucrats had made the fuel part of the July agreement, perhaps because "they wanted to make business" on the side, commented the President. He concluded that people had criticized former President Akayev for profiting from past fuel contracts, and he did not want the same criticism leveled against himself. In sum, the President said he was ready for the Americans to supply 100% of the fuel. ¶5. (C) Boucher responded that a reliable fuel supply is most important, and the U.S. Government appreciates the Kyrgyz flexibility on this issue. Boucher added that the U.S. would appreciate a public demonstration of support for the Base and suggested visiting on September 11, the fifth anniversary of the attacks on the U.S. President Bakiyev agreed. ¶6. (C) On internal affairs, the President said that constitutional reform was moving forward and would be finished in the fall. He did not think it was necessary for the Constitutional Assembly to decide on every article; they should merely make their views known regarding which form of government they prefer. Then there would be further consultations with the Parliament. He said he is ready to proceed with reform of the judicial system and law enforcement agencies, although it is not a simple matter: "We are on the threshold of reform," he claimed. -------------- BOUCHER: WHERE IS KYRGYZSTAN GOING? -------------- ¶7. (C) Boucher responded that his purpose in coming to Kyrgyzstan was to find out what was happening in the country and where it was headed. He said that the last time he had spoken to the President, the President had requested a speedy conclusion to the base negotiations. This had happened, and the U.S. was fulfilling its obligations as agreed in July. For his part, Boucher had asked that the President decrease the level of conflict with the opposition and involve civil society in the constitutional reform process, and Bakiyev had done this successfully. ¶8. (C) Boucher reviewed the good cooperation that the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan have enjoyed over the years, but noted that the U.S. had been stymied by the two PNGs and the SNB operations against the Surveillance Detection Team. Boucher stated that the Kyrgyz had acted on false information and incorrect interpretation. He said we have taken reciprocal measures by PNGing two Kyrgyz diplomats and do not plan on taking further steps. Boucher said that we are working with Kyrgyz Ministries to re-establish the Surveillance Detection Team in an atmosphere of complete transparency. Boucher concluded that the U.S. and Kyrgyzstan will overcome this difficult period in bilateral relations, but Kyrgyzstan should take the lesson that false information, including from third parties, should not come between our two countries. The PNGing of two U.S. diplomats was a serious, even an unfriendly, action, and we don't want this to continue, Boucher said. -------------- NORTH-SOUTH INTEGRATION -------------- ¶9. (C) On other issues, Boucher responded that the U.S. is actively promoting regional integration. On north-south energy integration, Boucher noted that Kyrgyz representatives attended the U.S. Trade and Development Agency-sponsored conference on hydro-electricity in Istanbul in June, which had been useful, and the next step is a follow-on conference in Dushanbe in October. He raised AES' interest in working in Kyrgyzstan, the work AES is doing in Tajikistan, some of which the U.S. is financing, and suggested that the Kyrgyz BISHKEK 00001196 003.2 OF 005 work with AES, as well, to "create a whole" -- to which the President nodded. Boucher said he had appointed a senior officer to his staff to convert the idea of integration into the reality of roads and electrical lines. On trade, Boucher noted the big markets in Pakistan, and especially India, and said that Kazakhstan would be holding a conference on trade integration shortly. In the end, he said, integrating the region makes economic sense. -------------- BAKIYEV: EXTREMISM IN THE SOUTH -------------- ¶10. (C) On the situation in southern Kyrgyzstan, the President said that religious extremism has been building for the last ten to fifteen years. He cited recent incidents in Batken, Jalalabad, and Osh, including the killing of Mufti Mohammadrafiq Kamalov earlier in the week and said that the Government of Kyrgyzstan had information that not only Kamalov, but his brother, Sadykjan Kamalov, head of the International Center for Islamic Cooperation (Note: and former International Visitor Program participant. End Note.) were extremists, had direct contact with terrorists, and should be behind bars. He said that the religious extremists were now no longer limiting themselves to disseminating literature, but were preaching an untrue version of Islam and how to overthrow the government. The Kyrgyz government is working with "real" Islamic clerics to provide support in the South, Bakiyev said. He added that the Kyrgyz government would "deal harshly" with terrorists in the South. He noted that the capacity of the law enforcement agencies needed to be increased. The Kyrgyz Government had requested assistance from the Russians and wanted the U.S.-donated helicopters to go to the SNB, as the SNB has no helicopters. -------------- SECURITY COOPERATION NEEDED -------------- ¶11. (S) Boucher responded that the U.S. wants to continue security cooperation with the Kyrgyz and has generally experienced good cooperation. The U.S. wants good relations with the SNB, but believes the SNB has spread false information about the U.S. and U.S. activities in Kyrgyzstan, and our bilateral cooperation program with the SNB has expired. We would like to reactivate our cooperation, as both countries would benefit. Boucher added that the U.S. is not trying to push any country, i.e. Russia, out of Kyrgyzstan; our goal is to support Kyrgyz goals and Kyrgyz sovereignty. When Kyrgyzstan cooperates with many countries, it provides competition, which in turn provides more choices. -------------- AGREEMENT ON UZBEKISTAN -------------- ¶12. (C) Boucher continued that he had just been in Uzbekistan, where he tried to re-establish a decent relationship, but it would be a hard-nosed relationship based on areas of specific interest. He noted it cannot be as broad a relationship as with Kyrgyzstan, but that President Karimov had expressed interest in cooperating in the areas of security, and political and economic development, but that there could still be a positive relationship with the U.S. if Uzbekistan works at it. Boucher noted that when Bakiyev meets with Karimov, he hopes that Bakiyev influences Karimov rather than the other way around. With a grin, Bakiyev said that Karimov is "very hard," that he had just had a difficult conversation with him in Minsk, so he is not sure how constructive their meeting will be. Boucher responded that this would be a shame for Uzbekistan, which is closing itself off. As Bakiyev nodded, Boucher concluded that by leaving only one door open, Uzbekistan is losing opportunities. BISHKEK 00001196 004.2 OF 005 -------------- REQUEST FOR HIPC ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶13. (C) Bakiyev said he hoped that the U.S. would provide assistance in getting Kyrgyzstan into the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program (HIPC). Kyrgyzstan was debating the issue, but the two billion dollars of debt weighed heavily on Kyrgyzstan and the President would appreciate if the U.S. could help in restructuring the debt burden. The Ambassador responded that it had always been U.S. policy to support Kyrgyzstan's entry into the program. -------------- REQUEST FOR THRESHOLD STATUS -------------- ¶14. (C) Bakiyev said that he had one final wish, that Assistant Secretary Boucher support Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Status for Kyrgyzstan. Boucher responded that the U.S. is interested in going forward with judicial reform and will address this quickly when he returns. He stated that given the events of the past month and a half, questions had been raised about the direction of the country and the direction of the relationship, but he hoped that the Kyrgyz would see the benefits of cooperation and reform. ¶15. (C) Bakiyev replied that he had no doubts that the relationship would develop further. "Kyrgyzstan," he said, "is a country that does not waver. We will be a stable, reliable partner. We won't switch priorities and we don,t switch partners." Turning to the PNG issue for the first time in the conversation, Bakiyev said that the issue of the two PNGs was not his idea. "Let's forget that. Intelligence is intelligence. I didn't decide this issue, and the Foreign Minister didn't approve this action." Boucher thanked the President and concluded that the President should not let this happen again. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶16. (C) Bakiyev came very well prepared to the meeting with Assistant Secretary Boucher. The Kyrgyz goal was to put the tensions of July behind us, and Bakiyev succeeded, although he has been put on notice that the relationship cannot afford another PNG situation. He is clearly most interested in the economic relationship, although he also said what we wanted to hear on constitutional reform and on the Base. ¶17. (C) Bakiyev succeeded in surprising everyone -- including his own advisors -- when he announced that the Kyrgyz would not follow up on the July agreement to provide 50% of the fuel to Manas Air Base. He clearly reveled in catching even his own staff off guard, and three days later they are still trying to figure out what this means: does it mean that Kyrgyzstan will not participate at all or does it mean they will participate in the open tender for 100% of the fuel deliveries, or does it mean, as Security Council Secretary believes, that the Kyrgyz Government will start taxing fuel. Security Council Secretary Niyazov told us that he would clarify this with the President when the latter returns from Sochi on August 17. He advised us to postpone for now the Defense Energy Support Center fuel team scheduled to arrive on August 15. We reminded Niyazov that if taxation was the goal, the overall cost to the U.S. could not increase, and Niyazov agreed. ¶18. (C) On the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program, the President apparently saw no irony in requesting assistance from the United States on this issue, although in April the Foreign Ministry had issued a public reprimand to the Ambassador for "interfering in internal issues" when she commented on it. During this part of the conversation, the BISHKEK 00001196 005.2 OF 005 Foreign Minister was determinedly studying the ceiling and would not meet the Ambassador's eye. ¶19. (C) We also found it interesting that the President made a point of telling us that it was not the Foreign Minister, nor the President himself, who decided the PNG issue, it was the SNB. First, this contradicts what he told us on July 12 -- and what virtually everyone else in Bishkek is telling us. Second, it begs the question of who is in charge of foreign policy if neither the President nor the Foreign Minister decide a question of such import. ¶20. (C) The President's comments were constructive and forward-looking. Nevertheless, many of his remarks, including the news regarding the fuel deal, where he was essentially using U.S. talking points, once again demonstrated that decisions are subject to repeated review. No decision is final, which leaves both Bakiyev's staff and, to a certain extent, the U.S. scrambling. END COMMENT. ¶21. (U) A/S Boucher has cleared this message. YOVANOVITCH