SWISS SEE GOLAN HEIGHTS RESOLUTION AS KEY TO

S E C R E T BERN 000545

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, EUR/AGS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016
TAGS: PREL KPAL IS SY SZ
SUBJECT: SWISS SEE GOLAN HEIGHTS RESOLUTION AS KEY TO
MIDDLE EAST PEACE

REF: SECSTATE 37552

Classified By: Poloff Eric Lundberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d

1.(S) Summary: Swiss officials think the Hamas victory has
put a long-term hold on progress on Israeli-Palestinian
talks, but believe a bold Israeli resolution of the Golan
Heights occupation could pay dividends on nearly all aspects
of the Middle East dispute. Nicolas Lang, the Swiss DFA's
special envoy on the Middle East, has said that he is
convinced that a compromise with Damascus is achievable,
"along the lines of the "secret US-UK protocol." Lang
asserted that such a gesture could reduce Syrian antagonism
against Israel, undermine Hizbollah, strengthen the Lebanese
government, decrease the importance of the Syrian-Iranian
relationship, and put pressure on the Palestinians to deal.
End summary.

Distraught about the Hamas Victory
--------------

2.(C) In a discussion of reftel demarches on Hamas, Swiss
Ambassador Nicolas Lang told Poloff on March 3 that he saw
little prospect for any constructive dialogue between Israel
and the new Palestinian Authority dominated by Hamas.
Switzerland, he said, had not been a financial backer of the
Palestinian Authority in the past, so would not need to
reprogram its aid. For now, Bern had no plans to receive any
high-level Hamas delegations. However, the Swiss were still
considering how they would deal with the new PA. Swiss
officials were considering ground rules, whereby officials
could meet with Hamas members as official office holders or
elected members of the assembly.

3.(C) Lang complained that 2005 had been a lost year. The
West, he said (while clearly implying the United States),had
the opportunity after Yasser Arafat's death to make progress
with the PA. However, PA President Abu Mazen had not
received the requisite support, and the opportunity was lost.
With no progress feasible in the Occupied Territories, the
only option was to push for progress elsewhere, namely the
Golan Heights.

Opportunity with Damascus
--------------

4.(S) Lang -- who had considered a March visit to Syria, but
reconsidered -- said that Syrian Vice President (then-Foreign
Minister) Farouk al-Sharaa had told him last year that
Damascus was willing to provide the assurances desired by the
United States in exchange for sovereignty over Golan (a
message passed on to senior USG officials, he said). These
assurances included water rights and the future presence of
monitoring forces. Lang described a "secret US-UK protocol,"
as forming the basis of these assurances. Lang said that he
had been put in touch with senior Syrian officials through
the efforts of Syrian-American Ibrahim "Abe" Soliman (ph).
According to Lang, the assassination of former Lebanese PM
Rafiq Hariri understandably stalled any Western approach to
Syria. However, given that the UN's Hariri investigation had
exhausted itself and Hizbollah had since regained any lost
momentum, a new strategy needed to be pursued.

5.(C) In Lang's view, the Syrian gambit could reap dramatic
improvement in several areas, outlined as follows:

-- A resolution of the Golan Heights would put pressure on
the PA and Hamas, as their's would be the last remaining
conflict;

-- Syria would have to close down Palestinian Islamic Jihad
camps;

-- Hizbollah, which continued to profit politically from the
Golan occupation, would have less credibility among the

Lebanese public as "legitimate fighters against occupation,"
and fewer ways to justify its militia;

-- Lebanon would profit from the decrease in Hizbollah's
stature and in Syrian-Israeli tension;

-- A partially mollified Syria would have less of a rationale
for links with Iran, since -- as Sharaa reportedly told Lang
-- Islamism poses the greatest threat to the ruling Assad
regime;

-- Regional tensions would decrease, as Israel could
normalize relations with its remaining neighbors.

6.(C) Lang acknowledged that Syria's culpability in Hariri's
murder, dictatorial nature of the regime, and the ongoing
problems on its Iraqi border remained serious obstacles to a
U.S. rapprochement. He urged USG officials to weigh the
advantages, however.

Possible travel to Washington
--------------

7.(C) Lang said that he was considering a visit to Washington
to meet with USG counterparts. He was mindful of
Switzerland's small role in the peace process, however, and
implied that the Swiss embassy in Washington had difficulty
getting meetings with USG decisionmakers. He hoped this
would change somewhat when current Swiss DFA Political
Director Urs Ziswiler becomes Ambassador to the United States
in May. (NB: Ziswiler served with the ICRC in Gaza in the
late 1970s, was DCM in the Swiss Embassy in Tel Aviv
1988-1990, and his wife is Israeli born.)
Willeford