SWISS SEE GOLAN HEIGHTS RESOLUTION AS KEY TO

S E C R E T BERN 000545 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR NEA, EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2016 TAGS: PREL KPAL IS SY SZ SUBJECT: SWISS SEE GOLAN HEIGHTS RESOLUTION AS KEY TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE REF: SECSTATE 37552 Classified By: Poloff Eric Lundberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d 1.(S) Summary: Swiss officials think the Hamas victory has put a long-term hold on progress on Israeli-Palestinian talks, but believe a bold Israeli resolution of the Golan Heights occupation could pay dividends on nearly all aspects of the Middle East dispute. Nicolas Lang, the Swiss DFA's special envoy on the Middle East, has said that he is convinced that a compromise with Damascus is achievable, "along the lines of the "secret US-UK protocol." Lang asserted that such a gesture could reduce Syrian antagonism against Israel, undermine Hizbollah, strengthen the Lebanese government, decrease the importance of the Syrian-Iranian relationship, and put pressure on the Palestinians to deal. End summary. Distraught about the Hamas Victory -------------- 2.(C) In a discussion of reftel demarches on Hamas, Swiss Ambassador Nicolas Lang told Poloff on March 3 that he saw little prospect for any constructive dialogue between Israel and the new Palestinian Authority dominated by Hamas. Switzerland, he said, had not been a financial backer of the Palestinian Authority in the past, so would not need to reprogram its aid. For now, Bern had no plans to receive any high-level Hamas delegations. However, the Swiss were still considering how they would deal with the new PA. Swiss officials were considering ground rules, whereby officials could meet with Hamas members as official office holders or elected members of the assembly. 3.(C) Lang complained that 2005 had been a lost year. The West, he said (while clearly implying the United States),had the opportunity after Yasser Arafat's death to make progress with the PA. However, PA President Abu Mazen had not received the requisite support, and the opportunity was lost. With no progress feasible in the Occupied Territories, the only option was to push for progress elsewhere, namely the Golan Heights. Opportunity with Damascus -------------- 4.(S) Lang -- who had considered a March visit to Syria, but reconsidered -- said that Syrian Vice President (then-Foreign Minister) Farouk al-Sharaa had told him last year that Damascus was willing to provide the assurances desired by the United States in exchange for sovereignty over Golan (a message passed on to senior USG officials, he said). These assurances included water rights and the future presence of monitoring forces. Lang described a "secret US-UK protocol," as forming the basis of these assurances. Lang said that he had been put in touch with senior Syrian officials through the efforts of Syrian-American Ibrahim "Abe" Soliman (ph). According to Lang, the assassination of former Lebanese PM Rafiq Hariri understandably stalled any Western approach to Syria. However, given that the UN's Hariri investigation had exhausted itself and Hizbollah had since regained any lost momentum, a new strategy needed to be pursued. 5.(C) In Lang's view, the Syrian gambit could reap dramatic improvement in several areas, outlined as follows: -- A resolution of the Golan Heights would put pressure on the PA and Hamas, as their's would be the last remaining conflict; -- Syria would have to close down Palestinian Islamic Jihad camps; -- Hizbollah, which continued to profit politically from the Golan occupation, would have less credibility among the Lebanese public as "legitimate fighters against occupation," and fewer ways to justify its militia; -- Lebanon would profit from the decrease in Hizbollah's stature and in Syrian-Israeli tension; -- A partially mollified Syria would have less of a rationale for links with Iran, since -- as Sharaa reportedly told Lang -- Islamism poses the greatest threat to the ruling Assad regime; -- Regional tensions would decrease, as Israel could normalize relations with its remaining neighbors. 6.(C) Lang acknowledged that Syria's culpability in Hariri's murder, dictatorial nature of the regime, and the ongoing problems on its Iraqi border remained serious obstacles to a U.S. rapprochement. He urged USG officials to weigh the advantages, however. Possible travel to Washington -------------- 7.(C) Lang said that he was considering a visit to Washington to meet with USG counterparts. He was mindful of Switzerland's small role in the peace process, however, and implied that the Swiss embassy in Washington had difficulty getting meetings with USG decisionmakers. He hoped this would change somewhat when current Swiss DFA Political Director Urs Ziswiler becomes Ambassador to the United States in May. (NB: Ziswiler served with the ICRC in Gaza in the late 1970s, was DCM in the Swiss Embassy in Tel Aviv 1988-1990, and his wife is Israeli born.) Willeford