SWISS TO BAKER COMMISSION: USG SHOULD NO LONGER \

2006-11-27 15:48:00 06BERN2115 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL 06BERN2115 VZCZCXRO9268\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK\ DE RUEHSW #2115/01 3311548\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 271548Z NOV 06\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3455\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 002115 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SECSTATE FOR NEA/I, EUR, EUR/AGS \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 \ TAGS: PREL KNNP PTER ETTC IR IZ SZ SUBJECT: SWISS TO BAKER COMMISSION: USG SHOULD NO LONGER \ "OUT-SOURCE" TO THE EU-3 OUR IRAN POLICY \ \ Classified By: Ambassador Peter Coneway, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ 1.(C) Summary: Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuehl met \ with Baker Commission co-chairman James Baker on November 21 \ in Houston to share Swiss views on Iran. In a briefing for \ Ambassador Coneway on November 27, Ambuehl reported that he \ told former-Secretary Baker that direct U.S.-Iranian talks \ would be necessary to achieve any progress on the Iranian \ nuclear question. The USG, Ambuehl quipped, should no longer \ "out-source" foreign policy to the EU-3, but meet bilaterally \ with Iran, lay the framework for broad dialogue, and then \ bring in multilateral partners. The Swiss are convinced Iran \ is determined to approach the threshold of nuclear-weapons \ status, but it may be possible to deter Iran from making the \ leap to becoming a full nuclear state. As Swiss officials \ told NEA PDAS Jeffrey in Washington last week, there have \ been back-channel messages to the Swiss indicating that \ Tehran desires to restore relations with the international \ community. Switzerland remains prepared to bring the two \ sides together at either the official, unofficial, or proxy \ level. End summary. \ \ 2.(C) State Secretary Ambuehl flew from Switzerland to \ Houston on November 21 to meet with James Baker in advance of \ the upcoming release of the Baker Commission report. Upon \ his return to Bern, Ambuehl invited Ambassador Coneway, DCM \ and Poloff for a briefing on his meeting. DFA Iran expert \ and Deputy Director for Human Security & Peace Support, \ Guillaume Scheurer, who traveled to Houston and thereafter to \ Washington to brief NEA PDAS Jeffrey, joined the meeting, as \ did DFA Deputy Americas chief Urs Hammer. (NB: DFA Deputy \ Disarmament head Jean-Daniel Praz and Swiss Embassy Political \ Counselor Ralf Hechner also accompanied Ambuehl to Houston). \ \ 3.(C) Ambuehl told the Ambassador that he had three \ objectives in meeting with Baker: First, to offer him the \ Swiss assessment of the situation in Iran; second, to convey \ Swiss ideas on how to restart talks on Iran's nuclear \ program, and; third, to offer Switzerland's good offices in \ potential talks. Ambuehl described Baker as interested and \ in a listening-mode. Baker, he said, peppered the Swiss \ delegation with questions, but gave little indication of his \ personal views on how to proceed, except to describe his \ mandate as first and foremost Iraq, then Iran. \ \ -------------- \ Gauging Iran's motives \ -------------- \ \ 4.(C) Swiss officials are sure Iran seeks to reach the \ threshold of nuclear-weapons status, but are unsure how the \ Iranians define the threshold, or whether it might be short \ of actual possession of a device, Ambuehl said. They are \ likewise convinced that Iran wants to negotiate and is ready \ to make concessions -- but only at the conclusion of \ negotiations, not as a pre-condition. Finally, Iran desires \ access to Western technology, especially U.S. technology, \ rather than Russian technology, for its civil nuclear program. \ \ 5.(C) Asked to comment on Iran's machinations in Iraq, \ Ambuehl said it would be a mistake to believe Tehran is \ dissatisfied with the status quo. While the Iranians fear a \ catastrophe in Iraq, they have no interest in helping the \ United States succeed. The current state of Iraqi civil \ unrest appeals to Iran. He surmised that Iran would prefer \ to sit down multilaterally on Iraq, rather than in bilateral \ discussions with the United States. That said, Ambuehl \ interjected, Iran needs a settlement with the West for their \ own interests; they needs things that we can offer them: \ recognition by the United States, regional influence, \ recognition as a major power, and better relations with the \ international community. "We have to buy them," Ambuehl \ asserted. \ \ -------------- \ What the Swiss would have us do \ -------------- \ \ 6.(C) As to how the Swiss would proceed, were they in the \ position of the United States or EU-3, Ambuehl offered that a \ necessary first step would be direct U.S.-Iranian talks. \ These talks could be at any level the USG desired: secret, \ shuttle diplomacy, proxy -- whatever. Ambuehl underscored \ his conviction that the United States should be in the \ drivers seat; the USG should no longer "out-source foreign \ policy" to the EU-3. Direct talks, Ambuehl said, should \ start out broad and outline a framework for a dialogue, one \ that includes incentives for Iran, as well as step-by-step \ mechanisms for advancement and provisions for strict \ supervision. Once the framework is set, the USG could \ \ BERN 00002115 002 OF 002 \ \ \ multilateralize the talks to the level of the P5-plus-one. \ \ 7.(C) Ambuehl asserted that the USG should not demand \ suspension as a pre-condition to talks. Granting that the \ Iranian leadership is untrustworthy, Ambuehl nonetheless \ insisted that one could not expect a card player to lay down \ his best card prior to the game. Ambassador Coneway \ countered that suspension was not necessarily a permanent \ move and the Iranians needed to show good faith through \ suspension prior to negotiations. Ambuehl conceded the \ point, but suggested that a certain amount of talking might \ be necessary to determine a negotiating partner's intentions. \ \ -------------- \ Switzerland's role? \ -------------- \ \ 8.(C) Ambuehl reiterated Switzerland's readiness to play an \ intermediary role between the United States and Iran -- a \ message he conveyed to NEA PDAS James Jeffrey, and one which \ Swiss Ambassador to Tehran, Philippe Welti, planned to convey \ during biannual consultations in Washington next month. \ Switzerland, Ambuehl said, would host any type of meeting the \ USG requested -- official, unofficial, or proxy. Whoever we \ proposed to represent the USG side, the Swiss would work to \ match with an equivalent delegation from the Iranian side. \ Ambuehl said that Ambassador Welti had recently been \ approached by the brother of former Iranian President \ Rafsanjani about opening unofficial channels to the USG. It \ remained unclear whether Rafsanjani's approach was made in \ coordination with, or opposition to, Ayatollah al-Khamanei \ and President Ahmadinejad. The Swiss Embassy in Tehran \ (which includes the U.S. Interest Section) was working to \ determine the answer to this question. Ambuehl acknowledged \ that any credible Iranian representative would need a mandate \ from both Khamanei and Ahmadinejad. \ \ 9.(C) Ambassador Coneway thanked Ambuehl for the briefing and \ expressed hope that Switzerland's role would be one with \ which we and our EU partners could agree. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 10.(C) Past Swiss offers to mediate with Iran have prompted \ unenthusiastic replies in both Washington and EU capitals. \ Clearly Ambuehl views the Baker Commission report as an \ avenue to promote his proposals once more. Switzerland \ serves USG interests well as Protecting Power in Tehran. \ However, we defer to the Department on how useful the Swiss \ contribution could be in our broader policy with Iran. \ CONEWAY \