DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 002109 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT, EUR/SE, EUR/AGS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2031 TAGS: PTER ETTC TU SZ SUBJECT: DEPUTY S/CT URBANCIC URGES SWISS ACTION ON PKK REF: SECSTATE 179961 Classified By: DCM Carol J. Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d 1.(C) Summary: A USG interagency team led by Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Frank Urbancic visited Bern on November 13 to encourage the Swiss to step up efforts against PKK/Kongra-Gel criminal activity in Europe. Swiss government officials appeared receptive to the USG proposal to cooperate on criminal investigations of the PKK, while setting aside bilateral differences over the PKK's status as a terrorist group. Swiss officials also appeared receptive to the USG proposal to cooperate on criminal investigations of the PKK, while setting aside bilateral differences over the PKK's status as a terrorist group. Swiss officials also were open to increased judicial assistance to the Turks in order to improve Ankara's ability to assemble cases that pass European muster when extradition requests are filed. Pursuing the PKK is nonetheless likely to remain a low priority for Swiss law enforcement officials focused on more high-profile threats in Switzerland, unless persistently pushed by the USG, Turkey and European neighbors. End summary. 2.(C) Deputy S/CT Urbancic led an interagency delegation, including EUR/SE director Doug Silliman, Treasury Department Advisor on Terrorism Finance and Financial Crimes Justin Serafini, and S/CT officer Zachary Rothschild, to Switzerland as the final stop in a six-nation swing through Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, UK, and Turkey. The delegation's goal was to raise awareness of the PKK's criminal threat to Europe and to engender cooperation in diplomatic, law enforcement, financing, and intelligence sharing areas. -------------- -------------- Overview of USG Strategy - Pursue as Organized Crime -------------- -------------- 3.(C) In the meeting with Swiss interagency officials (paragraph 12),Urbancic laid out the USG's three-fold strategy for combating the PKK/Kongra-Gel. First, with regard to the PKK's operational use of Northern Iraq, General Ralston had been appointed to work with Turkish and Iraqi counterparts to diminish PKK abilities there. Second, the USG is working with Turkish authorities to improve internal law enforcement and judicial practices. Third, the USG would work with key European capitals to tackle the PKK problem as an organized crime problem, effectively sidestepping the political question of whether the PKK is a terrorist group. The focus on this latter effort is to cut off the source of funding for the PKK. 4.(C) EUR/SE Doug Silliman offered an overview of PKK criminal activity, including trafficking in persons, drug trafficking to the UK, extortion, and protection rackets. The PKK raises an estimated 100 million Euros per year in Europe. A large part of this money goes toward the PKK's media operations, including KOJ TV out of Denmark and various print outlets. The second largest use for the funds is maintenance expenses for PKK/Kongra-Gel operatives in Europe. Another large sum is converted into cash and carried by couriers into northern Iraq to finance terrorist activities directly. -------------- Some Receptivity, but Swiss Standards High -------------- 5.(C) Urs von Daeniken, Director of the Swiss Service for Analysis and Prevention (the internal intelligence service) described the PKK presence in Switzerland as small and mostly non-violent domestically. While the Swiss do not label the PKK/Kongra-Gel a terrorist group, the Federal Police consider it a violent extremist organization and keep tabs on its activities, he claimed. He described cooperation within Europe as very good and noted that, since 1996, there had been 20 U.S.-Swiss bilateral exchanges of information (Comment: According to ORCA, nearly all of these "exchanges" involved one-way provisions of information to the Swiss. End comment.) 6.(C) According to Von Daeniken, PKK/Kongra-Gel in Switzerland comprises 400 members, of which about 100 are officers. In addition, some 1.5 million Swiss Francs are estimated to be collected in Geneva and 1 million more in Basel; funds are routed by couriers, not banks. In the past, Swiss police confiscated documents and attempted to prosecute PKK members for extortion, but cases inevitably faltered due to withdrawn testimony from victims. There was evidence of the PKK "taxing" drug smugglers as well, but insufficient to prosecute a case. He also averred that the PKK were involved in human smuggling and forged documents. Von Daeniken welcomed evidence of funding connections to northern Iraq. A hopeful sign, he offered, was that the police had detected a fall-off in PKK fund-raising success in recent years. He asserted that, as extremists, suspected PKK/Kongra-Gel members are not permitted to own firearms. Anyone suspected of extremism is denied entry. 7.(C) On this last points, Urbancic challenged von Daeniken as to why the European head of PKK/Kongra-Gel, Zubeyir Aydar, was living in Switzerland. Von Daeniken skirted the question, noting that the organization seemed not to be very hierarchical; the Zurich head of the organization seemed to operate fairly independently from other PKK officials. 8.(C) Asked what type of information Swiss authorities would need to pursue the PKK, Von Daeniken expressed interest in evidence about the courier routes and destinations for funds raised in Switzerland. He assured the delegation that U.S. intelligence information could be used in Swiss courts without the sources and methods being divulged to the defense. Swiss Federal Prosecutor Claude Nicati interjected that all information would be welcomed, as long as it added value. For the Swiss to launch a criminal investigation, there needed to be a criminal act beforehand, he stressed. Nicati concurred that pursuing the PKK through criminal investigation was a promising avenue, but underscored that Swiss standards are very high. To prosecute someone for giving funds for a criminal or terrorist activity, it must be proven that the giver knowingly and willingly did so. Asked to define further the level of evidence needed, Nicati replied that he would prefer that there be at least one witness to interview. Silliman and Legatt expressed hope that the Swiss would be prepared to take USG leads and launch their own investigations. -------------- Immigration Track -- Denial the Easiest Tool -------------- 9.(C) Pius Betschart of the Federal Office of Migration described the challenges his office faces in deporting extremists already granted asylum. Just as asylum is granted through an administrative procedure, so it can be revoked in the event of a crime or the determination that there is a security threat. However, a judicial appeal can supersede deportation if a judge determines there is a risk of torture in the destination country. This remains the problem with Turkey. The easiest option, Betschart asserted, would be to have as much information on suspected PKK members before they apply for entry, since the threshold for denial of entry is very low. -------------- Improving Turkish Judicial Practices -------------- 10.(C) Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud of the Department of Foreign Affairs Center for Security Policy emphasized the importance of improving both the Turkish penal system and practice of assembling cases along Western lines. It was not sufficient for the Turks to ask for the extradition of a suspect if the charges were solely "member of a terrorist group." Asked if the Swiss would be willing to assist the Turks in this field, Pitteloud readily agreed. -------------- -------------- Turkish Ambassador: Complaints, some encouragement -------------- -------------- 11.(C) Following the lunch, Urbancic and DCM called on the resident Turkish Ambassador, Alev Kilic. Urbancic laid out the three-pronged USG strategy on the PKK, as described in paragraph 3. Kilic provided the USG delegation with a one-page outline of PKK activity in Switzerland, wherein he estimated the PKK/Kongra-Gel strength here at 4 thousand. The paper accused Swiss authorities of tolerating a PKK presence, allowing use of Swiss banks, and not intervening when Kurdish protesters stoned the Turkish Embassy in March ¶2006. The paper also mentioned the July 2006 meeting between the Geneva-based NGO "Geneva Call" and PKK/Kongra-Gel members, in which the NGO asked the PKK to refrain from using land mines against the civilians (but not the Turkish military). The Turkish Ambassador expressed some optimism that the Swiss were becoming more cooperative with the PKK -- an imminent test will be Bern's willingness to extradite PKK member and suspected murderer Mehmet Esiyok. Ambassador Kilic was very grateful for Urbancic's visit. -------------- Swiss Participants -------------- 12.(U) The Swiss participants in the delegation meetings were as follows: Mr. Urs von Daeniken, Director, Service for Analysis and Prevention, Federal Police; Mr. Claude Nicati, Chief Prosecutor, Department of Justice and Police; Mr. Pius Betschart, Chief, Analysis Division, Federal Office of Migration; Amb. Jacques Pitteloud, Chief, Center for International Security Policy, DFA (also at lunch); Ms. Christine Schraner, Counterterrorism Coordinator, DFA (host of lunch); Mr. Riccardo Sansonetti, Chief, Financial Crime Section, Department of Finance Mr. Andre Schaller, Chief of Western & Central Europe, DFA (also at lunch); Ms. Simona Morosini, Sanctions Division, State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (also at lunch); Mr. Heinz Walker, Deputy, Economic & Financial Affairs Division, DFA; Mr. Urs Hammer, Deputy, Americas Division, DFA; Mr. Dieter Cavalleri, Deputy to the Counterterrorism Coordinator, DFA; Mr. Zolt Madaasz, Chief of Staff, Security Committee of the Federal Council (lunch only). -------------- Comment -------------- 13.(C) These consultations were more encouraging than might have been expected, given the low priority accorded the pursuit of the PKK/Kongra-Gel by the Swiss. Swiss officials were receptive to using organized crime fighting methods against the group; more so because politicians are reluctant to categorize groups as terrorist entities, absent a UN resolution. It will likely take regular prompting by ourselves, the Turks and -- most fruitfully -- European neighbors to keep the Swiss interagency even minimally focused on the PKK threat. 14.(C) Deputy Counterterrorism Coordinator Urbancic and EUR/SE Director Silliman cleared on this message. CONEWAY