S/CT CRUMPTON PRESSES THE SWISS TO SHARE MORE INTEL \

80378 2006-10-02 14:48:00 06BERN1867 Embassy Bern SECRET VZCZCXYZ0000\ PP RUEHWEB\ \ DE RUEHSW #1867/01 2751448\ ZNY SSSSS ZZH\ P 021448Z OCT 06\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3192\ INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2606\ RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0103\ S E C R E T BERN 001867 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR S/CT, EUR, ISN \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2031 \ TAGS: PTER ETTC SZ SUBJECT: S/CT CRUMPTON PRESSES THE SWISS TO SHARE MORE INTEL \ \ Classified By: DCM Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d/h \ \ 1.(S) Summary: Counterterrorism Coordinator Henry Crumpton \ met with Swiss officials on September 7 to urge better \ intelligence sharing on terrorism. Crumpton highlighted the \ importance of a broad exchange of information as a necessary \ means to defeating terrorist plans. Swiss officials \ expressed surprise at USG dissatisfaction with their \ performance, but pointed to various Swiss legal and resource \ reasons to explain their inability to share more. Swiss \ officials added that they welcomed the President's decision \ to transfer 14 high-value al-Qaida suspects to military \ custody, asserting that more such gestures would make \ U.S.-Swiss counterterrorism cooperation easier to sell to the \ Swiss public. End summary. \ \ -------------- \ Surprise at USG Dissatisfaction \ -------------- \ \ 2.(S) Prior to attending the U.S.-Swiss sponsored "Black Ice" \ bioterrorism exercise held September 7-8 in Montreux, U.S. \ Counterterrorism Coordinator Crumpton met in Bern with senior \ Swiss officials in order to convey the message that \ intelligence sharing needed to improve. At a breakfast \ meeting with Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Deputy \ Political Director Anton Thalmann, DFA Security Policy \ director Jacques Pitteloud, and Poloff, Ambassador Crumpton \ said that the USG, while pleased that Switzerland has frozen \ over 34 million Swiss Francs (about $28 million) in \ Al-Qaida/Taliban assets, was concerned that suspected \ terrorists continued to operate in Switzerland, and that \ Swiss officials were too restrictive in what information they \ shared. Crumpton stressed that it was not sufficient to \ share only intelligence information having a specific U.S. \ nexus; only with the broad picture can governments adequately \ assess the threat. \ \ 3.(S) Deputy PolDir Thalmann expressed surprise at the USG's \ dissatisfaction with the Swiss performance. He had not heard \ this dissatisfaction expressed with regard to Swiss Justice \ Minister Blocher's August visit to Washington for the signing \ of the new Operative Working Agreement (OWA) on \ counterterrorism cooperation. Pitteloud -- a former Swiss \ intelligence official aware of (and sympathetic to the USG \ concerns) intelligence sharing shortfalls -- offered that USG \ officials may have wished to emphasize the positive as they \ signed the OWA. Thalmann promised to consult with his \ interagency colleagues. \ \ 4.(S) Noting President Bush's speech the previous evening \ announcing the transfer of 14 high-value suspects from \ confidential confinement to Guantanamo Bay, Thalmann and \ \ SIPDIS \ Pitteloud said they were pleased the USG was moving closer to \ what they considered a more transparent approach to \ detainees. Pitteloud regretted that differences over \ detainees, overflights, and renditions had made closer \ Swiss-U.S. cooperation less popular with the Swiss public. \ \ -------------- -- \ Bank Secrecy and Countering Terrorist Financing \ -------------- -- \ \ 5.(C) Meeting later with Swiss officials from the Swiss \ Banking Commission and from the departments of Foreign \ Affairs, Economics, and Finance, Ambassador Crumpton -- \ joined by Embassy law enforcement and Econoff -- observed \ that Swiss bank secrecy laws proved a formidable obstacle \ regarding how much information the Swiss could share with the \ U.S. on suspect assets. Urs Zulauf, spokesman for the Swiss \ Banking Commission, explained that the Swiss needed very \ specific information from the USG in order to freeze assets \ or start criminal cases; information that was not always \ forthcoming. He explained that the Swiss legal system had \ very explicit requirements regarding terrorism financing: "we \ have no flexibility". \ \ 6.(C) Ambassador Crumpton acknowledged Swiss concerns and \ constraints and indicated he would relay this to Washington \ agencies. He requested, however, that the Swiss think \ creatively about ways the government could improve its \ information sharing. He stressed that there is no piece of \ information that is "purely domestic" as terrorists are \ micro-level actors with a macro-level impact. He noted that \ intelligence and information-sharing programs such as Swift \ have benefited Switzerland and have produced information -- \ Swiss-origin information -- that resulted in anti-terrorism \ cases. Ambassador Crumpton stressed that it was inadequate \ for the Banking Commission, DFA and others in the Swiss \ Administration to restrict information exchanges to threats \ specifically identifiable to the United States. Important \ puzzle pieces in the global war on terrorism could be \ disregarded if this limited approach is not expanded. \ \ -------------- -------------- \ Accustomed to Police Cooperation, not Intel Sharing \ -------------- -------------- \ \ 7.(S) Charge joined Ambassador Crumpton for a meeting with \ Federal Police Director Jean-Luc Vez, Jean-Paul Rouiller and \ Michel Perler of the Federal Criminal Police (BKP),and Juerg \ Buehler, deputy director of the Service for Analysis and \ Protection (Internal Intelligence Service). Ambassador \ Crumpton thanked Vez and Justice Minister Blocher for \ pressing forward on the U.S.-Swiss Operative Working \ Agreement (OWA). He hoped the new OWA would be more than a \ piece of paper, but rather a vehicle for real \ counterterrorism cooperation. Given the threat faced by both \ countries, one could not confine intelligence sharing only to \ "Swiss-specific" or "US-specific" intelligence. The Heathrow \ plot was thwarted because of good intelligence sharing among \ different services, which we were sharing even before we knew \ the American nexus. All friendly services should share as \ much as possible with each other. \ \ 8.(S) The Swiss officials chafed at the suggestion by Embassy \ law enforcement officials that they had not been responsive \ to specific requests for information. Traditionally, the \ Swiss had turned to the police forces to undertake \ investigations of all threats, including terrorism. He was \ convinced that it was time to develop the intelligence side, \ but the Swiss services were small and it would take \ considerable time to push the changes through the legislative \ process. Vez described U.S.-Swiss cooperation as good, but \ asserted that the USG needed to provide more detailed \ information if we expected the Swiss to prosecute terrorists. \ (Comment: The Swiss complaint that USG intelligence is \ insufficiently specific reflects their passive approach \ counterterrorism -- one would hope Swiss investigators could \ use this "lead-information" to build their own cases, rather \ than await complete criminal cases to be provided them on a \ platter. End comment.) \ \ 9.(S) Charge observed that recent polling had shown the Swiss \ public relatively unconcerned about terrorism. Asked how he \ viewed the threat, Vez said that he was confident there was \ "no threat to Switzerland," but he realized the situation \ could change rapidly. There was an evident \ "individualization" of the jihadi threat, and the fact that \ there was less coordination and control by a central command \ widened the threat, as seen with the attempted train bombings \ in Germany. Rouiller followed with an informative slide \ presentation on the Swiss nexus with senior al-Qaida leaders \ dating back to the early 1990s. \ \ 10.(S) Pulling Vez aside at the end, Ambassador Crumpton \ underlined the gravity of the situation, describing \ Switzerland as nearly the only country in Western Europe to \ have not provided a response to our information on the \ al-Qaida threat in Europe. Vez was vague in his response, \ giving no indication he would improve things in the near term. \ \ -------------- \ Comment \ -------------- \ \ 11.(S) The Swiss Service for Analysis and Prevention (DAP) is \ uncooperative toward Embassy law enforcement and other \ officials. This could partly be due to the anti-Americanism \ of DAP's director Urs von Daeniken, but the problem is more \ widespread; DAP doesn't share very well with other services \ or within the Swiss bureaucracy itself. What little \ information does get shared is by the Federal Criminal Police \ (BKP),a sister office in the Federal Police Bureau, whose \ counterterrorism cell hosts an FBI agent. However, even the \ BKP's information tends to be solely U.S.-specific, and short \ of the broader picture desired. \ \ 12.(S) Domestically, DAP has little to lose from poor \ cooperation with the U.S. Public sentiment leans against \ involvement in intelligence gathering, foreign or domestic. \ Justice Minister Blocher's attitude toward the situation has \ not been as helpful as initially hoped when he took office in \ January 2004. Although he is obviously aware of the problem, \ he apparently sees no political percentage to making a swift \ change. Embassy will continue to encourage senior USG \ officials to send the message conveyed by Ambassador Crumpton \ (and Treasury Under Secretary Stuart Levey after him),namely \ the need to share intelligence information broadly, in order \ to tackle the threat. \ CONEWAY \