ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING OF SRI LANKA CONTACT GROUP:

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERN 001626

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2016
TAGS: PTER PHUM PINS PREL MARR CE SZ
SUBJECT: ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING OF SRI LANKA CONTACT GROUP:
SWISS PLAN TO ATTEND

REF: SECSTATE 140812

Classified By: Poloff Eric Lundberg, Reasons 1.4 b/d

1.(C) Summary: Switzerland plans to send a delegation to the
September 27 organizational meeting of the Sri Lanka Contact
Group, but officials are determined that Swiss participation
should not compromise their ability to interact with both
sides in the conflict. Emboffs underlined the USG's interest
in input from potential contact group partners with regard to
both the structure and membership of the contact group(s) and
encouraged Swiss officials to present their ideas in
Washington. Sensitive that some might view Bern as soft on
the Tamil Tigers, officials stressed the importance of
toughness, but also for the ability for small players like
Switzerland to maintain "back channels" in support of a
peace. End summary.

2.(C) Swiss DFA deputy Asia director Aldo DeLuca, desk
officer Boris Richard, and Peace Policy section deputy Markus
Heiniger told Pol/Econ Counselor and Poloff on August 31 that
the Swiss government is trying to balance its interest in
participating in a Sri Lanka contact groups with its fear of
being perceived as one-sided. While committed to attending
the September 27 Washington meeting, the Swiss officials were
interested in USG clarification concerning the focus of the
meeting, countries invited, and the intended scope of the
contact group's activities. DeLuca noted that the original
USG demarche in the spring had focused on financial sanctions
and an arms embargo against the Tamil Tigers. Switzerland
would perceive a need to address the activities of the Sri
Lankan government as well, citing the Sri Lanka Monitoring
Mission's recent conclusion that Sri Lankan armed forces were
responsible for the massacre of 17 aid workers. DeLuca also
sought assurances that the Sri Lankan government itself would
not be a contact group member.

3.(C) Emboffs reminded the officials that the purpose of
their demarches thus far was to seek the views of our
partners on how the contact group should be organized. The
membership and details of the contact groups were not yet set
in stone. The USG was pushing this initiative, however, due
to the need for a group broader than the co-chairs which
could pressure the parties to engage in peace talks.
Certainly, reducing the Tigers' ability to commit terrorism
was an important part of that.

4.(C) Heiniger, who is the Swiss government's point man on
the Sri Lankan peace process, expressed doubt that sanctions
would positively influence Tamil Tiger behavior. "They've
never responded to force in the past," he said. Asked what
had brought them to the ceasefire in 2002, Heiniger offered
that they must have felt that they could achieve their ends
better at the negotiating table, though he conceded that the
post-9/11 environment probably played a role. Unprompted,
Heiniger asserted that Switzerland was not soft on the
Tigers. Following the August 2005 assassination of Sri
Lankan Foreign Minister Kadirgamar, Bern had imposed a visa
ban and prohibition on meetings with Tamil Tiger leaders.
That said, Bern had decided not to join the EU's recent
listing of the Tamil Tigers out of concern that such an
action would have shut off a further Swiss role in the peace
process.

5.(C) Comment: Swiss officials do want a place at the table
in any group addressing the Sri Lankan conflict, but their
bottom line is not endangering their ability to engage both
sides. At the September 27 meeting, they will be looking to
verify that human rights is a part of the contact group's
focus, as demonstrated in Swiss DCM Witwer's comments in
reftel. Having backstopped the Norwegian mediators in the
past, the Swiss may take their cue from Oslo in their
decision whether to join the contact group. End comment.
URBAN