IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \

2006-07-10 14:51:00 06BERN1280 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4324\
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O 101451Z JUL 06\
FM AMEMBASSY BERN\
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621\
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001280 \
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STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \
STATE ALSO FOR EUR, ISA, NEA \
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 \
TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ETTC SZ
SUBJECT: IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \
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Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \
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1.(C) Summary: Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani met \
with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on July 8, as \
part of his ongoing European road show. According to Swiss \
officials, Larijani tried to convince the Swiss that Iran was \
seriously looking at the latest P5 1 package but would not be \
kept to deadlines, such as the G8 Summit, merely to oblige \
other powers. Calmy-Rey reiterated Swiss support for a \
diplomatic solution and urged the Iranians to fulfill their \
IAEA obligations, if they wished to have their NPT rights \
respected. The Swiss viewed Larijani's European tour as an \
effort to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. End \
summary. \
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2.(C) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \
Ambuehl, as part of his pledge to Under Secretary Burns to \
keep Washington apprised of developments with Iran, on July \
10 offered Charge a readout of the July 8 meeting between FM \
Calmy-Rey and visiting Iranian negotiator Larijani. Swiss \
DFA disarmament specialist Jean-Daniel Praz and Poloff joined \
the meeting. According to Ambuehl, the meeting was short -- \
one hour, with interpreters reducing by half the amount of \
time spent in actual exchange of views. The Swiss chose not \
to hold a press conference afterward, while the Iranian \
Embassy gave two journalists a brief readout. Delegation \
members were as follows: \
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Iran: \
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Ali Larijani, Secretary, Supreme Council for National Security \
Javad Va'idi, Director for International Security, SCNS \
Sa'id Jalili, Dep. Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs \
Ibrahim Rahimpour, MFA Director General for Western Europe \
Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iranian Ambassador to Bern \
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Switzerland \
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Micheline Calmy-Rey, Foreign Minister \
Michael Ambuehl, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \
Livia Leu, Director for Near East & Africa \
Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Director, Disarmament & Arms Control \
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3.(C) Starting out the meeting, Calmy-Rey explained that \
Swiss policy favored non-proliferation and disarmament, the \
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a diplomatic solution to \
the dispute through existing multilateral organizations -- \
primarily the IAEA. Calmy-Rey told Larijani that she saw \
three reasons for hope in the current situation: \
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-- The United States seemed ready to participate in \
negotiations; \
-- The P5 1 share a fairly homogeneous position; \
-- Initial reaction from Tehran has been measured. \
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(Unstated but implied in Calmy-Rey's discourse, Ambuehl \
suggested, was that Iran would not find it easy to divide the \
international community as long as the P5 1 could hold \
together.) \
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4.(C) Larijani told Calmy-Rey that Iran was examining the \
package seriously and would reply with its own proposals. He \
added that there remained several "ambiguities" in the \
package that would need to be clarified. Tehran could accept \
no preconditions. Tehran would also not be bound by \
deadlines designed to serve such events as the coming G8 \
Summit in St. Petersburg. Larijani told Calmy-Rey that a \
month or so either way should not matter, quipping "Iran \
can't build a bomb in a couple of weeks." \
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5.(C) Addressing continued IAEA dissatisfaction at Iranian \
cooperation, the Swiss delegation told the Iranians that, if \
they wished their rights respected, they needed to fulfill \
their obligations, particularly the need to clarify the \
pre-2003 situation. Ambuehl said that Larijani responded in \
a typical manner that the IAEA maintained a double standard \
against Iran (as compared with Sweden, South Korea, Japan, \
and Argentina) and that, no matter how many questions Iran \
answers, the IAEA always has more questions. \
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Ambuehl's Take on the Meeting \
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6.(C) Ambuehl saw Larijani's motive for his European tour as \
wanting to lay the groundwork for negotiations. He sensed no \
attempt to divide the Swiss from the P5 1. Beyond this, our \
Swiss interlocutor did not think it necessary to look too \
deeply at Iranian intentions. "They are really not so sly," \
Ambuehl observed. The cancellation of Va'idi's scheduled \
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visit in June he ascribed to normal Iranian disorganization. \
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7.(C) Surveying Iranian relations with the P5 1, Ambuehl \
mentioned that he saw a remarkable homogeneity among members. \
He said that, during his recent visit to Beijing, Chinese \
officials had voiced concerns about Iran and he received the \
impression that China placed more weight on good relations \
with the United States than with Iran. Iran seemed to view \
China as an important economic partner, but not completely \
reliable. Ambuehl thought that Iran was less interested in \
Russian technology than Western. Iran viewed France as an \
interested seller; Germany as the most flexible of the major \
powers; the UK as a close U.S. Ally, and the United States as \
the country with the most say. \
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8.(C) Asked why Larijani paid a visit to Bern, Ambuehl \
estimated that Iran respected Switzerland's neutrality, \
independence, and lack of an agenda. Switzerland was non-EU \
and non-NATO but was technologically advanced and had an \
established nuclear energy sector supplying 40 percent of its \
own needs. Ambuehl stressed that neither side mentioned \
Switzerland's role as protecting power for the United States \
in Tehran. He further described as ridiculous a recently \
heard European concern that the USG was trying to bypass the \
EU-3 by opening up channels to Tehran via the Swiss. \
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9.(C) Finally, Ambuehl offered his thoughts on how to handle \
Iran. He observed that the Iranians approach discussions \
with a chip on the shoulder, as if everyone believed them to \
be inferior. The Iranians had a particularly acute need for \
respect. Rather than push for an earlier response to Iran, \
Ambuehl suggested that the P5 1 merely call Iran on its own \
August 22 date. Ambuehl also suggested that the five nuclear \
states be more mindful of the perceived "unfairness" of the \
NPT when dealing with non-nuclear states -- even such \
likeminded states as Switzerland and Ireland. \
URBAN \