IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \

2006-07-10 14:51:00 06BERN1280 Embassy Bern CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO4324\ OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR\ DE RUEHSW #1280/01 1911451\ ZNY CCCCC ZZH\ O 101451Z JUL 06\ FM AMEMBASSY BERN\ TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2621\ INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY\ RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERN 001280 \ \ SIPDIS \ \ SIPDIS \ \ STATE FOR P - U/S BURNS \ STATE ALSO FOR EUR, ISA, NEA \ \ E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016 \ TAGS: PREL KNNP PARM ETTC SZ SUBJECT: IRAN: LARIJANI MEETS WITH SWISS FM CALMY-REY \ \ Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Carol Urban, Reasons 1.4 b/d \ \ 1.(C) Summary: Iranian Nuclear Negotiator Ali Larijani met \ with Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on July 8, as \ part of his ongoing European road show. According to Swiss \ officials, Larijani tried to convince the Swiss that Iran was \ seriously looking at the latest P5 1 package but would not be \ kept to deadlines, such as the G8 Summit, merely to oblige \ other powers. Calmy-Rey reiterated Swiss support for a \ diplomatic solution and urged the Iranians to fulfill their \ IAEA obligations, if they wished to have their NPT rights \ respected. The Swiss viewed Larijani's European tour as an \ effort to lay the groundwork for future negotiations. End \ summary. \ \ 2.(C) Swiss State Secretary of Foreign Affairs Michael \ Ambuehl, as part of his pledge to Under Secretary Burns to \ keep Washington apprised of developments with Iran, on July \ 10 offered Charge a readout of the July 8 meeting between FM \ Calmy-Rey and visiting Iranian negotiator Larijani. Swiss \ DFA disarmament specialist Jean-Daniel Praz and Poloff joined \ the meeting. According to Ambuehl, the meeting was short -- \ one hour, with interpreters reducing by half the amount of \ time spent in actual exchange of views. The Swiss chose not \ to hold a press conference afterward, while the Iranian \ Embassy gave two journalists a brief readout. Delegation \ members were as follows: \ \ Iran: \ -------------- \ Ali Larijani, Secretary, Supreme Council for National Security \ Javad Va'idi, Director for International Security, SCNS \ Sa'id Jalili, Dep. Foreign Minister for Euro-American Affairs \ Ibrahim Rahimpour, MFA Director General for Western Europe \ Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iranian Ambassador to Bern \ \ Switzerland \ -------------- \ Micheline Calmy-Rey, Foreign Minister \ Michael Ambuehl, State Secretary of Foreign Affairs \ Livia Leu, Director for Near East & Africa \ Jean-Daniel Praz, Deputy Director, Disarmament & Arms Control \ \ 3.(C) Starting out the meeting, Calmy-Rey explained that \ Swiss policy favored non-proliferation and disarmament, the \ peaceful use of nuclear energy, and a diplomatic solution to \ the dispute through existing multilateral organizations -- \ primarily the IAEA. Calmy-Rey told Larijani that she saw \ three reasons for hope in the current situation: \ \ -- The United States seemed ready to participate in \ negotiations; \ -- The P5 1 share a fairly homogeneous position; \ -- Initial reaction from Tehran has been measured. \ \ (Unstated but implied in Calmy-Rey's discourse, Ambuehl \ suggested, was that Iran would not find it easy to divide the \ international community as long as the P5 1 could hold \ together.) \ \ 4.(C) Larijani told Calmy-Rey that Iran was examining the \ package seriously and would reply with its own proposals. He \ added that there remained several "ambiguities" in the \ package that would need to be clarified. Tehran could accept \ no preconditions. Tehran would also not be bound by \ deadlines designed to serve such events as the coming G8 \ Summit in St. Petersburg. Larijani told Calmy-Rey that a \ month or so either way should not matter, quipping "Iran \ can't build a bomb in a couple of weeks." \ \ 5.(C) Addressing continued IAEA dissatisfaction at Iranian \ cooperation, the Swiss delegation told the Iranians that, if \ they wished their rights respected, they needed to fulfill \ their obligations, particularly the need to clarify the \ pre-2003 situation. Ambuehl said that Larijani responded in \ a typical manner that the IAEA maintained a double standard \ against Iran (as compared with Sweden, South Korea, Japan, \ and Argentina) and that, no matter how many questions Iran \ answers, the IAEA always has more questions. \ \ Ambuehl's Take on the Meeting \ -------------- \ \ 6.(C) Ambuehl saw Larijani's motive for his European tour as \ wanting to lay the groundwork for negotiations. He sensed no \ attempt to divide the Swiss from the P5 1. Beyond this, our \ Swiss interlocutor did not think it necessary to look too \ deeply at Iranian intentions. "They are really not so sly," \ Ambuehl observed. The cancellation of Va'idi's scheduled \ \ BERN 00001280 002 OF 002 \ \ \ visit in June he ascribed to normal Iranian disorganization. \ \ 7.(C) Surveying Iranian relations with the P5 1, Ambuehl \ mentioned that he saw a remarkable homogeneity among members. \ He said that, during his recent visit to Beijing, Chinese \ officials had voiced concerns about Iran and he received the \ impression that China placed more weight on good relations \ with the United States than with Iran. Iran seemed to view \ China as an important economic partner, but not completely \ reliable. Ambuehl thought that Iran was less interested in \ Russian technology than Western. Iran viewed France as an \ interested seller; Germany as the most flexible of the major \ powers; the UK as a close U.S. Ally, and the United States as \ the country with the most say. \ \ 8.(C) Asked why Larijani paid a visit to Bern, Ambuehl \ estimated that Iran respected Switzerland's neutrality, \ independence, and lack of an agenda. Switzerland was non-EU \ and non-NATO but was technologically advanced and had an \ established nuclear energy sector supplying 40 percent of its \ own needs. Ambuehl stressed that neither side mentioned \ Switzerland's role as protecting power for the United States \ in Tehran. He further described as ridiculous a recently \ heard European concern that the USG was trying to bypass the \ EU-3 by opening up channels to Tehran via the Swiss. \ \ 9.(C) Finally, Ambuehl offered his thoughts on how to handle \ Iran. He observed that the Iranians approach discussions \ with a chip on the shoulder, as if everyone believed them to \ be inferior. The Iranians had a particularly acute need for \ respect. Rather than push for an earlier response to Iran, \ Ambuehl suggested that the P5 1 merely call Iran on its own \ August 22 date. Ambuehl also suggested that the five nuclear \ states be more mindful of the perceived "unfairness" of the \ NPT when dealing with non-nuclear states -- even such \ likeminded states as Switzerland and Ireland. \ URBAN \