ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETINGS IN GERMANY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 000455 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2016 TAGS: PREL KISL PHUM PTER GM SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED'S MEETINGS IN GERMANY Classified By: DCM JOHN CLOUD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: Senior German officials responded positively to USG efforts to show solidarity with Denmark and agreed with the basic principle of using the incident to stress the importance of building democracy in the BMENA region. The Germans agreed with the USG assessment that the caricatures, although clearly offensive to Muslims, were being exploited by Iran and Syria for their own internal purposes. They expressed interest in our policy of using American Muslims to reach out to other Muslims. German officials also briefed us on Fonmin Steinmeier's just completed visit to Israel and expressed concern that Israel might be trying to degrade living conditions in the Occupied Territories under a Hamas-led government to create conditions for new Palestinian elections. On Kosovo, Political Director Schaefer briefed us on intensive German contacts with both the Serbians and the Kosovars. Schaefer reported indications the Kosovars were at least considering accepting limited sovereignty and a special status for Mitrovica. A/S Fried briefed the Germans on USG energy security concerns in Eurasia. NSA-equivalent Heusgen reported that the Germans were also sending tough messages to the Russians on the need to build trust as a credible energy supplier. Both sides considered next steps in Georgia. End summary. ¶2. (U) EUR A/S Daniel Fried and NSC Director for Middle Initiatives Farah Pandith met with German NSA-equivalent Christoph Heusgen (accompanied by Chancellery North America director Dirk Brengelmann) and MFA Political Director Michael Schaefer (accompanied by North America Desk Director Christoph Eichhorn, Middle East Director Andreas Reinicke, and note taker) during their February 14-15 visit to Berlin. DCM and A/Polcouns (note taker) accompanied A/S Fried and Director Pandith. Laying out the USG Strategy -------------- ¶3. (C) In both meetings, A/S Fried and Director Pandith laid out the USG response to the controversy created by the publication (and subsequent republication) of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper: the USG viewed the drawings as offensive, but opposed compromise on the issue of freedom of speech and condemned the manipulations of Muslim public sentiment in particular by the Governments of Iran and Syria. Democracy, they argued, was the system of government best able to reconcile in practice the values of freedom, respect, and sensitivity at the center of the current controversy. The U.S. was considering ways to shape a response to the cartoon issue, including especially using the Forum for the Future and the Democracy Assistance Dialogue, to bring together editors and journalists with experience in dealing with politically sensitive issues with counterparts and democracy advocates from the Middle East. These counterparts were to be selected on the basis of their independence from government control. Efforts to promote dialogue would be conducted in parallel with our efforts to build democracy in the region. Pandith told Heusgen and Schaefer that the USG sought to use the voices of American (and ultimately European) Muslims to engage with the Muslim world both to isolate extremists and to emphasize that the current controversy was not one of "Islam vs. Democracy." She noted that a Belgian Muslim had told her that Muslims had come to Belgium and the West because they wanted to enjoy these freedoms. Fried stressed the USG interest in supporting an evolving Islam that was modern and enlightened. He expressed concern that in many instances Muslims continue to appear to Europeans like an "alien" force. ¶4. (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried and Pandith that Chancellor Merkel had called Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen to express German solidarity with Denmark. She told him that Denmark had nothing to apologize for and urged Denmark to stick to its principles. Germany saw clearly that Iran and Syria (and to some extent Egypt as well) were trying to manipulate public reaction to the caricatures. Heusgen said he found it outrageous that Syria was trying to fuel public outrage over religious sensitivities, given its massacre of members of the Muslim Brotherhood in Hama in February 1982. Merkel understood it was important not to offend religious feelings and wanted to engage in a "dialogue of cultures." ¶5. (C) Turning to Germany's own Muslim population, Heusgen commented that many of the Turks now in Germany tended to live in their own sections of large cities, were generally from poor families and often had a limited education. Merkel discussed this issue with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, who argued that Turks in Germany first had to become comfortable in their "own" culture and language before they could seek to integrate into a new culture, Germany. Heusgen questioned this approach and argued that this approach would mean that Turkish immigrants would never get beyond the first stage of learning their own culture. Heusgen then argued that Europeans, including Muslim immigrants, had to better understand their adopted civilization. Without such understanding, they could not effectively promote democratic values in the Middle East. ¶6. (C) Heusgen said Germany was disappointed at the results of the November Barcelona Process meeting. The Europeans had stressed the importance of the rule of law, but no or few heads of state from the region came, and many others from the region appeared to reject these arguments. This left the West in an uncomfortable situation of needing Middle East governments to help in the War against Terrorism, even if those governments had poor human rights records. Fried stressed the need to keep advancing with our shared reform agenda in the region. ¶7. (C) Political Director Schaefer noted a broad consensus on where the problems with the caricatures lay. Limits to account for religious sensitivities should exist, but these limits should be tested in the courts and not by throwing stones and burning buildings. We, in the West, needed to be aware of how words are being perceived in a different cultural context. Schaefer saw the genesis of the current crisis as the translation of a set of caricatures that were innocuous by Western standards to a cultural context where they were clearly explosive. Although the West had succeeded in gaining broad acceptance for certain universal principles, such as the right to life and human dignity, there are important cultural values which genuinely differ from one culture to the next and have to be respected. He gave as an example his own experiences in dealing with "Asian" values. In that instance, it was clear that Asian cultures give a priority to the well-being of the group that is difficult for Westerners to understand. We faced one additional problem: we tended to preach to the converted. Who are our counterparts in the Muslim world? He urged the West to undertake speaking with "more difficult" people who might disagree with us but still exhibited a sense of responsibility. ¶8. (C) Taking A/S Fried's point, Schaefer agreed that fora like Forum for the Future might offer a good opportunity for such dialogue. He argued that Turkey also had an important role to play, but could not be "overburdened" given its own struggle to build democratic institutions. A/S Fried agreed with Schaefer on the need to reach out further, but argued that we still had to be clear that what we were talking about is democracy. Schaefer noted he agreed largely with the U.S. approach of using Muslims within American and European societies to help reach out. Reinicke said the West had to take into consideration Muslim sensitivities. Schaefer continued the argument saying that the West had to approach the Muslim world on democracy with a clear sense of respect. A/S Fried argued that it was important that the West not cast the debate in terms of freedom of speech vs. respect for religious sensitivities. Rather we wanted to promote the idea of democracy being best able to deal with issues where there were competing claims like those of freedom of speech and religious sensitivities. Steinmeier, Israel, and Hamas -------------- ¶9. (C) Schaefer asked Reinicke to comment on German Fonmin Steinmeier's just completed visit to the Middle East (Reinicke accompanied him),including a visit to Israel. Reinicke said the Israelis appeared undecided how to respond to the Hamas victory in January, but at least some are arguing Israel should make life so difficult for the Palestinians that a Hamas-led government would fail, necessitating new elections. The Palestinian response was to argue that if conditions grow even more difficult in the Occupied Territories, the Palestinians will blame the West and not Hamas. Schaefer added that Steinmeier was clear on the conditions for talking with Hamas, but argued that we needed to have a "Plan B." A/S Fried argued that we should avoid a situation where the West was debating what to do about Hamas. Instead, we should try to force Hamas to debate what it should do to meet the Quartet,s conditions. Schaefer agreed with the point. ¶10. (C) Heusgen told A/S Fried that Merkel spoke with Putin on February 14 regarding Russia's invitation to Hamas. Putin, according to Heusgen, agreed to stick to Quartet decisions on handling Hamas. In a private part of the meeting, A/S Fried told Heusgen that expressed USG appreciated Chancellor Merkel clear statements during the Munich Security Conference. Kosovo -------------- ¶11. (C) Schaefer said that the Germans had held and would be holding a number of further meetings with both the Serbs and the Kosovars. Yesterday, the Germans met with Kostunica to discuss the issue of Kosovar independence. The Germans delivered what Schaefer called a difficult message. There would be another meeting with Marti Ahtisaari on February 15. In Schaefer's view, the Serbs needed to be perceived as getting something for Kosovo's independence. Although the Serbs would not accept independence de jure, they would accept it de facto if they obtained compromises on roughly 8 of the 10 issues of concern to them (such as property rights, churches, decentralization, etc.). To the Kosovars, te Germans had been equally tough, saying they ha to earn independence. Schaefer said the Kosovas had to be prepared for "gracious compromises" ith the Serbs. Schaefer said he spoke with Albaian Kosovar leader Thaci, who told him the Kosovars were prepared to consider limited sovereignty an to accept a special status for Mitrovica. Schafer used the argument that Germany had limited svereignty in the early post-war period and was nt a full member of the United Nations for 25 years. A/S Fried said the USG understood there had to be a transitional period for Kosovo and guarantees for the Serbian minority. Energy Security -------------- ¶12. (C) A/S Fried told Heusgen the U.S. was aware of the development of a "Green Paper" within the EU outlining their thinking on energy security and was pleased that our thinking largely overlapped. The U.S. emphasized diversification of energy sources, including from Caspian sources, and multiple pipeline routes, all on a commercial basis. The USG was beginning to discuss this with BP and other energy companies. We were not trying to determine routes, but seeing if these policies were also supported by the market. Heusgen said Merkel had told Putin the Russian game in the Ukraine during the January crisis was not helpful. She said Russia needed to develop trust and confidence that it was a reliable producer of energy. Heusgen said it remained to be seen whether Putin had drawn the necessary lessons from the experience. A/S Fried noted that the Poles were particularly upset by the Baltic pipeline, but the Poles believed Merkel was a vast improvement, and appreciated Germany's decision to invest 100 million euros in Poland. He argued that the Poles would show more flexibility once they were certain they were not isolated in dealing with Russia. Georgia -------------- ¶13. (C) A/S Fried said the Russians were continuing to maintain security links with separatists in South Ossetia and sending Russian citizens to work in key, senior positions there. Heusgen said he had spoken with Russian Fonmin Ivanov, who asked the Germans to urge the Georgians to deal directly with the Russians. Saakashvili was being heavy-handed in the German view. A/S Fried said the U.S. would keep pushing Saakashvili to do the "right thing." In the meantime, we had to prevent Russia from continuing its efforts to dismember Georgia. ¶14. (U) This message has been cleared by A/S Fried. TIMKEN JR