INTERAGENCY DELEGATION URGES U.S-GERMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003391 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/SE, EUR/PGI, EUR/AGS, AND S/CT E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016 TAGS: PTER PREL GM TU SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY DELEGATION URGES U.S-GERMAN COOPERATION AGAINST PKK REF: A. STATE 179961 ¶B. BERLIN 2400 ¶C. BERLIN 1650 ¶D. BERLIN 1443 ¶E. BERLIN 1109 ¶F. BERLIN 988 ¶G. BERLIN 889 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. A U.S. delegation sought expanded German actions against the PKK and proposed closer cooperation between Germany and the U.S., as well as among Turkey, Germany, the U.S., and other EU member states. German officials acknowledged the importance of fighting the PKK. The Interior Ministry appeared satisfied with the current level of efforts, but when pressed, officials there criticized the lack of political will in other EU states to combat the PKK. The delegation's brainstorming with officials at the Chancellery and Foreign Ministry produced new ideas to increase the pressure on the PKK. End Summary. -------------- INTERIOR MINISTRY: ALREADY DOING ALL WE CAN -------------- ¶2. (C) Federal Ministry of the Interior (MOI) Deputy Director General for Counterterrorism Gerhard Schindler explained the MOI coordinates German actions against the PKK and he described German strategy and actions (refs B - G) that can be traced back to the 1993 German PKK ban. He explained a primary German tactic is to target upper level leaders by charging them with any possible criminal offense rather than going after them only on terrorism-related charges. Germany believes its actions have achieved results because high level PKK leaders had fled Germany and others avoid visiting. That said, there are mid-level PKK officials who have remained in Germany. Also, the PKK leadership has for years continued to instruct its representatives in Germany and other countries where the PKK is active on how much money to raise. This reality, Schindler said, continues. ¶3. (C) Schindler was hesitant in discussing ways other EU countries could do more to fight the PKK. He said his ministry and German law enforcement authorities have numerous contacts and excellent working relationships with their EU counterparts. "All EU police agencies agree, they all see the problem as we do," Schindler said, "but the political class is different." Schindler resisted clarifying his remarks, but ultimately agreed when U.S. team leader Urbancic asked whether the problem in other EU countries is the lack of political will to follow police and security investigations with prosecutions. Schindler was reluctant to criticize his EU partners and followed up by praising French prosecutors for investigating and detaining a terrorist who, under German law, German officials had been unable to arrest. Urbancic clarified the delegation did not intend to ask other EU countries simply to copy the German model. ¶4. (C) Responding to a question from the delegation, Schindler said he thought Germany had followed up the EU listing of the PKK as a terrorist organization by proposing specific PKK leaders for derivative designation. Schindler added that the amount of money frozen subsequent to EU and UN terrorist designations had not been large. It is right to list leaders and organizations, he said, but that is not the way to reach their money. Concerning the previous German ban of the PKK-linked newspaper Ozgur Politika, which has been overturned by a German court, Schindler confirmed that Germany is redrafting the law to reinstate the ban. -------------- CHANCELLERY: NEW IDEAS INFORMALLY FLOATED -------------- ¶5. (C) Chancellery Deputy Director General for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime Hans Vorbeck admitted the PKK was not Germany's highest CT priority, but noted authorities here have been fighting them for years. Chancellery desk officer for North American and European Security Policy Volker Pellet said German courts are skeptical of Turkish extradition requests, but he expects the situation to improve gradually. Asked about the utility of expanding EU sanctions, Vorbeck said they are not much use and the trend to make such EU actions more transparent might limit their effectiveness further. Nevertheless, Vorbeck assessed that German measures had pushed PKK senior BERLIN 00003391 002 OF 002 leadership to the Benelux countries and Switzerland. ¶6. (C) Asked about expanded U.S.-German information sharing to combat the PKK, Vorbeck stressed the MOI lead in the German government's efforts. Chancellery Desk Officer for International Terrorism and Organized Crime Alexandra Schaefer-Borrmann said there is already a good exchange of information among EU members; she suggested the U.S. might be able to join that existing dialogue. Pellet asked about U.S. actions against the PKK in Northern Iraq; EUR/SE Director Silliman responded by describing the U.S. strategic approach and his recent visit to the region. ¶7. (C) In closing, Vorbeck observed that the German interagency Joint Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) is limited to addressing Islamic terrorism. Its structures can therefore not be used against the PKK. Schaefer-Borrmann hinted that the Center's mandate could eventually be broadened, but that controversy surrounding the GTAZ's establishment had to be limited by narrowing its scope to only one type of terrorism. The GTAZ enables collaboration between the federal and state levels, as well as nearly 40 police, security, prosecution, asylum, and other authorities via numerous working groups all while taking into account the German constitutional and legal hurdles that can affect such information sharing. Vorbeck admitted Germany should do more against the PKK. -------------- FOREIGN MINISTRY: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES -------------- ¶8. (C) Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office Director for Counterterrorism Matthias Sonn said his tour in Ankara in the late 1990s and his subsequent posting as MFA Office Director for Turkey meant he was very familiar with the PKK problem. He criticized the PKK's "corrosive influence on Turkish-German society." Sonn appreciated hearing the delegation's assessment that Germany had done much to combat the PKK, but he thought it was embarrassing the EU had not done more and that it had fallen to the U.S. to seek more action on European territory. Sonn mentioned several obstacles that hindered Germany's effort: (1) the belief among some senior German officials that the PKK represents oppressed Kurds and their "legitimate fight" against Turkish security forces, (2) the German tactic of prosecuting PKK leaders for criminal offenses meant the police and courts in numerous German federal states were taking inconsistent approaches, (3) German courts had been skeptical of Turkish extradition requests, and (4) Germany could revoke asylum status, but it was a long judicial and administrative process. Despite these hindrances, Sonn mentioned two areas where Germany might be able to apply more pressure on the PKK: (1) by seeking an EU listing of the PKK-affiliated newspaper Ozgur Politika (and its affiliates) that MOI had tried to ban, and (2) by increasing the scrutiny of travelers departing on the regular flights from Northern Iraq to Frankfurt, in particular to find PKK cash couriers. ¶9. (C) As to measures to pressure the PKK outside of German jurisdiction, Sonn called the EU travel ban "useless" because organizations did not travel; also, the end of border controls among Schengen states meant unhindered travel for PKK-affiliated individuals. He added Turkey expects the U.S. to "resolve the PKK issue in Northern Iraq." 10 (U) S/CT Urbancic and EUR/SE Silliman cleared this cable. TIMKEN JR