Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BERLIN3220
2006-11-03 16:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Berlin
Cable title:
PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE, GOVERNMENT MISSTEPS
VZCZCXRO9110 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHRL #3220/01 3071603 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 031603Z NOV 06 FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5970 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUCNFRG/FRG COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003220
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM GM LE AF BK SR
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE, GOVERNMENT MISSTEPS
COMPLICATE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES FOR GRAND COALITION
REF: A. BERLIN 3141
B. BERLIN 3142
C. BERLIN 3145
D. BERLIN 2769
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 003220
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM GM LE AF BK SR
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE, GOVERNMENT MISSTEPS
COMPLICATE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES FOR GRAND COALITION
REF: A. BERLIN 3141
B. BERLIN 3142
C. BERLIN 3145
D. BERLIN 2769
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Setbacks related to German overseas
deployments are reinforcing a tendency toward short-term
caution on military issues. Barely one week after the
release of a well-received White Paper on security that cast
Germany as an increasingly engaged and transformed security
partner, Berlin -- especially Defense Minister Jung -- is
under pressure on Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Bosnia. The
Chancellery in particular is in crisis-management mode with
regard to the Bundestag. As Chancellor Merkel looks ahead to
the CDU's national party congress November 27-28, she may be
especially careful to avoid any mis-steps on foreign policy
that might compound the feeding frenzy and weaken her
standing within the party and her coalition. End summary.
2. (C) The Grand Coalition Government was faced last week
with bad news from Afghanistan -- photographs of German
soldiers mishandling human remains hit the press last week --
and Lebanon -- three separate incidents with Israeli aircraft
in the eastern Mediterranean raised fears of an accidental
clash between German and Israeli forces (Refs A and B). The
public response of the government to these developments has
been tentative and largely defensive. To counter anticipated
parliamentary objections that German forces were stretched
too thin worldwide, Defense Minister Jung announced over the
weekend that Germany would begin withdrawing its 850 soldiers
in Bosnia in December. This step fed impressions the
government was reeling, and it encouraged still more
criticism, even though Jung intended the opposite (and
indeed, the drawdown actually is consistent with ongoing
discussions with EU partners). Merkel reportedly was unhappy
with Jung's uncoordinated Bosnia announcement but has stood
by him publicly. Chancellery sources have told us they are
frustrated by this problem of the government's own making.
3. (C) The Chancellery also is particularly worried about
losing influence in the Bundestag, with the upcoming renewal
of Germany's OEF mandate this month. The constitution and
German law on overseas military deployments exacerbate this
legislative-management issue: even the relatively small
number (ca. 9,000) of deployed troops attracts continual
parliamentary and public attention. While senior officials
from the Chancellery and Foreign Office would like to see the
law changed, they recognize that is not likely in the
near-term.
4. (C) The White Paper approved by the cabinet October 25
struck a forward-leaning tone and proposed a 50 percent
increase (to 14,000) in the level of ambition for overseas
deployments (Ref C). In a matter of days, that positive buzz
disappeared amid controversy over ongoing operations. Jung,
who travels November 2-3 to Israel and Lebanon, likely will
face further criticism when the Bundestag convenes again next
week.
5. (C) Domestic politics, where Merkel is beset by criticism
over reforms and the CDU's declining popular support,
complicates things for the Chancellor as well (Ref D).
Merkel will stand for re-election as CDU chairwoman at the
party's November 27-28 congress. While there is no doubt she
will be returned with a large majority again, a significant
drop from her previous levels of support (she won 98 percent
of the vote from her Bundestag caucus in September 2005 on
the heels of her successful general election campaign, and
won 88 percent party-wide as chairwoman in 2004) could damage
her standing within the party. This in turn could encourage
the persistent sniping from state-level rivals and contribute
to an image of Merkel as a weakened leader at home.
6. (C) Comment: We should continue privately to encourage
senior German officials to show strong leadership in
explaining their deployments publicly. It is noteworthy that
not all criticism from the political class has focused on
drawing down deployed forces; the most effective criticism of
the UNIFIL deployment, for example, has centered on the
possibility that UN mandate was not robust enough and might
prevent German forces from stopping Hizballah arms smuggling.
But Merkel may see a high profile on security issues in the
immediate future as a risk to her standing within the CDU and
the Coalition. A weakened Merkel, on the eve of the NATO
Summit, could make more difficult progress toward our goals
for the transatlantic relationship.
BERLIN 00003220 002 OF 002
TIMKEN JR
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM GM LE AF BK SR
SUBJECT: PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE, GOVERNMENT MISSTEPS
COMPLICATE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES FOR GRAND COALITION
REF: A. BERLIN 3141
B. BERLIN 3142
C. BERLIN 3145
D. BERLIN 2769
Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: Setbacks related to German overseas
deployments are reinforcing a tendency toward short-term
caution on military issues. Barely one week after the
release of a well-received White Paper on security that cast
Germany as an increasingly engaged and transformed security
partner, Berlin -- especially Defense Minister Jung -- is
under pressure on Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Bosnia. The
Chancellery in particular is in crisis-management mode with
regard to the Bundestag. As Chancellor Merkel looks ahead to
the CDU's national party congress November 27-28, she may be
especially careful to avoid any mis-steps on foreign policy
that might compound the feeding frenzy and weaken her
standing within the party and her coalition. End summary.
2. (C) The Grand Coalition Government was faced last week
with bad news from Afghanistan -- photographs of German
soldiers mishandling human remains hit the press last week --
and Lebanon -- three separate incidents with Israeli aircraft
in the eastern Mediterranean raised fears of an accidental
clash between German and Israeli forces (Refs A and B). The
public response of the government to these developments has
been tentative and largely defensive. To counter anticipated
parliamentary objections that German forces were stretched
too thin worldwide, Defense Minister Jung announced over the
weekend that Germany would begin withdrawing its 850 soldiers
in Bosnia in December. This step fed impressions the
government was reeling, and it encouraged still more
criticism, even though Jung intended the opposite (and
indeed, the drawdown actually is consistent with ongoing
discussions with EU partners). Merkel reportedly was unhappy
with Jung's uncoordinated Bosnia announcement but has stood
by him publicly. Chancellery sources have told us they are
frustrated by this problem of the government's own making.
3. (C) The Chancellery also is particularly worried about
losing influence in the Bundestag, with the upcoming renewal
of Germany's OEF mandate this month. The constitution and
German law on overseas military deployments exacerbate this
legislative-management issue: even the relatively small
number (ca. 9,000) of deployed troops attracts continual
parliamentary and public attention. While senior officials
from the Chancellery and Foreign Office would like to see the
law changed, they recognize that is not likely in the
near-term.
4. (C) The White Paper approved by the cabinet October 25
struck a forward-leaning tone and proposed a 50 percent
increase (to 14,000) in the level of ambition for overseas
deployments (Ref C). In a matter of days, that positive buzz
disappeared amid controversy over ongoing operations. Jung,
who travels November 2-3 to Israel and Lebanon, likely will
face further criticism when the Bundestag convenes again next
week.
5. (C) Domestic politics, where Merkel is beset by criticism
over reforms and the CDU's declining popular support,
complicates things for the Chancellor as well (Ref D).
Merkel will stand for re-election as CDU chairwoman at the
party's November 27-28 congress. While there is no doubt she
will be returned with a large majority again, a significant
drop from her previous levels of support (she won 98 percent
of the vote from her Bundestag caucus in September 2005 on
the heels of her successful general election campaign, and
won 88 percent party-wide as chairwoman in 2004) could damage
her standing within the party. This in turn could encourage
the persistent sniping from state-level rivals and contribute
to an image of Merkel as a weakened leader at home.
6. (C) Comment: We should continue privately to encourage
senior German officials to show strong leadership in
explaining their deployments publicly. It is noteworthy that
not all criticism from the political class has focused on
drawing down deployed forces; the most effective criticism of
the UNIFIL deployment, for example, has centered on the
possibility that UN mandate was not robust enough and might
prevent German forces from stopping Hizballah arms smuggling.
But Merkel may see a high profile on security issues in the
immediate future as a risk to her standing within the CDU and
the Coalition. A weakened Merkel, on the eve of the NATO
Summit, could make more difficult progress toward our goals
for the transatlantic relationship.
BERLIN 00003220 002 OF 002
TIMKEN JR