DHS A/S BAKER ENGAGES ON PNR, SEEKS GREATER CT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 003173

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DHS FOR A/S STEWART BAKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: KHLS PGOV PTER PREL EAIR GM EU
SUBJECT: DHS A/S BAKER ENGAGES ON PNR, SEEKS GREATER CT
INFO SHARING

REF: BERLIN 2785

Classified By: Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs Robert F. Cekuta
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Department of Homeland Security Assistant
Secretary for Policy Stewart Baker urged greater bilateral

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biographic and biometric information sharing and explained
U.S. objections to the recent U.S.-EU Passenger Name Records
(PNR) agreement. A/S Baker urged Germany to accept an early
November U.S. delegation to discuss which parts of the Pruem
agreement the United States wanted to use as a basis for a
bilateral agreement to step up our fight against terrorism;
senior Interior Ministry interlocutors reiterated their
interest but sought a written U.S. statement to begin the
process. On PNR, German interlocutors appeared to lament
they would need to be intensively engaged in managing the
issue due to their assuming the EU Presidency in the first
half of 2007. A/S Baker resisted senior German calls to
simply extend the interim agreement. He also highlighted how
PNR data had helped DHS intercept terrorists while the
agreement's limitations had prevented U.S. agencies from
acting to prevent the travel of other suspects. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In Berlin on October 18 and 19, A/S Baker met with:
- Ministry of the Interior (MOI) State Secretary August
Hanning,
- MOI Director General for Police and Counterterrorism
Guenter Krause,
- MOI Director General for the Federal Police (former Border
Police) Ruediger Kass,
- Ministry of Justice State Secretary Lutz Diwell,
- Chancellery Federal Intelligence Coordinator Klaus-Dieter
Fritsche, and
- Federal Data Privacy and Freedom of Information
Commissioner Peter Schaar.
Assistant Secretary Baker also received a briefing at the
German Joint Interagency Counterterrorism Center (GTAZ) and
met with a small group of German journalists.

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EXPANDED INFORMATION SHARING
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3. (C) Ministry of the Interior State Secretary Hanning said
Germany is prepared for broader counterterrorism information
sharing, including biometric and biographic information,
following the recent visit of Minister Schaeuble to
Washington (ref A) and meetings with U.S. Department of
Justice officials October 12. A/S Baker said an interagency
delegation is ready to visit Berlin November 7-8 to begin
discussions on what parts of the Pruem agreement might be
fruitful for the U.S. to pursue with Germany as a prelude to
an agreement with the Pruem group of EU countries.
Concerning fingerprints specifically, A/S Baker noted the two
distinct U.S. systems -- the U.S. VISIT system used at ports
of entry, which has a very fast response time, and the other
more traditional system used by U.S. law enforcement. DG
Krause said the more an eventual U.S.-German agreement looked
like the Pruem text -- especially its data privacy provisions
-- the easier it would be to get through the German
Bundestag. Krause added the texts need not be identical, but
he urged the U.S. side to study Pruem in detail and to send a
written response noting which areas the U.S. seeks to pursue
with Germany.


4. (C) Krause noted that any EU Framework Decision on data
protection in the area of law enforcement and public security
should be limited to broad principles. More specific details
should be covered through separate arrangements based on the
requirements of the system or relationship in question.


5. (C) Federal Intelligence Coordinator Fritsche said Germany
needs not just "more information sharing than ever" but new
data sources. He observed that German authorities never
before performed background checks on those writing formal
invitations and guarantees for foreign students to obtain
German visas. The investigation after the summer 2006 failed
train bombings revealed Islamist radicals in Germany had
invited to Germany other individuals who had been involved in
the bomb plot. Germany has now closed this loophole,
Fritsche said. A/S Baker responded terror plots could be
unraveled by sharing information and gave as an example the
UK aircraft bombing plot. The U.S. and EU should both be
interested in which of their nationals and residents are
flying to and from Pakistan, for example, whether they

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originally boarded flights from the U.S. or EU region or not.


6. (C) Ministry of the Interior DG for the Federal Police
Kass told A/S Baker that after the failed train bomb plot,
Germany needs new measures to provide security and Kass looks
to technology -- facial recognition, iris scanning, and
fingerprints -- to help. Kass noted his desire to make
progress on a U.S.-Germany International Registered Traveler
concept and offered to meet either in Berlin or Washington to
advance this issue. He also asked about technology that
could identify people and objects behaving suspiciously,
e.g., people on a train platform with a certain suitcase at
one moment, and without it later.

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PASSENGER NAME RECORDS (PNR)
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7. (C) Both MOI State Secretary Hanning and DG Krause
suggested to A/S Baker the U.S. and EU should simply extend
the interim PNR agreement. All officials noted that the MOI
would have lead on this issue for the GOG. Krause wondered
if an ICAO- or IATA-wide agreement might not be a better
alternative. A/S Baker disagreed with the proposal to extend
the agreement and listed several U.S. concerns, including the
detailed, "code of conduct" mentality underlying the current
text; the limited number of PNR fields to which U.S. agencies
have access; the need to delete data before the end of its
utility; the complications associated with third country
sharing (A/S Baker provided examples of how this provision
had impeded U.S. law enforcement efforts); and lack of
reciprocity (i.e., that EU member states are not obliged to
follow the same rules the U.S. must). A/S Baker noted the
utility of engaging IATA and/or ICAO so long as the United
States and the EU are in agreement on the principles to be
promoted. After the 9/11 Commission Report, the passage of
the Intelligence Reform Act and several Executive Orders,
U.S. agencies are required to share information in ways that
the U.S.-EU PNR agreement seeks to inhibit. The U.S. seeks a
different kind of PNR agreement, based on general principles,
not a list of detailed "dos and don'ts," and more modeled on
mutual legal assistance treaties, which envision the sharing
of data between law enforcement agencies, and less on the
data privacy rules the EU applies to the commercial sector.
He offered to share with Hanning the list of principles the
U.S. proposed to the EU negotiating team and urged Germany to
seek from the EU a broad negotiating mandate.


8. (C) Both MOI interlocutors and State Secretary of Justice
Diwell referred to German laws governing German law
enforcement agencies, which include data privacy provisions.
Hanning noted that data protection advocates are pushing in
the opposite direction. Diwell said it is a fundamental EU
and German position that agencies have rules that govern how
they can use data, whether and when they can share it with
other agencies, and that the original rules apply to any
agency subsequently receiving the data. He also cautioned
that all 25 EU member states would have to ratify a new
U.S.-EU PNR agreement. A/S Baker warned that in many cases
the actual airline databases reside in the United States, and
the airlines of many EU countries do not have flights to the
United States, and so in this light, from the U.S.
perspective, it was difficult to see why an EU government and
parliament should have any influence on the access of U.S.
agencies to data in the United States. A/S Baker told both
MOI interlocutors and Diwell the U.S. objections to the
current interim PNR agreement were such that the U.S.
preferred no deal to an extension beyond July 2007 of the
current one.


9. (C) Fritsche asked if U.S. agencies were engaged in
"sophisticated data mining" of PNR data and cautioned the
trend in the EU was towards greater transparency. Travelers
provided information inadvertently to airlines and travel
agencies, but Fritsche was not sure Germany would be able to
use those data. A/S Baker downplayed the sophistication of
U.S. use of PNR data, but gave examples of their value; e.g.
phone numbers had been useful to track militants and
additional suspect individuals could be identified when they
traveled as a group with a known extremist.


10. (C) Data Privacy Commissioner Peter Schaar and his staff
member Hans Tischler asked A/S Baker numerous question as
they read line-by-line through A/S Baker's October 11
interpretive letter on PNR to the European Commission and
Presidency of the EU Council. Among Schaar's many questions:

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- Were there contradictions between the letter (which allows
for broad sharing) and the agreement (which they read as more
restrictive)?
- What is a "serious crime" that is "transnational in nature"?
- What is "facilitated disclosure" and would other U.S.
agencies have "conditional direct access" to PNR data?
- What constitutes "comparable standards" of data protection?
- Would DHS audit the data privacy provisions of third U.S.
agencies?
- Why did DHS not support a faster switch to "push" vice
"pull" PNR data access?
- Would the U.S. agree to a spring 2007 joint review of U.S.
implementation of the PNR agreement?
- Why did the U.S. seek access to additional data including:
additional frequent flier data, sensitive data fields, and
the number of articles of hand luggage?


11. (C) A/S Baker explained U.S. objections to the current
PNR agreement and invited Schaar to send his questions in
writing; Schaar explained his objections to broad
inter-agency sharing and sharing with "police on the street,"
long data retention periods, and U.S. access to more data
fields. Occasionally the two found areas of common ground:
When A/S Baker asked hypothetically whether a tip that
terrorists would use aircraft "this week" would be
sufficiently specific for other U.S. agencies to access and
analyze PNR data, Schaar said "probably yes." Schaar noted
that his "bottom line standard" is that the rules for
disclosure beyond CBP should be written down in a concrete
fashion. In another instance, Schaar said he was unconcerned
about repeated "pushes" of PNR data, even when triggered by a
U.S. request. Once you have the data, Schaar said, it did
not matter to him how many more times airlines sent it.
Schaar also said he had no objection to DHS acquiring
information from frequent flier accounts as along as the data
was among the 34 data fields listed in the agreement (a
position with which Tischler did not agree.) Similarly,
Schaar noted that he did not fundamentally object to
temporary access to sensitive data as long as the carriers,
not the United States, were responsible for "flipping the
switch."


12. (C) As chairman of the EU Working Group of Article 29
Data Privacy Commissioners, Schaar noted that the Group was
preparing a written opinion on the letter to the Council.


13. (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Baker.
TIMKEN JR