SUBJECT: GERMAN SECURITY POLICY WHITE PAPER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BERLIN 003145 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PREL GM SUBJECT: SUBJECT: GERMAN SECURITY POLICY WHITE PAPER APPLAUDED, QUESTIONS REMAIN Classified By: Classified by Deputy Chief of Mission John M. Koenig for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. Chancellor Merkel and her cabinet approved October 25 a White Paper on security policy and the future of the Bundeswehr, the first since 1994. The document is on the whole a success, defining priorities in a manner consistent with that of the U.S. and reaffirming the role of NATO and the German-U.S. partnership. The paper leaves some questions unanswered, particularly on how to boost defense spending or to improve NATO-EU relations. But the White Paper is a clear signal of Germany's commitment to a close security partnership with the U.S. and a definitive rejection of the vision of Europe as a counterweight to the United States. The English version of the White Paper can be accessed at www.weissbuch.de/download/White Paper 2006.pdf and the summary is available at www.weissbuch.de/download/ White Paper 2006 Summary.pdf. End Summary. ¶2. (C) The new security strategy defines Germany's national interests, which in itself is an achievement and a departure from Germany's post-War tendency to define itself through its engagement in multilateral organizations and arrangements. The paper identifies global threats in a way strikingly similar to the U.S. and provides at least a partial strategy to deal with them. It highlights the three security concerns facing Germany today: international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and regional conflicts and failing states. The policy concludes that meeting these threats requires preventive (even pre-emptive),efficient and coherent cooperation at both the national and international levels. However, the question of when Germany should actively engage on certain matters, which goals take priority, and how they can be achieved is not discussed, most likely because of differences of opinion within the coalition government. In some ways a compromise document, one can detect in some portions of the paper the fissures between the CDU/CSU and SPD. The paper stresses the need to boost spending and continue the transformation of the Bundeswehr but offers no budgetary targets. NATO First... -------------- ¶3. (C) NATO is described as the "strongest anchor" of German security and defense policy, essential for meeting Germany's security challenges. The paper is strong on transformation, partnerships, and NATO action to meet global challenges. It also calls for more expeditionary capabilities. The paper defines relations with the U.S. as central to German foreign and security policy, to "shape the transatlantic partnership in the Alliance with the future in mind, and to cultivate the close and trusting relationship with the USA. Now and in the future, the fundamental issues of European security can be only addressed together with the USA." ¶4. (U) The paper states that German security policy is multilateral in character, and that risks and threats must be addressed with a comprehensive approach of suitably matched instruments, including diplomatic, economic, development policy and policing measures as well as military means. In order to respond more aggressively to security concerns, the White Paper calls for the establishment of an inter-ministerial approach called "networked security" including federal intelligence and military intelligence services, the MoD, MFA and the Bundeswehr. (White Paper detractors question what networked security means in practice.) ¶5. (C) European integration is also considered vital to German security policy, and the paper supports an enhanced strategic partnership between the EU and NATO - not as competitors but as coordinated contributors to global peace and security. The paper mentions "Berlin Plus" as a vehicle for cooperation but otherwise fails to provide concrete steps to achieve a better relationship. Special attention is given to the relationship with France and the United Kingdom as partners for peace and stability throughout Europe. Attention is then focused on areas where additional emphasis is required: Central Asia, Russia, and Ukraine in particular, in addition to a general treatment of other regions of the world. ¶6. (C) The paper observes that Germany has become one of the largest troop contributors to international peace missions ) a sea change in tangible German participation in international security and a radical departure from the German role during the Cold War. It praises the NATO Response Force (NRF) and calls for renewed efforts toward inter-operability, enhanced strategic airlift capabilities, and increased dialog between the EU and NATO. The White Paper confirms Germany's commitment to have available -- although not necessarily all at one time -- 15,000 troops for the NRF and 18,000 for EU Battlegroups. (These numbers include troops on rotation, in instruction or on leave.) Domestic Bundeswehr Deployments Remain Controversial -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The White Paper further notes that the employment of the Bundeswehr within Germany already "is...permissible under certain conditions to support the police forces in the event of imminent danger to the existence of free democratic basic order" but points out that the constitution does not allow the use domestically of equipment and munitions unique to the military. (Note: this is a reference to a 2006 Constitutional Court ruling that the Bundeswehr could not shoot down a roque aircraft. End note.) With the rise and threat of terrorism within German borders, the White Paper states that the "Federal Government therefore considers it necessary to expand the constitutional framework for the deployment of the Armed Forces" -- specifically for air- and sea-based defense. (Note: This limitation to air and sea reportedly is a concession to the SPD, and especially Justice Minister Zypries, who had opposed earlier, more general, draft language in this section. There is no consensus within the Coalition Government yet on the details of such a constitutional change. The Interior, Justice, and Defense Ministries may not be able to easily resolve their differing views on the circumstances in which the Bundeswehr would be used, and how it would be used. End note.) Role of Nuclear Deterrence Unchanged -------------- ¶8. (C) The White Paper also recognizes the role nuclear deterrence plays in the security environment, stating that the Alliance will continue to need "nuclear assets in the foreseeable future" and that Germany is prepared to make its contribution "towards nuclear participation commensurate to its role in the Alliance." The end goal remains, however, the eventual worldwide elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, on arms control and disarmament, the White Paper reiterates Germany's support for the NPT, CWC, BWC, PSI, the Ottawa Convention and opportunities to further control small arms and light weapons. ¶9. (C) The paper sticks with conscription in Germany and underscores that only volunteers or career soldiers would take part in the response or stabilization forces. ¶10. (C) Comment: The White Paper is an important and positive step forward in German security policy that the USG should welcome; it anchors Germany in a close partnership with the United States, confirms NATO as the preeminent Transatlantic security organization, and prepares Germany for a more active security role in meeting 21st-century threats. Although it fails to resolve some key issues, most notably the use of the military within Germany, this is an important milestone that advances our Transatlantic agenda. We will need to continue to press Germany on insufficient defense spending, still a critical shortcoming. But the White Paper provides a compass that will guide German security policy in a direction with great potential for increased cooperation with the U.S. and our allies. TIMKEN JR