U.S.-GERMAN COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY: SEIZING THE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 002785

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR NSC, DHS, STATE (S/CT AND EUR)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016
TAGS: PTER PGOV PREL KHLS CVIS TBIO GM EU
SUBJECT: U.S.-GERMAN COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY: SEIZING THE
OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE OUR COOPERATION

REF: A. BERLIN 2058


B. BERLIN 2654

C. BERLIN 2303

D. BERLIN 1995

Classified By: DCM John M. Koenig for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S) Summary. The discovery this summer of the plot to
bomb German trains, coming on top of terrorists' plans in the
UK to blow-up transatlantic flights, has created an opening
for the German government to move on further counterterrorism
initiatives. Interior Minister Schaeuble's trip to
Washington September 25-26, followed by Germany's assumption
of the EU and G-8 Presidencies January 1 offers opportunities
for the U.S. to work with Germany to set out common
priorities and achieve specific objectives. Interior
Minister Schaeuble too wants to build on the solid
cooperation that now exists in fighting terrorism and has
told his staff he wants real progress in his upcoming visit.
Improved terrorist information-sharing tops his list for
steps to improve U.S./German collaboration. Besides boosting
bilateral cooperation, we should use Schaeuble's visit and
the upcoming German presidencies to set the stage for better
coordination and progress on a range of G-8 and EU
initiatives as Germany prepares to assume the twin
presidencies in January 2007. Specific areas Mission
suggests we pursue as part of a strategy of working with
Germany bilaterally and as a partner in building stronger
cooperation within the G-8 and the EU are:

- Data exchange agreements

- Cooperation in fighting terrorists' use of the Internet

- Strengthened cooperation against bioterrorism

- Counterterrorism cooperation with Germany and a group of
similar-minded countries in the EU by means of linking into
what they agreed in the Pruem agreements. End Summary.

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BILATERAL PROGRESS WITHIN REACH
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2. (C) German Interior Minister Schaeuble's primary goal in
Washington, according to his Diplomatic Advisor Lothar
Freischlader, is expanding terrorist data exchange. British
officials briefed Schaeuble in London August 16 on the role
of U.S.-UK cooperation in preventing the airplane bomb plot.
The briefing convinced Schaeuble that Germany has to deepen
cooperation with the U.S., Freischlader said. Having the
Minister in Washington and so favorably inclined is an
opportunity not to be missed. The Embassy has consistently
pushed for more information exchange (ref A) and visiting DHS
Counselor Rosenzweig September 5 called sharing terrorist
data DHS's first priority (ref B). While we have had good
informal information exchanges with many German federal and
state agencies, they are often based on professional
relationships Mission personnel have built up over the years.
Up to now, the most forthcoming response we have had from
German officials at the director-general level was a call for
experts to meet; lower level staff sometimes rehash German
concerns about data protection and pour cold water. U.S.
officials should seek Schaeuble's commitment in Washington to
agree to a systematic and robust exchange of terrorist
watch-list data (HSPD-6). Experts may still need to meet on
implementation details but Schaeuble should instruct his
staff that they are to discuss how, not whether, to make
information sharing possible.


3. (S) Post has also long sought the sharing of terrorists'
fingerprint data (ref A). FBI Director Mueller raised this
issue with Schaeuble's deputy, August Hanning, in Berlin
September 19 (ref C). Senior MOI officials repeatedly tell
us systematic fingerprint sharing presents more of a
challenge, mostly due to German and EU rules and public
concerns over data privacy. Regardless, given the persuasive
power of the successful dismantling of the UK bomb plot,
Schaeuble should hear whatever we can tell him about how
fingerprint data sharing enabled victories in the war on
terrorism. We should tell Schaeuble we are prepared to begin
deeper information sharing with watchlist data, but the
future of terrorism prevention depends on greater resort to
biometrics.

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GERMAN G-8 PRESIDENCY
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4. (C) German officials repeatedly state they are not
looking to launch a raft of new initiatives in their G-8
Presidency. Their general goal is to advance initiatives
already launched and see that past commitments are met, but
they named bioterrorism as one topic on which they would
focus. Therefore there is an opportunity to work closely
with Germany to ensure forward movement in ongoing G-8
efforts in defending against bioterrorism. One area on the
counterterrorism front where German officials see need for an
initiative, however, regards terrorists' use of the Internet.
The Germans, with the UK, France, and Russia, have
previously put forward a proposal in the G-8 which Post
understands raised constitutional/legal difficulties for the
U.S.


5. (S) German officials tell us Schaeuble was struck by the
role of the Internet in this summer's failed German train
bombing plot. Internet sites radicalized the plotters and
taught them how to make their suitcase bombs, German
officials report. The German press reports Arabic-language
Internet monitoring is a priority for Schaeuble's 50 million
Euro budget increase for the domestic security service (BfV).
German officials told visiting S/CT Counterterrorism
Coordinator Crumpton Sept. 6 Germany is aware of U.S. First
Amendment concerns and is prepared to water down the proposal
to satisfy U.S. and Canadian objections. The MFA's
counterterrorism office Director Matthias Sonn added there
would be no U.S. action required other than sharing "best
practices." We may have other ideas we might pursue with
Germany or how countries could work together to deal with the
problems resulting from terrorists' use of international
communications systems. We might also review past G-8
agreements/initiatives to see which need bird-dogging or
fresh impetus during Germany's presidency.

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GERMAN EU PRESIDENCY
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6. (C) Likewise, Germany's record as a force for greater
cooperation among EU members, and German officials' repeated
statements that counterterrorism cooperation in the EU cannot
be allowed to fall to the lowest common denominator, suggests
opportunities under the German EU Presidency. German
officials told Amb. Crumpton Germany will push for progress
on the EU's 45-item action plan, but plans no major new EU
counterterrorism initiatives. This again gives us the chance
to influence German thinking by encouraging them to
concentrate on those items most in the U.S. interest.
Minister Schaeuble, like his predecessor Otto Schily, has
focused on deepening EU counterterrorism cooperation with
those who are ready and willing. One example is the set of
so-called Pruem agreements that envision nearly instantaneous
law enforcement data sharing -- including biometrics --
between select EU partners. Germany's and Schaeuble's
objective is clear and commendable, as long as other partners
like the U.S. are not left out. Germany should be sensitive
to U.S. concerns that EU initiatives, while laudably designed
to tighten cooperation within the 25 member states, should
not come at the cost of more complex sharing with the U.S.
Schaeuble the transatlanticist should be particularly
responsive to this U.S. concern. Post has transmitted the
text of the Pruem agreements to Washington. We might look
into the agreements to see whether there are aspects where it
might be advantageous for the U.S. somehow to "join."


7. (C) Another subject we should raise more explicitly with
German officials is the EU Third Pillar privacy directive,
which the EU may take steps to implement during Germany's
presidency. This is a key example of an EU initiative that
has potential negative impact on current EU member state law
enforcement and judicial information sharing with the U.S.
It will be important to make the U.S. message clear not only
in Brussels but with key member states and the German EU
Presidency. Separately, Germany, along with a few other EU
member states, has taken a special interest in further reform
of the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 Al-Qaida Sanctions
Committee, but Germany claims its proposals are not as
objectionable to the U.S. as those of others. We should use
German EU chairmanship and its chairing periodic U.S.-EU
meetings to our advantage in this setting as well. There may
also be an opportunity to use the German EU Presidency, given
Germany's stance and efforts against the PKK, to give impetus
to other key EU member states to similarly target PKK
fundraising and logistical support.

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OTHER ISSUES
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8. (C) The areas listed above seem, from the viewpoint of
Mission Germany, the items on which we should concentrate our
efforts with the Germans through the first half of 2007.
There are other areas where German progress will be important
in the international fight against terror, however, which we
should continue to support/emphasize in our dealings with
German officials and politicians. Germany is revising and
expanding a number of counterterrorism laws (ref. D),which
again shows Schaeuble's commitment to address the threat
Germany faces and utilize the opening they feel they have at
the moment with the public. German interlocutors have told
us they want to work with us on other bilateral and
multilateral efforts in 2007, i.e., joint biometric
"registered traveler" program for Frankfurt airport,
personnel exchanges between the U.S. National
Counterterrorism Center NCTC and its German equivalent GTAZ,
and greater dialogue between U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and the German Interior Ministry on biometric travel
documents. The Embassy will work these issues, but suggests
Washington agencies may wish to consider the items listed in
the paras above as the areas on which we should concrete our
efforts.
TIMKEN JR