CDU/CSU AND SPD INTERNAL DISCONTENT: IMPACT ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 002769 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2021 TAGS: PGOV GM SUBJECT: CDU/CSU AND SPD INTERNAL DISCONTENT: IMPACT ON MERKEL AND THE GRAND COALITION REF: BERLIN 1893 Classified By: PolCouns John Bauman. Reason: 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (U) Summary. Chancellor Merkel begins the fall political season in a secure position, despite sniping from rivals within her own party and tensions between the coalition partners at the party level. However, party sources and polls indicate discontent remains significant. The SPD is plagued by similar problems and in addition faces political challenges from right and left. Though neither Merkel nor the Grand Coalition is in danger, the fall is likely to see continued tension within and between the Union and SPD, which will limit the Chancellor's and government's room for maneuver on key domestic and foreign policy issues. We do not expect intramural strife in the Union and SPD to stop reform efforts or prevent Germany from taking on new international responsibilities. End Summary. CDU/CSU Discontent -------------- ¶2. (U) The summer's open criticisms of the Chancellor coincided with and reinforced a slide in opinion polls for both the CDU/CSU and Merkel. The CDU slipped from an average of around 37 percent to around 32 percent in late August. A September poll indicated 51 percent of CDU/CSU voters were disappointed with their parties and CDU contacts report that the mood among parliamentarians is sour. The Chancellor's poll slide has also been significant -- she has slipped from first to third place (behind the SPD's Kurt Beck and Frank-Walter Steinmeier) in one popularity measure and a poll on voter satisfaction with Merkel showed her slipping from 63 to 56 percent from June to August. Discontent in the CDU falls into three main categories: -- The free-market oriented wing of the party and the Christian social wing (also especially strong in the CSU) both are unhappy with the government's policies. The former (largely in business circles) sees a betrayal of the party's campaign commitment to increase economic freedom. The latter (led in particular by North-Rhine Westphalia Minister-President Juergen Ruettgers) fears the abandonment of the party's commitment to the "social-market." Merkel has, however, sought to position herself in the center of this debate. -- Both factions agree that Merkel has not pushed hard enough for conservative policies within the coalition. 
-- Merkel and her proteges in the leadership have been pushing for a modernization of the party's understanding of society (e.g., more acceptance of non-traditional lifestyles, immigrants, and working women). A large, predominantly rural and religiously committed, segment of the party objects to these trends. . SPD Not Better Off -------------- ¶3. (U) Though spared the summer's public infighting, and holding steady in polls at around 30 percent, the SPD is in fact no better off. 67 percent of SPD voters in the September poll said they were disappointed with the party. The SPD's public image has benefited from the novelty and charisma of new Chairman Kurt Beck and the prominence of Foreign Minister Steinmeier. But party contacts also report that activists, especially at the mid-levels, are unhappy with the government's direction and in the spring the SPD suffered through a public fight over strategy between Vice-Chancellor Muentefering and then-Chairman Platzeck. In addition, the SPD faces political challenges from the Left Party.PDS and from the right as the CDU modernizes its social message. Discontent Not Fatal -------------- ¶4. (C) These discontents will continue, but their impact should not be exaggerated. Neither party has reason to believe it would receive a stronger mandate from early elections. There is no sign that cabinet relationships have been damaged -- cabinet discipline continues to hold and contacts tell us the working relationships among the cabinet and senior parliamentary leadership remain good. During the Bundestag's annual Budget Debate (in fact, a general policy debate) on Sept. 6, Ministers strongly defended the government's positions and policies. The Chancellor made only a few, indirect remarks directed at the SPD - for example noting that SPD leader Beck's recent call for greater attention to the productive (i.e., middle) classes was an BERLIN 00002769 002 OF 002 adoption of long-standing CDU/CSU policy. Likewise, SPD leaders were restrained -- SPD caucus leader Struck recalled that his party would have preferred to see health reform take a different turn. The SPD leadership has focused its criticism of the CDU/CSU on Minister-Presidents who oppose government plans for health care reform. But Is a Constraint -------------- ¶5. (C) Though strife in the coalition will not stop reform efforts or prevent Germany from taking on new international responsibilities, it puts a brake on Merkel's government, forcing her to widen the decision-making circle to maintain unity. An example is health care reform -- one of Merkel's key priorities -- which has been postponed in the face of rising opposition from the states and within the Bundestag caucuses. Strains have also reportedly led the government to back off plans for cuts in business taxes and laws protecting workers against dismissal. A more cautious government will look long and hard at foreign policy initiatives and may not be able to decide quickly (e.g., Lebanon). This will not diminish the commitment of Merkel's government to trans-Atlanticism and a strong relationship with the U.S., but we may need to factor in the increasingly deliberate (and deliberative) nature of her management of the Grand Coalition. End Comment. TIMKEN JR