GERMAN VIEWS ON S/P INITIATIVE, "PARTNERSHIP FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BERLIN 001937 SIPDIS SIPDIS S/P FOR TODD DEATHERAGE E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2016 TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL KCOR KDEM KCRS KMCA KMPI GM SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ON S/P INITIATIVE, "PARTNERSHIP FOR BETTER GOVERNANCE" Classified By: EMIN Robert F. Cekuta for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: S/P Director Dr. Stephen Krasner consulted with German officials June 29 on the "Partnership for Better Governance" initiative (PBG). The PBG would be a multilateral partnership to support the emergence of democratic institutions in the developing world by contracting to provide things like basic public services, accountability mechanisms, and audits. Developing countries would essentially hire the PBG either to help provide a service, like tax collection, or to certify that a specific state service already being provided is transparent and effective. The goal would be to legitimate the external provision of services and to further democratic consolidation by offering both help and an international seal of approval to reformers. While agreeing with Dr. Krasner that better governance is a key to development, the German officials raised questions about how to fit the initiative into existing efforts, whether it would be part of current multilateral structures or freestanding, and how to maximize the initiative's legitimacy, especially given political sensitivities about sovereignty in the developing world. End Summary. INTRODUCING THE PARTNERSHIP FOR BETTER GOVERNANCE -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) S/P Director Dr. Stephen Krasner, S/P Special Assistant Todd Deatherage, and S/P Member Philip Levy met June 29 in Berlin with officials from the German Chancellery, Foreign Ministry, and Development Ministry to discuss their ideas for a Partnership for Better Governance (PBG). EMIN and Emboff also participated in the meetings. ¶3. (C) Dr. Krasner explained that, in addition to our continuing focus on elections, more needs to be done to help consolidate democratic gains by building functioning, transparent institutions. The PBG would coordinate and legitimate the external provision of services that a developing state has trouble providing, audit the delivery of such services, and identify innovative accountability mechanisms like citizen surveys that assess service provision. ¶4. (C) The PBG could also act as a clearinghouse for information, collecting stories about what works, propagating best practices, and developing standards for the delivery of state services. The idea would be to strengthen reformers in developing countries by legitimating good governance choices. For example, the PBG could certify that a police force met standards of non-corruption, thereby offering a reformist leader credible proof that his or her policies were working. ¶5. (C) The PBG members would be interested liberal democracies in both the developed and developing worlds, as well as key implementing organizations, like the UN, the World Bank, and the IMF. The PBG would provide its services on a contractual basis for a limited period, while concurrently building the capacity of the developing country to take over once the contract expires. This capacity building function would be crucial because it would make the developing country's progress sustainable. INPUT FROM GERMANY -------------- ¶6. (C) German officials said they were open to the concept of the PBG, but also raised several questions. These questions fell into three broad categories. ¶7. (C) First, how would the PBG add value to existing good governance efforts, both bilateral and multilateral? All of our interlocutors pointed out that German development aid already focuses heavily on good governance. As Foreign Minister Steinmeier's Deputy Chief of Staff, Dieter Haller, said, "This is something our political party foundations have been doing for decades." Rolf Nikel, Deputy Director General of the Chancellery, argued that much of what the PBG would do is already being done, even if not coordinated, so Germany would have to be convinced a new structure was necessary. Michael Hofmann, Director General for Global Issues at the Development Ministry, echoed this, but also saw a possible BERLIN 00001937 002 OF 002 role for the PBG in information gathering and sharing. Hofmann noted the development community needs more information about good governance best practices. Markus Ederer, Director of Policy Planning at the MFA, said it would be important to avoid duplication of things already being done and asked whether the PBG would be a kind of pledging forum or a formal institution with its own capacity. ¶8. (C) Second, assuming a PBG is needed, would it be a new institution or would it be embedded in an existing one? The Development Ministry's Hofmann pointed out that the ad hoc structure of the PBG might make it hard to integrate the organization into the World Bank or the UN. If the PBG was to be part of the UN, for example, then it would have to come under the control of the "UN family," said Hofmann, which would limit its flexibility. Several other interlocutors pointed out, however, that creating a freestanding PBG might lead to needless duplication of staff and technical resources. ¶9. (C) Third, how can we maximize the PBG's legitimacy, especially considering sensitivities about sovereignty in the developing world? Nikel, at the Chancellery, argued most countries in the developing world are still very touchy about anything that appears to limit their sovereignty. Hofmann, at the Development Ministry, also emphasized the legitimacy issue, noting that the topic was so sensitive, "it had taken 50 years just to reach a point where the World Bank could start talking about good governance and corruption." Hofmann emphasized it would be important to structure the PBG to avoid provoking any kind of backlash in the developing world, noting that there should be more transparency in good governance, but that this should take the form of information sharing among donors, rather than public efforts to shame leaders into reforming. He added that allowing the PBG to provide services might also be exploited by developing country politicians who would try to blame the donor countries if things went wrong. Hofmann also argued that the roll-out of a possible PBG should include international leaders who have a kind of personal legitimacy in the developing world and that getting the right personalities involved might be just as important as getting the right countries to participate initially. All the interlocutors also questioned why an ad hoc, voluntary structure would be more legitimate than a global organization with as many members as possible. ¶10. (C) Comment: The German officials Dr. Krasner met were clearly interested in the PBG, but will need to be convinced that such an initiative will fit well with Germany's current development strategy. German development officials are proud of their focus on governance and rule-of-law issues and rarely miss an opportunity to highlight the extensive contribution made in this field by the international offices of Germany's political party foundations. To gain German support, the PBG would need to be structured to accommodate Germany's capacities and strong feelings on this issue, but the Development Ministry in particular will be suspicious of anything that appears to sideline the UN or World Bank. Germany can also be expected to coordinate closely with other big European donors, such as France, before deciding whether to support this initiative. End Comment. ¶11. (U) This message was cleared with S/P after Dr. Krasner's departure. TIMKEN JR