Serbia - No Participation in Status Talks

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000097 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL KDEM SR PBTS PGOV PNAT SUBJECT: Serbia - No Participation in Status Talks if Kosovo Independence Presumed Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Key Serbian negotiators on Kosovo again told Contact Group (CG) representatives that the GOS would likely withdraw from status talks if independence was "presumed" at the outset. The GOS presented a non-paper detailing their objections to CG draft position papers (text below),which they assert are based on a presumption of independence as the only potential outcome of status talks. On decentralization, the GOS strongly denied any Serb interest in Kosovo's ethnic partition and emphasized that its new proposal on decentralization was far more "realistic" than the April 2004 Belgrade plan. End Summary. Kosovo Independence: A Non-Starter for GOS -------------- ¶2. (U) On January 20, Aleksander Samardzic, Vladeta Jankovic, Dusan Batakovic, Leon Kojen, leading members of the Serbian negotiating team on Kosovo, met with Contact Group representatives. Citing three recently circulated internal CG papers, the GOS representatives strongly objected to formulations in those papers that they believe "presume independence" for Kosovo. They called the tone of the papers "disturbing," said they were a "non-starter" for Belgrade, and implied they were a recipe for Serbian withdraw from final status talks. President Tadic's adviser Kojen was especially emphatic, warning that an emphasis on independence at the beginning of the process "will raise the issue of Serbia's participation in talks." Instead, Kojen argued that the process should tackle practical issues -- such as decentralization and protection of holy sites -- in order to build good will before the "really tough" issue of status was raised. Batakovic said that the GOS viewed the Kai Eide's report as a minimum starting point and that the CG papers represent "steps backward" from that report. (Comment: This is the second time key GOS representatives have warned that an a priori presumption of independence by the CG would lead to a Belgrade boycott of status talks. The first instance occurred in December, after the UK Ambassador in Belgrade delivered an alleged CG demarche ruling out the potential return of Kosovo to Serbia. End Comment) Serbs Claim More Realistic Approach to Decentralization -------------- -------------- --- ¶3. (U) Samardzic said that Belgrade's thinking on decentralization had become significantly more "realistic" in the year and a half since the 2004 Belgrade Plan was presented. Having digested international and K-Albanian feedback, he and Kojen categorically assured us that Belgrade no longer sought state-like institutions (parliament, executive council) that would unite Serb-majority municipalities. They also categorically denied any Belgrade interest in the ethnic partition of Kosovo. They called for "flexible" implementation of decentralization;" i.e., the Serbs would have no objection either to all municipalities in Kosovo enjoying the same competencies or to differentiated competencies for Serb-majority municipalities (as is the case in Spain, Samardzic claimed). All expressed concern about the recent "platform" (septel) released by the Albanians of southern Serbia and rejected any linkage between that region and any aspect of the Kosovo status process. ¶4. (U) Samardzic and Kojen expressed concern that the draft agenda for the 1/25 Vienna meeting was far too ambitious for a one-day session. Text of Non-Paper -------------- Some Comments on Three Contact Group Draft Non- Papers (Decentralization; Serbian Religious Heritage; International Presence) General: The most significant feature of the three draft non-papers is their pervasive assumption that the question of Kosovo's future status can only be resolved in one way by granting Kosovo some form of independent statehood. The assumption is sometimes quite explicit, as in the decentralization non-paper, which starts by mentioning "Kosovo's possible independence" (p. 1),but then quickly moves to talking about "Serb communes [i.e., municipalities] on either side of the future border and the "cooperation [that] would mitigate the reality of the separation by a border" (p. 2),the border in question clearly being that between Serbia and the future independent state of Kosovo. The point is driven home by the next sentence which discusses the possibility of the "free movement of persons between the two countries, or the establishment even of a 'mini-Schengen' between them" (p. 2). Particular formulations such as those just quoted might not matter so much if the underlying conception of decentralization were genuinely neutral on the issue of status. But this is unfortunately not the case: decentralization is primarily seen as a way of reconciling the Kosovo Serb community to an independent Kosovo and even as a prelude to creating an "institutional link" between Belgrade and Pristina.1 In the same way, the non-paper on Serbian religious heritage poses the whole issue from the perspective of an independent Kosovo. For example, it explicitly mentions and rejects extraterritoriality for some of the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries on the ground that this "would not be in keeping with the idea of a multiethnic Kosovo in which all the communities would have their place". There might instead be "special rights" protecting "Serbian religious heritage", but only "within the framework of a single State" (p. 2). The single state mentioned here could only be a future independent Kosovo, as extraterritoriality would be unnecessary if it were recognized that the churches and monasteries in question are situated, as in fact they are, on Serbian (and Serbian- Montenegrin) territory. The non-paper on international presence is somewhat less explicit than the other two, but it is still noticeable that the question discussed in most detail, the powers of a possible International Community Representative in Kosovo, is posed by comparing the future Kosovo with two independent, internationally recognized states, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, that have had such a representative for a number of years. Thus, the same implication seems to be there: the future status of Kosovo will be some form of independence. ¶1. It is only if decentralization is seen as taking place within an independent Kosovo that it makes sense to tie it, as the draft non-paper does, with Albanian demands regarding the municipalities of Presevo and Bujanovac in central Serbia. If the assumption is not made, there is no reason to make the connection: for the Albanians in Presevo and Bujanovac already exercise all the rights that are now denied to the Kosovo Serbs and that decentralization is supposed to restore to them. From the point of view of Belgrade, the assumption in the draft non-papers that the future status of Kosovo will be some form of independence rather than some kind of broad autonomy within Serbia is not only unwelcome, but poses a procedural dilemma. The rationale generally offered for starting the status process with specific issues such as decentralization, Serbian religious heritage, etc. is that, unlike the question of status itself, these are the issues where it is easier to find at least some common ground and thus a solution that could be acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina. So, it is often argued, the question of status should be postponed until some of these important but more specific issues have been resolved in a mutually acceptable manner, paving the way for the discussion of the more difficult status issues. This in fact seems to be the view of both the Special Envoy and the Contact Group countries. If this rationale is accepted, as it is accepted by Belgrade at least with respect to the decentralization process, it makes little sense to approach specific issues by making very definite assumptions about status. For this will block the talks at the very start, by inevitably raising status issues that would then tend to monopolize all attention and effectively prevent fruitful discussion of matters where there might be some common ground. Thus, the dilemma for Belgrade, but also for Pristina, the Special Envoy and the Contact Group, is whether to start with specific issues, looking for some common ground, or to address the question of status directly. Belgrade is prepared for either alternative, but if the first one (specific issues) is chosen by the Special Envoy, the Contact Group non-papers on specific matters can only play a useful role if all assumptions about the future status of Kosovo are carefully avoided. Unless this is done, talks on matters such as decentralization or the Serbian religious heritage will fail at the very start, and this is an outcome that everyone involved has good reason to avoid. Further comments given below on the two draft non- papers illustrate Belgrade's approach on the first of the two alternatives mentioned above - where discussion of specific issues is taken as far as it can fruitfully go without involving the question of status. Decentralization: In line with the position the Serbian delegation presented in Vienna in September 2005 and with the Eide report, Belgrade insists on the following four crucial points, mentioned here without further elaboration: (a) new, wider competences for the Serb majority municipalities; (b) the setting up of new Serb- majority municipalities in a number of areas (Northern Mitrovica, Central Kosovo, Kosovo Pomoravlje region, and Metohija); ( c) the establishment of "horizontal links" between such Serb-majority municipalities; (d) direct institutional links of these Serb-majority municipalities with Belgrade.2 Decentralization in this sense is clearly a matter of meaningful self government at the local level, and has the twin purpose of restoring normal living conditions for the Serb community in Kosovo and thus also making possible the return of a significant number of lDP's from central Serbia. It does not exhaust, however, the legitimate political demands of the Serb community. There is the obvious need for the Kosovo Serbs to have some institutional guarantees at the level of central government, particularly in the Kosovo parliament. A good proposal here would be that, where matters of vital interest to the Serb community are concerned, no decision can be taken in the Kosovo parliament without the majority of the Serb representatives voting in its favor. And there is also the issue of the overall constitutional position of the Serb community in Kosovo, which is an aspect of the general status issue, i.e. of the constitutional relationship to be negotiated between Serbia and its province of Kosovo. Both these issues, however, can be addressed independently of decentralization, and after some commonly agreed solution has been found for that issue. A very surprising feature of the decentralization non-paper is the attempt to link decentralization with "cross-border inter-communal cooperation" and "cross-border relations" generally. This is a new departure, and one that has little support in the realities of the situation in Kosovo. For example, these ideas are completely foreign to the very balanced and widely accepted recommendations on decentralization contained in the Eide report. Given that the cooperation envisaged in the draft non-paper would clearly be between communes (i.e., municipalities) belonging to two different independent states, any attempt to link decentralization in Kosovo with such "cross-border cooperation" is completely unacceptable to Belgrade. Serbian religious heritage: Even apart from the fact that the draft paper assumes an independent Kosovo, the solutions proposed here for the protection of the Serbian religious heritage are grievously inadequate. The non-paper explicitly concentrates on the protection of "buildings and material goods", while the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Serbian political leadership insist on the protection of living religious communities, which certainly includes but goes beyond the protection of buildings and material goods. Given that more than 150 Orthodox churches and monasteries have been completely or partly destroyed after 1999, it is necessary to protect the most important Orthodox churches and monasteries in Albanian- majority areas (Pecka patrijarsija, Visoki Decani, Bogorodica Ljeviska, Sveti Arhandeli, Devic) both by creating "safe zones" around them,3 as advocated in the Eide report, and also by linking them institutionally with the Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo. In other words, these churches and monasteries with their "safe zones" should belong territorially to the "Serbian entity" in Kosovo, together with all the Serb- majority municipalities in the province (though it should be added, to avoid misunderstanding, that the Serbian entity as envisaged here would not be a compact, continuous territory). The draft non-paper envisages the formation of a "High Authority" or "supervisory council" that would have extensive powers in arbitrating disputes involving the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, "could serve as a facilitator for international donors", and could even "be responsible for the management and maintenance of the buildings" (i.e., of the most important churches and monasteries). It is important to stress that such a proposal is fundamentally unacceptable to the Serbian Orthodox Church and would in fact constitute a very serious infringement of basic religious freedoms. The only reasonable view, given the brutal persecution of the Orthodox faith in Kosovo after 1999, is that the Serbian Orthodox Church in the province should in any case retain its present administrative ties with the Ministry of Religious Affairs in Belgrade. 16 January 2006 3 Such "safe zones" should comprise both the estates now owned by those churches and monasteries, and the estates they lost due to nationalization after 1945 and should now rightfully recover through denationalization. MOORE