SCENESETTER FOR MAY 27 VISIT OF CODEL INHOFE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000842 SIPDIS C O R R E C T E D COPY -- SECTION MARKINGS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR DRL, INL, EUR/SCE NSC FOR BRAUN DEPT FOR H - PLEASE PASS TO OFFICES OF SENATOR INHOFE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR MAY 27 VISIT OF CODEL INHOFE BELGRADE 00000842 001.4 OF 004 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECT ACCORDINGLY ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Your visit comes at a time when the future of Serbia and Montenegro (SaM) is at a critical crossroads. Serbia will face difficult decisions in the weeks and months ahead on such key issues as: Kosovo final status, the dissolution of the SaM State Union, full ICTY compliance (rendering General Mladic to the Hague), overcoming the suspension of Stabilization and Association Agreement Talks with the EU, defense reform, and generally accelerating Euro- Atlantic Security integration. Future Serbian government positions, policies and actions regarding the critical issues outlined above will be a clear indicator as to whether or not Serbia is committed to its goal of European integration, NATO membership, and regional stability or turn to nationalism and isolation. Your visit will center on Serbian President Boris Tadic and Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic. Both leaders have been advocates of PfP and eventual NATO Membership, generally constructive over Kosovo final status (although still opposed to independence),and outspoken on Serbia's need to fulfill its international obligations to the Hague. You may use this opportunity to send a strong message that the U.S. is committed to keeping Serbia on the road of Euro-Atlantic integration. ¶2. (SBU) Additionally, we hope that you will use your visit to support the SaM defense reform process and encourage a stronger bilateral U.S.-SaM military relationship. We believe that now is the right moment to support defense reform. Doing so will greatly enhance our ability to achieve our multiple security sector goals. The SaM government has recently signed a WMD non-proliferation agreement and is in the process of moving forward on a bilateral SOFA, and a security cooperation agreement that includes Article 98 guarantees. Signature of the latter agreement could pave the way for initiation of IMET and FMF programs soon. As we move forward with these initial steps, and attempt to re-start our mil-to-mil programs, we are remaining strongly firm on PIFWC (Mladic) conditionality for PfP membership. By strengthening the hand of the reformers we can further marginalize the old guard and eventually drive them out entirely. This could also lead to a further erosion of possible clandestine support for Mladic and others. The reformers are on the rise here, but they can still lose to competing reactionary forces within SaM governmental and military institutions. END SUMMARY ¶3. (SBU) Political Situation. ¶A. (SBU) Dissolution of the SaM State Union. On 21 May 2006 Montenegro held an independence referendum. Montenegrin voters had the choice of returning full sovereignty to Montenegro with a Yes vote or opting to remain part of the SaM State Union with a No vote. Previously, the European Union brokered a deal with the Montenegrin Government and opposition to establish a 55 Percent threshold for independence. On 23 May 2006 the OSCE certified that the Montenegrin referendum was free and fair. As of 24 May 2006 preliminary official results indicate that 86.1 Percent of all eligible voters turned out with independence garnering 55.5 Percent of the vote while 44.5 Percent favored the State Union. With the referendum's success, the Montenegrin government will in the upcoming weeks move to dissolve the State Union, declare independence, and seek bilateral recognition. SaM Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic and Serbian President Boris Tadic offered messages of support and understanding to Montenegro. In their respective statements, both leaders respected the expressed will of the Montenegrin people and emphasized that both states must work closely together in the future on common economic and security interests. ¶B. (SBU) Political Uncertainty in Serbia. The Serbian minority coalition government of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica maintains a slim five-seat majority in parliament only with the support of the Socialists of former authoritarian leader Milosevic. The prospects of Kostunica's fragile minority government lasting until its mandate expires in December 2007 are uncertain. The EU's suspension of SAA talks on 3 May 2006 due to the Serbian Government's failure to apprehend and deliver General Mladic to the Hague led to the resignation of Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus and eroded the Government's reformist credentials. Further, Prime Minister Kostunica did not anticipate the success of the Montenegrin BELGRADE 00000842 002.4 OF 004 referendum and now faces the task of reconstructing the Serbian Government by integrating the existing State Union Foreign and Defense Ministries. The reconstruction of the Serbian Government poses two key issues -- the future of Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic and who will exercise command and control of the Armed Forces. Foreign Minister Draskovic due to his pro-western and progressive stances on PfP/Nato, the Hague and Kosovo is a target of the nationalist Radicals and Socialists. The latter have stated that they will not support his nomination to Kostunica's cabinet in Parliament. However, the exact mechanism to transfer the foreign and defense ministries has not yet been determined and Kostunica may seek to avoid a parliamentary showdown over Draskovic. With regards to control of the Armed Forces, the Serbian constitution specifies that President Tadic is the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in both peace and war. However, specific responsibilities and decision- making authority over defense matters is still a subject of debate. There are strong indications that the Prime Minister may insert himself along with the President or worse undermine the President's authority over the Armed Forces. This may have a potentially negative effect on defense reform. ¶C. (SBU) Future of Democracy. The government's mandate extends until December of 2007, but there is constant speculation about early elections. For the government, the incentive would be to secure passage of a new Serbian constitution, one of Kostunica's highest priorities as a legacy for his government. The government might also seek political cover on the Kosovo issue, a risky issue for any party in power. While recent polls show that the reactionary and rabid nationalist radical and the socialist parties could win the majority of votes if the elections were held tomorrow, most observers here agree that a unified or well-led Democratic bloc of parties could continue to lead Serbia in the future despite all the challenges. A more significant conclusion from the polling data is the increasing drop out rate of voters in the democratic bloc. ICTY compliance, PfP Membership and an opening to Europe will have a dramatic impact in bringing those disaffected democrats back. We will continue to press Serbia's leadership (civilian and military) to seize this opportunity. President Tadic is the leader of Serbia's democratic opposition and largest democratic party. His leadership in the months to come will be critical for the survival of democracy in Serbia. ¶4. (SBU) Key Challenges. ¶A. (SBU) Kosovo. The Serbian government continues to engage responsibly on decentralization talks, while it insists that it will never accept Kosovo independence. Any discussion should welcome the progress in the latest round of decentralization talks and protection of religious sites in Vienna and encourage military and civilian leadership to continue constructive engagement. Of note, US Special Envoy Wisner as well as UN Envoy Ahtisaari have delivered "private messages" to both President Tadic and Prime Minister Kostunica about the likely outcome of Kosovo status talks. There is no need to acknowledge these discussions, but do stress as appropriate the need for Serbia to support an outcome that will balance the will of the Albanian majority in Kosovo and their own aspirations, which we share, for a leadership role in a stable south central Europe that is fully integrated in Euro-Atlantic institutions. ¶B. (SBU) ICTY Cooperation. Serbia continues to feel the consequences from its failure to comply with the ICTY. The EU's recent suspension of SAA talks with Belgrade resulted from the Serbian Government's inability to locate, arrest and render indicted war criminal General Ratko Mladic to the Hague. Congress has required that the USG (delegated to the Secretary) determine by May 31 whether or not Serbia is fully complying with its ICTY obligations; non- certification would result in the suspension of assistance to central government bodies. Full ICTY compliance continues to be a policy condition for Serbia's entry into PfP. Of note, the Serbian Security Services have improved their efforts and shown greater determination to locate Mladic. We have also seen some incremental indications of increased political will on the part of Prime Minister Kostunica to ensure Mladic's handover to ICTY. We would also recommend that you BELGRADE 00000842 003.4 OF 004 reinforce the need for continued progress on ICTY, particularly with regard to Mladic. In the end, the Mladic issue remains the key impediment to Serbia's integration in Euro-Atlantic political and military structures. ¶5. (SBU) Status of Defense Reform. ¶A. (SBU) General. With the disruptive effects of the political and economic situations, the military setting in Serbia and Montenegro remains mixed in terms of the state of defense reform, armed forces capabilities, and mil-to-mil relations. In some of these areas, much has been accomplished in the past two years. In laying the ground work for reforms, SaM has produced a Defense Strategy, White Paper, and just recently a Defense Doctrine. These may only be temporary or transitory, but these products do lay out a direction for the Armed Forces in terms of orientation towards PfP, NATO, and in general Euro-Atlantic institutions. The White Paper defines the participation in Peacekeeping Operations as one of the three primary missions of the armed forces, and commits the country to long-term reductions in personnel and equipment. The Strategic Defense Review (SDR) with parliamentary ratification hoped for by the end of 2006. This document, which lays out the details of what in the future will be the Serbian armed forces organization, as well as numbers of personnel and equipment, has been reviewed thoroughly by representatives of the DAO and the National Defense University. Far from perfect, we do believe the military is generally headed in the right direction in terms of orientation, size, missions, and capabilities. ¶B. (SBU) Orientation. This change in orientation has not always been smooth or easy for the Armed Forces. In the past few years, over 50 General Officers, and hundreds of Colonels have been retired. Education and focusing of the military leadership on concepts of civilian control, transparency, and western military standards has been key. We are in the process of growing the bilateral relationship further through agreements such as SOFA and a Security Cooperation Agreement. Passage and implementation of these agreements would go a long way in giving us the tools to assist their defense reform needs, and help ensure a military orientation and posture that would be in our interests. At the heart of defense reform is the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Major General Zdravko Ponos. General Ponos is the author of the Armed Forces Strategic Defense Review and the catalyst for defense reform within the General Staff. He enjoys the strong support of President Tadic and is expected to be the next Chief of the General Staff. ¶C. (SBU) Moving Forward and The Bilateral Agreements. It is important that we look for ways to engage further. While Mladic conditionality continues to block Serbian participation in PfP, there are numerous opportunities for promoting Euro-Atlantic integration that remain untapped. This includes the State Partnership Program, which remains on hold due to the government's continued consideration of a bilateral Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). In addition to the SOFA, an ACSA, a Security Cooperation Agreement (with our required Article 98 guarantees) all remain emphasis items. In this regard, we have recently received assurances from senior officials in the government may be ready to move forward on these agreements. You should encourage President Tadic and General Ponos to continue to push the government to complete these agreements quickly and to look for creative ways to use implementation to promote Serbia's interest in closer security ties with both the United States and NATO. ¶6. (SBU) The Economy, U.S. Assistance and Perceptions of U.S. ¶A. (SBU) In addition to the political and strategic challenges the shaky coalition government faces, it must also grapple with the challenge of building sustained prosperity to deliver rising incomes to a long-deprived population. Per capita income is USD 3,226, compared to USD 8,416 in Croatia, and unemployment hovers around 19 percent. The minister of labor and social policy reported that some 20 percent of Serbians live with incomes below the poverty line of USD 2.90 a day. The Government has made significant progress, with the banking sector now largely privatized and the economy producing BELGRADE 00000842 004.4 OF 004 strong growth, about 6.5 percent last year. While the government has been successful in pushing forward reform in some areas, more legal and regulatory reform is still necessary. Often new laws are found to have significant problems after Parliament approves them. Privatization is moving forward in some areas but has slowed, largely due to political reasons, with reference to large industrial companies left over from the socialist era.. The government also still faces the daunting task of restructuring the large monopoly enterprises, such as power and telecoms, that continue to burden the economy; however, the GOS is moving forward on privatization of the oil company, consistent with its commitment to the IMF. Serbia did attract a fair amount of foreign investment in 2005, about USD 1.5 billion, but it still is not receiving significant levels of greenfield investment, which is the key to increasing exports and employment. Investors face numerous structural barriers, including extreme difficulty in land transactions, but the political uncertainty surrounding Kosovo status negotiations plays a role, as well. ¶B. (SBU) Over the last year, we have refocused our public diplomacy and assistance efforts on the economy. We have eschewed relations with Milosevic-era tycoons and kleptocrats in favor of a visible public campaign to associate the U.S. with the demoralized SaM middle class. We have made it clear that our aid will be in the form of tangible projects to support domestic and foreign investment and the creation of jobs through small and medium enterprise development. Slowly we are making some gains in improving our negative public image here, a challenge in a country where foreigners are viewed with distrust and where the U.S. is recognized as a powerful but unfriendly country. ¶7. (SBU) Moving Serbia in the Right Direction. There is still strong respect for American power and recognition of our commitment to deliver on our promises. That gives us considerable leverage to help move Belgrade in the right direction on Defense Reform, ICTY and Kosovo and an opportunity to strengthen the hand of reformers committed to Serbia's full integration in Euro-Atlantic structures. Your visit here is a great opportunity to relay encouraging messages to political and military leaders in Serbia. They need to hear that we are ready to declare the Milosevic's era as over and that we are focused on the future. But that will require Serbia to continue the difficult and wrenching process of reconciliation. Mladic and the ICTY are only a small part of that process, but a critical element for building a Euro-Atlantic future. The military can play an important role in that process. By becoming one of the institutions leading the country towards Euro-Atlantic integration, it could help inspire other changes in the country. POLT