UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000814

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

EO 12958:N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PBTS SR MW
SUBJECT: AFTER THE MONTENEGRIN REFERENDUM: CALM
BUT COMPLICATED - CORRECTED COPY


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1. (SBU) Summary: Despite a blanket refusal by
the GOS until now to discuss the practicalities
of future inter-republic relations if
Montenegrins vote for independence, several
senior GOS and GOM officials have indicated they
anticipate a calm, but complicated transition
after the referendum. Although we would see
plenty of confusion in the event of a pro-
independence vote, we do not expect significant
disruption of the government or command of
military forces. Nonetheless, strong antipathy
between both sides and their determination to
promote their respective position regardless of
the outcome could complicate next steps. In case
of a "grey zone" result, the GoM has sent signals
it could pull out of the State Union structures,
a boycott that would hamstring the already
largely dysfunctional State Union. End Summary.


2. (SBU) In a private conversation with the
Ambassador on May 17, GOS Minister of Justice
Stojkovic said that if the pro-independence vote
prevails, the Serbian Parliament would have to
pass amendments (with the force of
"constitutional laws") to the Law on Serbian
Government ministries creating at least two extra
ministries ? defense and foreign affairs ? even
before the new Constitution is adopted in Serbia.
The three member SaM Supreme Defense Council
which is the collective Commander-and-Chief of
the SaM armed forces consisting of members from
both republics would also have to be
restructured. The GoS has not been willing to
pronounce itself on how it will handle either
outcome. It has refused our offer to discuss
clarifying a stable post-referendum process while
privately reassuring us that everything will
remain calm and there will be no significant
problems. The prime minister and president's
office, the justice minister and our contacts in
the MFA have all to some degree assured us that
there will be no dramatic showdowns.


3. (U) Earlier this week, EU Foreign Ministers
called on Belgrade and Podgorica to begin a
dialogue on their future relations immediately
following the referendum, regardless of the
outcome. Brussels also publicly acknowledg

ed for
the first time that independence would not hinder
or slow Montenegro's drive for EU membership,
undercutting a critical key argument of the pro-
Union bloc.


4. (SBU) If it wins the referendum, the GOM has
indicated that it will move forward on
independence as quickly as possible, but will be
patient and pragmatic in order to assist a smooth
transition. It has communicated to the USG and
other internationals that it is ready to adopt an
international persona immediately. Nonetheless,
it remains wary that Belgrade will attempt to
stall secession negotiations, which the GoM sees
as necessary only to deal with "formalities" and
a few "unsolved issues." The GoM will not wait
long to declare independence -- certainly not
past July 13 (Montenegro's historical
independence day). According to two close
advisors to Serbian PM Kostunica advisor,
Belgrade anticipates a protracted secession
discussion with Podgorica in the event of
independence, and that the GOS would not be in
the mood to compromise. Kostunica himself told
the Ambassador that he would accept the outcome
of the referendum and will be prepared to "re-
model" the relationship between Montenegro and
Serbia after the referendum.


5. (SBU) The GoM leadership has repeatedly
signaled that, while it predicts a clear victory
for independence, it will not hesitate to
capitalize on a "grey zone" result. It is very
likely that they will withdraw Montenegrin cadres
from State Union institutions after a "grey zone"
result, either shortly after the referendum or
following a failed effort to negotiate a union of
independent states with Serbia.


6. The SaM Foreign Ministry is largely a Serbian
artifact already; although many SaM embassies
would see their Montenegrin COMs depart. We
believe that neither republic would take

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irresponsible steps endangering the defense
forces, especially given that command of the
military is already effectively divided between
the republics. The greatest impact would be on
the SaM Council of Ministers and parliament.
While assigned a generally marginal function, SAM
institutions have passed a small number of laws
of interest to the international community and
the USG (e.g., the PIFWC asset freeze), and they
are currently needed to formally fill gaps in the
leadership of the Defense and Foreign Affairs
ministries and ratify international agreements.
Essentially, the State Union could move from
dysfunctional to nonfunctional, until either a
new relationship between Belgrade and Podgorica
could be agreed - or Belgrade abandons the State
Union as well.


6. (SBU) Comment: In the case of independence,
legal and political confusion and uncertainty
will certainly ensue. The US and other
international actors (especially the EU) could
play an important role in maintaining calm and
responsible dialog between the republics as they
sort out the myriad items they would have to
address. The need for international community
intervention, especially from the EU, will be
even more urgent in the case of a grey zone as
the two republics move to re-define their
relationship.

POLT