PRESIDENT TADIC COMPLAINS ABOUT, BUT HIDES BEHIND,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000745

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2016
TAGS: PREL ECON EINV PHUM KIRF PGOV AMGT YI SR
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TADIC COMPLAINS ABOUT, BUT HIDES BEHIND,
RIVALS ON KOSOVO AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

REF: BELGRADE 738

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Polt met with Serbian President
Boris Tadic on May 10 to gauge his mood on the political
scene, prospects for Kosovo and the five issues offered one
day earlier to the PM: (1) public statements calling for
capture of Mladic, (2) sign our SOFA, (3) review the recently
passed Religion Law, (4) build a rail connection for the US
Steel plant, and (5) finalize the deal for the new U.S.
Embassy building in Belgrade. The President downplayed the
effect of Labus, resignation and speculated about the
possibility of national elections in the fall. On Kosovo,
Tadic noted that his common policy with the PM limited his
maneuverability to be more creative on issues relating to an
independent Kosovo. He painted a dramatic picture of a
possible Serbian exodus from Kosovo. End Summary.


2. (C) One day after calling on PM Kostunica (reftel),
Ambassador Polt and DCM met with Serbian President Boris
Tadic and senior negotiator Leon Kojen on May 10 to gauge
Tadic,s mood on the political scene following the
resignation of Deputy PM Labus, prospects for Kosovo and the
five steps offered earlier to the PM which the GOS can take
right now to improve its standing in the U.S. and the
international community: (1) a call publicly for the capture
of Mladic, (2) sign our standard SOFA, (3) commit publicly to
review and amend the recently passed Religion Law, (4) build
a promised rail connection from the US Steel plant to a
Danube port, and (5) finalize the deal for the new U.S.
Embassy building site in Belgrade. Tadic was receptive on
the specifics and offered a readiness to help. The President
downplayed the effect of Labus, resignation and hinted at
the possibility of national elections in the fall. On
Kosovo, Tadic and Kojen said the Serbs have been stymied at
the decentralization talks in Vienna and Tadic blamed the
common Kosovo policy with the PM for his inability be more
creative relating to an independent Kosovo. He painted a
dramatic picture of a possible Serbian exodus from an
independent Kosovo.


3. (SBU) Politics, Labus and Elections: Tadic said he must
&worry8 about not only himself but also his rivals such as
the PM and his coalition partners because he expects to need
them as partners after new elections. He characterized the
Labus resignation as an &important8 moral decision
ultimately &without real consequence.8 He said Labus did
not consult with him, the G-17 , academics or other opinion
makers and therefore there was no crafted, supportive
response to his move. Tadic called the resignation a loss
for the pro-Western bloc as he considered Labus the only
significant link between the GOS and European institutions.
Tadic predicted that Finance Minister Dinkic is planning to
abandon Labus and take control, but Kojen quoted one G-17 MP
as saying &a few of us are with Labus,8 suggesting a
possible G-17 split. On elections, Tadic casually opined
that elections &in autumn8 could be the &right time.8


4. (U) Regional travel: Tadic will go to Sarajevo in &a few
weeks8 as part of a planned tour including Zagreb, Mostar
and Banja Luka as a method of encouraging stronger ties and
easier travel between former Yugoslav republics.


5. (SBU) Mladic: Tadic said how the country handles Mladic
is almost as important as apprehending him. The President
disagreed with the PM,s preference that Mladic turn himself
in, stating that it is &better for Serbia8 if the fugitive
is arrested and turned over by force. Tadic does not expect
Kostunica to change his position.


6. (C) Kosovo Decentralization Talks: Kojen bemoaned the
situation for the Serbian delegation at the talks in Vienna.
Kojen stressed that USG support for the GOS decentralization
package would not only keep Serbs in Kosovo, but would help
Serbia,s democrats face down the Radical threat. Tadic
expressed frustration that the international community seemed
to reject all GOS proposals.


7. (C) Kosovo predictions: When asked by the Ambassador to
reflect on possible practical and constructive steps the GOS
and USG could undertake in the event of an independent
Kosovo, Tadic large demurred, saying it was not the right
time for him to speculate on the failure of GOS policy. He
emphasized that he had made a &huge effort8 to forge a
common policy with the PM at the behest of the USG and
European countries and that this was the reason he had
&little room to maneuver8 on such a question. The
Ambassador assured Tadic that he was not trying to divide the
President and PM, but to encourage creative thinking about
dealing with facts on the ground. Tadic called non-acceptance
of an independent Kosovo &a cornerstone8 of the common
policy. Kojen said that if Kosovo becomes independent, there
will be &very little8 the USG could do with the GOS as that
would be the &moment of maximum disappointment8 and many
Serbs would blame the USG. Tadic could not resist painting a
dramatic picture of Kosovo Serbs fleeing in the tens of
thousands, warning that media coverage would lend itself as
ammunition to the Radicals and Socialists who would frame the
exodus as a &new Serbian tragedy.8 The Ambassador
suggested that the Kosovo Serbs could eventually obtain a
substantive package making their future in Kosovo possible.
It would then be in Tadic and Kostunica,s hands as to how
they characterized the ultimate settlement.


8. (SBU) Religion Law: Tadic claimed to have studied the
legislation for seven days prior to signing, and said that as
President he &must sometimes sign decrees even when I do not
fully believe8 in them. He said he signed the law for
practical reasons: a) strong support from influential
religious quarters, b) the need to &maintain his political
credibility8 and viability to accomplish his goals in other
areas, and c) despite believing that &at least three
paragraphs8 of the law are unconstitutional, Tadic said a
constitutional judge told him the law was acceptable. Tadic
stressed that he said he delineated his reservations about
the law in a letter accompanying his signature of the law.
Moreover, he said he would instruct his DS party to introduce
into Parliament amendments to the law.


9. (U) SOFA: Tadic told the Ambassador he was &knocking on
an open door8 about signing the standard SOFA but offered no
specifics on making progress towards pushing the signing of
an agreement.


10. (C) US Steel: Tadic agreed to look into the issue of
completing the rail connection but warned that Minister of
Capital Investment Illic is &busy spending money on local
elections, but not on US Steel.8


11. (U) New Embassy Building: Tadic promised to contact City
of Belgrade leadership to help speed the process of
finalizing the deal.


12. (SBU) Ambassador,s comment: The purpose of this meeting
with Tadic and the prior one with Kostunica was to continue
to set the stage for more practical discussions of Serbia,s
future after Mladic, after the Montenegro referendum, and
after a Kosovo settlement. The list of &things you can do
now8 I presented was simply a vehicle to remind both leaders
that there are useful things they can focus on other than
Kosovo status and their political competition to enhance
Serbia,s standing with us and the international community.
As expected, both were relatively quick to agree to act on
many of the issues I raised, but neither was willing to talk
practically about the day after a Kosovo decision. There
was, however, one point of light between Kostunica,s and
Tadic,s position. Kostunica was most emphatic that he would
never accept Kosovo independence. Tadic said he would not
accept it now, but that his future position, under predicted
dire consequences, was uncertain. End Ambassador,s comment.
POLT