AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAM PRESIDENT MAROVIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 000067 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS SR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAM PRESIDENT MAROVIC REF: BELGRADE 54 Classified By: Ambassador Michael Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (c) Summary: The Ambassador met January 17 with SaM President Marovic at the latter,s request primarily to discuss modalities of the Montenegro referendum. Marovic highlighted his desire to find a compromise approach that would mollify both pro-independence and opposition leaders, ensuring that the rules of the game did not pre-determine an outcome in favor of either side. The Ambassador pledged to support Marovic,s efforts to bring both sides to agreement, but cautioned against unfounded optimism in this regard. End Summary. ¶2. (c) Marovic said he spoke with EU Special Envoy Lajcak during his most recent visit to Belgrade (reftel),noting he hoped to help Lajcak find common ground between Djukanovic's people and the opposition. Marovic said he is keeping communication lines open with opposition leaders like Bulatovic because he recognizes that while pro-state union forces do not represent a majority, they are a significant minority that could cause substantial mischief if they feel the outcome of the referendum was pre-determined to their detriment. A referendum along those lines, he said, would force the opposition to boycott, call into question the international legitimacy of the referendum, and significantly raise tensions between the two camps throughout the republic. ¶3. (c) At the same time, Marovic said the current EU position (which he said Lajcak explained as 50 percent turnout and 60 percent voting yes) would be completely unacceptable to Djukanovic and force him to call a referendum under the existing law. Thus the key to a successful referendum, said Marovic, is to establish rules that both sides felt gave them a chance to win and would keep the opposition from boycotting. ¶4. (c) Marovic said he proposed a plan to Lajcak consisting of several parts that would mollify Djukanovic and Bulatovic, as well as mollify Serbian leaders. Marovic said the referendum should propose two questions instead of one (as outlined by Lajcak reftel) to eliminate abstentions as de facto &no8 votes, that turnout should be agreed at 50 percent, and that the percentage of "yes" votes needed to win should be a number at least 50 percent of the turnout in the most recent Montenegrin elections ) a formulation that would amount to 42 percent of registered voters voting yes. He said there should also be a minimum "spread" between votes for independence (question one) and votes to preserve the state union (question two). He said a minimum difference of 10 percent support for these two questions would give the outcome greater legitimacy. ¶5. (c) Marovic told the Ambassador that, in addition to these compromises, he told Lajcak he would encourage Djukanovic and Bulatovic to sign a "secret agreement" prior to the vote pledging to form a government of national reconciliation in the next elections whatever the outcome, to ensure stability in Montenegro following the referendum. Finally, he said he would also propose to Serbian PM Kostunica, as part of an independence scenario, to accede to Djukanovic,s earlier appeal for a "union of independent states" as a further measure to encourage stability in Montenegro after independence. ¶6. (c) Barring a compromise solution of this sort, said Marovic, the only other outcome that might preserve stability would be for the USG and EU to present a joint proposal for what would constitute an internationally acceptable referendum process. Adding the weight of the USG to the process, with the continued engagement of the EU on the issue, said Marovic, would discourage the opposition from boycotting while giving Djukanovic a clear way forward to international legitimacy for the referendum. ¶7. (c) The Ambassador welcomed Marovic's clear and creative thinking on this thorny issue, agreeing that it is critically important to establish rules of the game that do not pre-judge the outcome of the vote and encourage one side or the other to take unilateral action. The Ambassador pledged continued USG support for a fair referendum held according to prevailing European standards, and said we will engage with al the concerned parties to encourage them to find compromise solutions. He cautioned Marovic, though, that selling many of his proposals would be an uphill battle ) Djukanovic will not likely warm to the idea of a "Grand Coalition" when he has the upper hand, Bulatovic would be hard-pressed to give up the boycott option as his most potent negotiating tool, and Kostunica is already fairly dead-set against any sort of post-referendum union with an independent Montenegro. ¶8. (c) Comment: Marovic's proposals, while some are too ambitious, do strike at the heart of the conditions for a successful referendum: both sides must believe they have a decent chance of winning in order to engage in the run-up and to eschew instability in the aftermath. We should play an active role in encouraging our EU counterparts to work closely with Marovic and others to find compromise formulae that will bring all sides into the voting booth ) before Kosovo status negotiations heat up. Barring agreement by the two sides, we should support the Europeans in setting down an acceptable compromise for us. POLT