SERBIA: DEL PONTE NOT SATISFIED W ICTY COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 000515 SIPDIS DEPT PASS EUR DAS DICARLO/SCE DIR ENGLISH AND P STAFF BAME; HAGUE FOR JOHNSON; NSC FOR BRAUN AND WILLIAMSON; DOJ FOR CARL ALEXANDRE. E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL SR YI ICTY SUBJECT: SERBIA: DEL PONTE NOT SATISFIED W ICTY COOPERATION Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt per 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (c) SUMMARY: ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte,s March 29 visit to Belgrade reinforced previous trends ) she will continue to push the EU to maintain a hard line on Mladic conditionality for SAA talks, and she continues to be unimpressed by Belgrade,s lack of effort to bring the PIFWC in. We fully agree that timing the Secretary,s announcement on certification in concert with the EU announcement, if she decides to play it this way, as was done last year, will be our best chance to bring maximum pressure to bear on the GoS on Mladic. End summary. ¶2. (u) Carla del Ponte (CDP) met March 29 in Belgrade with the usual suspects on ICTY cooperation, notably PM Kostunica, DEFMIN Stankovic, President Tadic, and ICTY Cooperation Council Chair Rasim Ljajic. Unlike on previous trips, she did not make a press statement following her meetings, and did not provide a formal outbrief for Belgrade,s diplomatic corps. Following the visit, local press characterized the meetings in different ways ) some mildly positive and playing down the possibility of a postponement of SAA talks, other outlets playing up the possibility of a postponement. Local press also dutifully carried the GoS,s reiteration that it recognized the need to fulfill all its international commitments (without mentioning Mladic or ICTY by name). ¶3. (c) RLA and Poloff met at the end of the visit with CDP political advisor Jean Daniel Ruch, who confirmed that CDP would continue to press the EU to condition continued SAA talks on Mladic,s apprehension. Ruch admitted that this line was becoming easier to sell, as many EU member states ) most surprisingly, France ) were getting on board the conditionality band wagon. Ruch added that France,s motivation was likely less a sudden attack of principals regarding Mladic, but more likely a convenient dovetailing of Mladic policy and their increasing opposition to enlargement. ¶4. (c) Ruch said talks with BIA chief Bulatovic were educational, but ultimately disappointing. He said Bulatovic told CDP the GoS could track Mladic,s whereabouts through December of 2005, indicating they were getting closer and needed &just a little more time8 to close in on Mladic. Ruch said CDP interpreted this more as an indication that the government had a good idea where he is already, and simply lacked the will to move. Ruch added that BIA,s report of new efforts since CDP,s last visits lacked substance, noting &they haven,t done anything.8 He said CDP was pressing Kostunica and Bulatovic to put more pressure on higher ranking former officials ) namely, former intel chief Aca Tomic ) but said he did not expect much to come of this given Tomic,s good relations with Kostunica. ¶5. (c) Ruch said CDP was encouraged by her meeting with Tadic, who according to Ruch promised CDP that DS would not allow the government to fall if it came under attack for taking a more aggressive approach to cooperating with ICTY. Tadic reportedly said DS parliamentarians would support the government if any move were made to topple it over ICTY. Ruch was unaware that DS is currently boycotting parliament. Ruch also noted that the traveling party and the GoS had finally exchanged notes to formally start providing ICTY greater access to government documents, and said they hoped to test the new arrangement in the coming weeks. ¶6. (c) COMMENT: CDP,s appeals regarding SAA talks are increasingly in line with what appears to be an anti-enlargement sentiment growing in the EU. The Mladic issue will be a convenient cause celebre for anti-enlargement forces in the EU to slow down Serbia,s efforts to join. There is a delicate balance in play here. While we urge Brussels and key EU capitals to keep the enlargement window sufficiently open to help with a Serbia benefits package for the final settlement on Kosovo we should also use the April 5 talks to maximum effect in pressuring the government to hand over Mladic. POLT