SERBIA-KOSOVO: LACK OF PREPARATION FOR POTENTIAL

UNCLAS BELGRADE 000366 SIPDIS SENSITIVE DEPT FOR PRM/ECA, VIENNA FOR HOVENIER E.O. 12958: DECL. 00/00/12 TAGS: PGOV PREF SR SUBJECT: SERBIA-KOSOVO: LACK OF PREPARATION FOR POTENTIAL IDP/REFUGEE FLOWS ¶1. (SBU) Commissioner for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia Dragisa Dabetic told our REFCOORD March 2 that he was not prepared to receive an outflow of ethnic Serbs and other minorities from Kosovo. He said, however, that if Kosovo became independent, there would be a large outflow. Formulating contingency plans at this moment was politically impossible. When the time came to react, the Serbian government would react, though he could not predict at this time how. ¶2. (SBU) UNHCR officials in Belgrade have reminded Embassy officials on numerous occasions that their 2006 budget (10 million USD) will be only 80 percent funded. At a dinner March 1, visiting UNHCR Deputy Director for Europe Udo Janz said that there would have to be heavy cuts in UNHCR spending in Belgrade during the last two quarters of the year. Nor did he see any immediate source of contingency funds, should massive new demands emanate from a Kosovo settlement. ¶3. (SBU) UNHCR has reportedly drawn up a contingency plan, but prefers to close-hold it for fear of precipitating a self-fulfilling prophecy. UNHCR has revised upward from a previous draft its estimates of how many people would leave Kosovo if independence is granted. According to its estimates, any outcome would result in internal movements within Kosovo, i.e. Serbs from southern Kosovo to north of the Ibar. Should there be violence, the outflow may be as much as a third of the remaining Serb and minority population in Kosovo, as many as 70,000 people, and not only to North Mitrovica, but into Serbia proper as well. Serbian Refugee Coordinator Dabetic, however, claimed that there are some 216,000 non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo, including 124,000 Serbs, all of whom who would leave. ¶4. (SBU) Over the past few weeks, our REFCOORD has had the opportunity to speak to a number of IDPs who have returned to Kosovo or who intend to return. (All are actual or potential U.S. refugee assistance beneficiaries.) All of them distrust the media and politicians, whether in Pristina or in Belgrade. They have little idea of what is happening in the final status process and how it may actually affect them. Most Serbs we talked to simply hope that a Serbian flag will fly over whatever part of Kosovo they find themselves in and that their security will somehow be assured. ¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: A Serbian government in denial, ordinary Kosovo Serbs in the dark, and the main international refugee agency underfinanced, together do not bode well for post-status contingency preparation. How assurances about final status arrangements, especially on security, are communicated to Serbs on the ground in Kosovo will be as important as the details of the final status itself. The ability of radical politicians and others to exploit the situation for their own ends will impact the size and speed of any outflow. The ability and willingness of the Serbian government to protect and project Serb living conditions in Kosovo will determine the dimension of the refugee/IDP challenges we will face. POLT