SERBIA'S DEMOCRATS UNDER THREAT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000257 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM PREL SR SUBJECT: SERBIA'S DEMOCRATS UNDER THREAT? REF: A) 05 BELGRADE 2343 B) 05 BELGRADE 2341 C) 05 BELGRADE 2326 D) 05 BELGRADE 2224 Classified By: Classified by POLOFF Michael Papp for reasons 1.4 (B&D) Summary -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Recent polls indicate that Serbia's anti-Western nationalists are within striking distance of capturing a parliamentary majority in new elections. Potentially traumatic issues later this year, such as Kosovo final status, could strengthen their hand even further. Early elections, perhaps linked to a Serb rejection of a Kosovo final status settlement, are a distinct possibility. Although they are under threat, it is by no means a certainty that the democrats will be ousted -- especially if they (including Tadic and Kostunica) work jointly against the Radicals. For our part, we will continue to work closely with reform forces in Serbia. Progress on issues related to Serb interests in Kosovo (e.g., decentralization, religious sites, etc.),combined with a Euro-Atlantic embrace of Serbia if it follows a constructive course, could also help mitigate the erosion of support for the democratic forces. End Summary. New Elections: Kostunica Will Decide -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Kostunica's fragile minority government continues its precarious existence amidst increasing talk of early elections sometime this year. Polls show that only 18 percent of Serbs support the government while 70 percent lack trust in their government. A majority favors new elections (see reftel d). All of the governing parties have weakened substantially since the last parliamentary elections were held; according to recent polls, Kostunica's DSS is the sole governing party that would today cross the minimum 5 percent threshold for re-election to parliament. The government continues to rely on the support of Slobodan Milosevic's divided Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) for its tenuous 3-seat majority. Polls showing rising abstention rates among democratically-inclinded voters also indicate strengthened support for the nationalist/Radical bloc. Additionally, DS Vice President Dusan Petrovic told poloff that the Prime Minsiter had to postpone an extraordinary session of parliament, originally planned for February 16, because he had to re-secure a majority in parliament. ¶3. (SBU) There is considerable speculation here about the viability of the SPS and about Kostunica's relationship with the Radicals. Milosevic in many ways has undermined the SPS by using his still considerable influence in sole pursuit of providing safety and security for his family, preventing any serious house-cleaning. The assumption is that the SRS could easily induce SPS MPs to abandon Kostunica and bring down the government. Our sources suggest, however, that the Radicals will wait until the Kosovo talks heat up before trying to force elections. Many observers have noted that Prime Minister Kostunica has made a tacit agreement with the Radicals to keep the GOS in power until it deems the time is ripe for elections. (Comment: Other observers here discount the possibility that Kostunica could team up with the Radicals. End Comment) ¶4. (SBU) Numbers are also shifting on the democratic side, with Tadic's DS currengly polling about 18% (compared to 36% for the SRS). DS's willingness to allow Karic's PSS to bring down the government by "buying" M.P.s from the ruling coalition has been set back with the government's aggressive effort to crush Karic. (Karic has fled the country with his three brothers - septel). Petrovic told poloff that the Karic card may still work. He speculated that Karic, desperate to halt legal action against him, is offering large sums of money to any MP who will break with the GOS. ¶5. (SBU) Despite his party's generally gloomy numbers, Kostunica and his DSS are making the best of the situation. While the DS continues to focus on its upcoming Party Congress and play hardball in its negotiations with smaller democratic parties on possible future coalition arrangments, the DSS has been working to consolidate its ties with its coalition partners through the use of government hand-outs and other means. A good part of FM Draskovic's Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO),some of G-17 , and Capital Investment Minister Ilic's populist New Serbia Party (NS) are considered to be strongly in the DSS camp. None of the DSS' coalition partners has a strong incentive to leave government, since their dismal poll numbers threaten them with extinction in new elections (absent some sort of pre-electoral coalition.) Polls Suggest Tight Race -------------- ¶5. (U) A January 2006 Medium-Gallup poll -- reflecting rising abstention rates and Karic's travails -- indicted that the Radicals and Socialists are in striking distance of a parliamentary majority in new elections. While all parties, including the SRS, are losing supporters, the poll suggests that Radicals are losing them at a much slower rate, helping their overall relative numbers. Together, the Radicals and Socialists would currently poll 43.7 percent while the Democratic bloc (DS, DSS, NS, G-17 , SPO, LDS),excluding Karic's PSS, comes in at 44.9%. Minority parties come in around 4-6 percent and would likely join the democrats. However, most experts agree that the largest part of Karic voters would likely go to the SRS or the Socialists, with a smaller number dropping out or joining the DSS or the NS. ¶6. (SBU) Factoring in everything, the Gallup poll showed the Radical/Socialist block just two seats shy of a governing majority if elections had been held in January. (An even more recent IRI-commissioned poll puts the SRS/SPS coalition at 3 seats short of a majority.) Moreover, significant numbers of DSS and PSS voters claim in recent polls that the Radicals would be their first preference as a coalition partner. The Gallup polls also suggest that another 3-5 percent of voters say they would change their vote to the Radicals in the event of the loss of Kosovo. ¶7. (U) The numbers, do not however, factor in an aggressive get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaign, which could strengthen results on the democratic side. In short, early elections would be very close and difficult to call. Divided and Directionless: The Democratic Parties -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The constant bickering between democratic parties in the GOS and opposition will certainly not help. Kostunica's decision to use the state apparatus to attack the supporters and financial network around Karic and his PSS has helped protect his government against attack in the short term, but possibly at the expense of strengthening the anti-democratic bloc. The ferocity of the GOS campaign against Karic, notwithstanding the veracity of charges of corruption against him and his business empire, will make it difficult for Kostunica to attract significant numbers of PSS voters and could help drive them to the Radicals' camp (or into abstention). ¶9. (SBU) President Tadic's DS also has not been able to generate new enthusiasm among disillusioned voters, and polls show that its support continues to erode (see ref c). Petrovic indicated to poloff that the party has made little progress on establishing a platform that would widen the DS' support base, is uncertain how to utilize Tadic's position and relative popularity, has not identified a publicly acceptable rationale for ending their parliamentary walkout, and lacks a strategy to balance its opposition to Kostunica's government and its plan to ally with the DSS and its partners to form a new government in the event of early elections. A senior advisor to Tadic told us 2/17 that the DS is convinced nonetheless that the SPS/SRS bloc is incapable of winning a majority in future elections. Steps We Can Take -------------- ¶9. (U) Our efforts will focus on reducing the risk of political instability by developing more inclusive political structures and helping reformist elements attract back their old supporters. In the short term, that means working closely with the DS, DSS and others to refine their messages and improve their party operations in order to better reach out to disaffected voters. We will also seek to increase public engagements on democratically-oriented topics, such as corruption and economic reforms, key issues that Serbs actually care about, and use NDI and IRI to build stronger and more productive ties within the democratic bloc. Additionally, the democratic parties will have to carefully analyze a proposal to lower the parliamentary threshold to three percent, which could significantly reduce the SRS' chances of controlling the next government. ¶10. (U) Approximately $1.4 million of our SEED funding has been allocated in FY06 for this program, with an estimated total four-year budget of approximately $6 million. To support this program, USAID will work in the following three related areas: developing parliamentary coalitions on specific issues and strengthening local government coalitions that will help at the national level; strengthening party caucuses between the parliament and the government; and working with democratic opposition parties on enhancing their role in parliament. Finally, we have prepared an aggressive and targeted GOTV campaign that draws on our successes in the last Presidential and local elections. Comment -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Polls repeatedly indicate profound public frustration with politicians, especially the democrats who have been running Serbia since Milosevic's ouster over 5 years ago. Nor is democracy as a concept deeply-rooted -- according to a poll that appeared earlier in February, at least 51 percent of the respondents believe that it is more important to have a capable leader than a parliamentary system, and only 23 percent are opposed to having a strong, single ruler. Additionally, the five most popular (or in this case, least unpopular) figures in Serbia are indicted war criminals Mladic, Seselj, and Karadzic, followed by the leaders of the SRS, Nikolic and Vucic. In a year that will see outcomes on highly emotional issues like Kosovo, we cannot exclude the possibility of a Radical/Socialist bloc taking power. ¶12. (C) This is not a foregone conclusion, however. If the democratic parties could put aside their differences and work together, they could conceivably weather this tough year and beyond -- potentially even without early elections. The DS would need to be brought into the tent for this to work. ¶13. (C) Post will work to coordinate and assist democratic parties and NGOs in order to shore up societal support for democratic parties, market-oriented reforms, and Western integration. Kosovo-related developments could also have a measurable impact on domestic Serbian politics. Demonstrable progress on decentralization in Kosovo, protection of Serbian religious sites, and other "Serb issues" could give the savvier democrats advantages they could exploit. In addition, a warm embrace of Serbia by the international community in response to a constructive Belgrade approach on Kosovo would also be helpful to the democrats. MOORE