MONTENEGRO: AFTER THE REFERENDUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 000210 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM SR MW PNAT SUBJECT: MONTENEGRO: AFTER THE REFERENDUM Classified by POLOFF Michael Papp for reasons 1.4 (B&D) SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (SBU) Summary: It is increasingly likely that Montenegro will hold a referendum on independence in the spring of 2006. Whether or not the vote is for independence, Montenegro's relationships with Serbia, and, potentially, with the United States will change significantly. Regardless of the outcome, our goal for a strong partnership between Serbia and Montenegro and a single economic space between them will remain unchanged. Either outcome could raise USG resource planning issues vis-a-vis Montenegro, although an independence path would likely place greater demands on USG resources (including facilities and staffing) and assistance. Only a small risk exists of major violence or significant electoral fraud. End summary. INDEPENDENCE. NOW WHAT? -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Policy considerations and practical challenges will face Montenegro, Serbia, and the U.S. in the period after the referendum, should Montenegro's voters choose independence in a free and fair vote held according to international standards. The GoM proposal for a Union of Independent States (UIS) outlines many of the key questions to be answered regarding relations between Montenegro and Serbia and provides a useful roadmap, even if Serbian PM Kostunica is unwavering in his opposition to the Union as such. The proposal encompasses seven issues: succession; freedom of movement; mutuality of rights and responsibilities of citizens; defense; diplomatic and consular cooperation; and continuity of associations -- the seventh, establishment of Union institutions, is applicable only if a Union is agreed, which currently seems unlikely, given Belgrade's reluctance to consider it. ¶3. (U) The Constitutional Charter is very clear on some points regarding succession in case of independence, and vague on others. UNSCR 1244 and final status talks for Kosovo would apply only to Serbia. If Montenegro votes for independence, the Charter states it will "not inherit the right to international personality;" however, all other "disputable issues shall be separately regulated between the successor state and the newly independent state." The GoM in its proposal for a Union of Independent States proposed handling "all disputable issues" in a succession procedure just as was the case with the former SFRY. Montenegro stands to benefit from an application of the SFRY procedure, gaining property and assets situated abroad. Consequently, Serbia is likely to resist that approach and will demand compensation for Montenegro's significant arrears owed to the state budget. It should be noted that in 2001, Serbia and Montenegro succeeded to the signature of the SFRY to the 1983 Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and State Debts ("The Vienna Convention of 1983" - not entered into force). While many Western states do not favor the Convention, its endorsement by the Badinter Commission with regard to the dissolution of the SFRY, and its central principle of equity, favor its use in the present case. ¶4. (SBU) The GOM has already signaled plans to establish a defense ministry in the event of independence. According their initial thinking, they would seek reductions in military force levels in Montenegro to about 3300 active personnel. In its Union proposal, the GoM called for a "military alliance" of Montenegro and Serbia. The "alliance" would encompass, among other things, military cooperation in education, exercises, and international peacekeeping. The proposal would assist in assuring stability. Additionally, however, Montenegro will need to stay focused on defense reform, including civilian control of the military, affordability, and roles and tasks -- the future of the coastal navy will require particular deliberation, with Montenegro predisposed to its abolition and replacement by a Coast Guard. There could be an impact on defense reform in Serbia as well. At the very least, constitutional and institutional issues related to the establishment of a Serbian defense ministry and military would need to be addressed. We have often leveraged Montenegro's pro-reform orientation within the SMAF and MoD to push the SMAF to make important and necessary reforms and difficult personnel decisions. With Montenegro exiting the scene, we will have to remain vigilant to ensure a Serbian military and MoD stays on the path of reform. ¶5. (SBU) Montenegro's UIS proposal calls for cooperation in diplomatic and consular affairs. While clearly both states would have representation in key capitals and occasionally divergent interests, cooperation (especially in consular matters) would stretch limited foreign affairs budgets, and should be encouraged. Belgrade would likely demand matching funding from Podgorica for such a plan, however. ¶6. (SBU) For the vast majority of the populace in both Serbia and Montenegro, guaranteeing freedom of movement of people (e.g., a visa-free regime),goods, services and capital, and ensuring mutuality of rights (except voting) is central. Ideally, the border--post-independence-- should eventually resemble divisions between EU states, with minimal hindrances. Preservation of property rights will be a central concern. These guarantees will advance development of the common economic space. Additionally, they will preserve intact the social relationships that add to regional stability, through access to education, health care, recreation, and the like, even while the political relationship is terminated. ¶7. (SBU) The GoM is expected to move quickly to seek membership in international organizations and to establish direct bilateral relationships. UN membership will be a high priority for the GoM.. (Note: Montenegro is larger (in population or GDP or both) than approximately 30 of the UN's 191 member states. End note.) As for relations with the U.S., we would recommend that the U.S. recognize an independent Montenegro with little delay and establish diplomatic relations with it, provided that a referendum was held according to internationally-recognized standards. How we propose we handle a U.S. presence is discussed below. We expect the EU and other European states would also react fairly quickly and along the same lines. ¶8. (SBU) While the GoS opposes Montenegrin independence, we do not expect an aggressive reaction in the event of a pro-independence outcome of a democratic referendum. In fact, many senior Serbian leaders (especially the Foreign Minister) have indicated that they would push for early Serbian recognition of an independent Montenegro. Polls and our own anecdotal evidence strongly suggest that emotions about the prospect of Montenegrin independence are far less intense than about Kosovo. ¶9. (SBU) Following U.S. recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations, Consulate Podgorica should be upgraded to an Embassy. There are numerous options that should be considered at that point, including whether and when to nominate an ambassador. While we review our options, the U.S. ambassador resident in Belgrade should be accredited to both Montenegro and Serbia (perhaps elevating the principal officer in Podgorica to charge d'affaires ad hoc). We should argue that this interim dual accreditation would underscore our strong support for a strong continuing relationship between Montenegro and Serbia during the potentially difficult early days of statehood. Dual accreditation would also minimize the impact on the already overstretched USG facilities in Podgorica. In any case, administrative support should continue to flow from the embassy in Belgrade to Podgorica. ¶10. (SBU) Certain functions currently handled by Embassy Belgrade (e.g., regional assistance programs, specialized administrative functions) could be transformed into regional support programs, still based in Belgrade. Fortunately, the present post location in Podgorica is well suited for expansion to an NOB. (The Mayor of Podgorica has told us that we could purchase enough property adjacent to our current plot to cover over 10 acres of well-situated and protected land.) ¶11. (SBU) An independence scenario would probably require additional resources, staffing, and office space early on. During the first years of its existence, the staffing pattern of an embassy in Montenegro should probably resemble the staffing of posts in small transition countries in the region (e.g., Skopje, Ljubljana),before assuming the more modest scale of a mission such as Luxembourg down the road. ¶12. (SBU) Montenegrins comprise about 25 percent of Belgrade's present NIV workload, and the substantial travel distance to Belgrade would probably argue for in-country visa issuing. This would involve the hiring of probably one American officer and a few LES employees. Office space for visa functions could be added through the provision of temporary facilities on the present consulate grounds. We would have to make decisions regarding communications upgrades, including the possibility of handling classified information,. Until facilities and staffing existed to support such functions, visa issuance and classified information handling would remain an Embassy Belgrade function, although such an arrangement would not be efficient in the longer-run. UNITY. NOW WHAT? -------------- ¶13. (SBU) The status quo ante referendum, marked by the dysfunctional State Union, will no longer be acceptable if independence is rejected. Although Montenegrin pro-State Union officials have assured us that the current institutions would function normally if they were in power in Montenegro, we believe the Union would need an overhaul. Ultimately, the Serbs and Montenegrins would need to sit down at the negotiating table, probably for several months, to redefine their relationship. At that juncture, international assistance or mediation might again be necessary. We should review ourselves whether or not it makes sense to deal with the two republics separately in the area of development assistance. It might seem incongruous to tell Serbia and Montenegro to devolve authority to the state union level if we continued to deal with the republics as semi-independent entities. ¶14. (SBU) While the parties themselves would have the lead in re-defining their links, we foresee numerous areas that should be addressed. The SaM Council of Ministers has five departments: foreign affairs, defense, international economic relations, internal economic relations and protection of human and minority rights. The preeminence of the State over its constituent republics in these areas should be emphasized in case of continued unity. Additionally, an office or ministry should be established in respect to law enforcement. In case of continued unity, a greater emphasis on central state-level direction of defense matters, and economic issues, will aid in accession to PfP and NATO, and the EU, respectively. This could require transferring to the state union level many of the ministerial functions now handled at the republic level, including (but not limited to) Finance, Education, Labor Agriculture, and the like. ¶15. (SBU) A glaring weakness in the present Constitutional Charter is the absence of any right of taxation to be exercised by the State Union. Contributions for the conduct of State Union affairs are voted by the republic parliaments (see Article 18),leading to an inadequacy of both means and oversight, by either state level parliament or ministries. Rectifying this (intentional) omission would reduce the state's dysfunctionality, and minimize the scope for republic intrusion into state affairs (e.g., when the Serbian Republic Minister of Finance provoked the resignation of the State Union Minister of Defense). ¶16. (SBU) The presence of two currencies in one state is also anomalous (dinar in Serbia, Euro in Montenegro). Montenegro has benefited from early adoption of the Euro, deriving a lower inflation rate and lower costs of international trade, including tourism, which outweigh the cost of not being able to utilize fiscal policy as a state tool. With both republics focused on eventual EU membership, earlier adoption of the Euro by Serbia would help unify the common economic space. ¶17. (U) The central staffing increases envisioned for an embassy will likely be needed for a consulate as well -- consular and security staffing to support visa issuance, and IM staffing to support communications. These considerations will need to be factored into current plans to build an annex to the present consulate building. And if There is Instability -------------- ¶18. (SBU) There is a small risk of instability in connection with the referendum. Anti-independence sentiment could fuel sporadic violence, either in an attempt to derail the referendum in response to a perceived rigged election or to impede implementation of a vote in favor of independence. Opposition parties have warned of such a possibility, while assuring us that they do not condone such tactics. The GoM has already taken steps to control possible sources of turbulence, as exemplified by the arrest and continued detention of a so-called "Serbian Volunteer Corps," accused of spreading hate speech. At this time, there has been little talk of violence among nationalists in Serbia. We think it very unlikely that Serbia would send volunteers or arms to stir up or exacerbate small outbreaks of violence. With the leadership of both government parties (DPS and SDP) repeatedly stating in public and private that they will accept whatever decision is made by the voters, we see less risk of violence originating among pro-independence factions. ¶19. (SBU) Significant electoral fraud, enough to affect the outcome of the referendum, is possible but unlikely. In ten elections in Montenegro monitored by the OSCE and international community since 1997, all organized with the ruling DPS in control, all were judged free and fair, despite minor irregularities. Nonetheless, Serb nationalists in both republics will fully exploit even the perception of impropriety to negative consequences. It is incumbent upon the international community to ensure that these opportunities are few by closely monitoring the process. ¶20. (SBU) While the risk of significant violence or fraud is slight, either would make the post-referendum period more difficult to manage -- or predict. Widespread fraud leading to an independence vote would require a careful USG and international response. POLT