Religion and Politics in Serbia -- The

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BELGRADE 002065 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL. 12/20/16 TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI KIRF SR SUBJECT: Religion and Politics in Serbia -- The Political Role of the Serbian Orthodox Church Classified by: POLCOUNS Gustavo Delgado, reasons 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) has played an important political role since the end of the Milosevic era, increasingly collaborating with conservative nationalists to promote a mutually beneficial agenda that encourages conservative values at home and school, discourages strong action on ICTY compliance, and supports a hardline position on Kosovo. The church is likely to remain hardline in the near future as the status of Kosovo is determined, but moderate voices in the church could come to the fore if reformists lead the next coalition government after parliamentary elections January 21. End Summary. -------------- Brief History -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The SOC grew out of the tradition of eastern Christianity, following Constantinople rather than Rome after the Great Schism. Under Ottoman rule, the church became closely associated with Serbian resistance, which linked it to Serbian national identity and the resulting Serbian monarchy. In Tito's Yugoslavia, the atheistic state officially discouraged all forms of reigion, severely limiting the SOC's role in sociey. With the collapse of communism and the resurence ofnationalist movements in the 1980s and 90, the church saw a mild religious revival and an increase in its power. ¶3. (SBU) Th SOC played a controversial role in the Yugoslav wars, sometimes giving mixed messages. On the one hand, the church called for peace and reconciliation, but also issued a number of official statements voicing its support for Serbia keeping the conquered territories, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some individual bishops even went as far as to conduct services blessing soldiers just before important battles (as infamously portrayed in the "Scorpions" video from Srebrenica). In the aftermath of the October 5th movement which ousted President Milosevic, the church has moved to establish greater ties to the Serbian government, finding a willing ally in Prime Minister Kostunica, and has begun a campaign of desecularization. -------------- Factions within the Church -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Church member and critic Mirko Djordjevic described to Emboffs the divisions within the SOC as generally continuing along the same lines of pro-war versus anti-war that arose in the 1990's, with current Patriarch Pavle maintaining a balance between the two. However, he added, there are no clearly defined groups of hardliners and moderates, but rather a spectrum of views that vary based on the issue. Observers have noted that the more hardline bishops seem to be gaining in power at the expense of the moderates, as evident in the promotion away from the center of power of prominent moderate Irinej Dobrijevic (recently named Bishop of Australia and New Zealand),and the ascent of outspokenly conservative Bosnian clergymen at the last Bishops Conference. Some observers have also claimed that the influx of refugees into Serbia has helped contribute to the rise of the hardline faction, as these groups tend to be more conservative. -------------- SOC Relations with Political Leadership -------------- ¶5. (SBU) While various parties maintain contacts with the factions within the SOC, the party with the strongest church ties is the DSS. Aside from PM Kostunica's personal family ties to church leaders (his wife is neice to Metropolitan Amfilohije),observers remark that he and his party are actively working to ensure BELGRADE 00002065 002 OF 004 SOC support on a number of issues, most prominently the final status of Kosovo. A church insider commented that the DSS generally pushes for the advancement of the hardliners within the church, and is opposed to moderates gaining power. The SOC has also had traditionally strong ties to DSS members who have been Education Ministers, especially the previous minister, Ljiljana Colic, who frequently referenced the church in her decisions and called Saint Sava "the ideal of the Serbian education system." Dr. Milan Vukomanovic, a religion and sociology professor at Belgrade University, said the SOC is so linked to the DSS that its fortunes will ascend or descend based on DSS performance at the polls. The SOC played a central role in helping Kostunica get his constitution passed, with Patriarch Pavle garnering extensive media coverage as he was carried from his sickbed to cast a "yes" vote in the constitutional referendum. ¶6. (SBU) Other parties, while not as influential as the DSS, also have church ties. Observers say the DS has recently moved to improve relations with moderate church leaders, with some claiming Tadic is hoping to keep a hardline conservative from becoming the next Patriarch. Djordjevic and other observers claim that some church officials also have strong ties to the Radicals. Additionally, some analysts hypothesize that if the monarchist SPO develops closer ties to the royal family (to include perhaps putting family members on the party list),they could gain more support from the SOC, since the church is one of the most outspoken proponents of restoring the monarchy. However, with SPO polling under 5 percent in recent election surveys, and with Crown Prince Aleksander more of a mind to start his own monarchy party (on those occasions when he considers a political life),this scenario is unlikely. -------------- Desecularization -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Critics of the SOC claim that the church is pushing more and more for official integration into the Serbian state. In the current constitution, the SOC is not recognized as the official state religion, but it is granted "special status" as first among a list of 7 "traditional faiths" in Serbia. The SOC has publicly requested that it be given official status as the state religion, but so far this has been rejected by the government. Observers note that it already has de facto official status, particularly when considering the very close ties to the Ministry of Religious Affairs, which the Helsinki Committee on Human Rights says "behaves almost like an external government 'service' of the SOC." ¶8. (SBU) The Kostunica government has shown itself to be willing to compromise with the church on this issue, as evident in the Draft Law on the Freedom of Religion, Churches, Religious Communities and Religious Associations of July 2004, which granted the clergy of the SOC public immunity and solidified its primus inter pares status relative to other religions. The Religion Law was originally vetoed by President Tadic as clearly inadequate to European standards for protecting human and religious rights, but was passed over his objections by the parliament as a sidebar issue in an emergency session early this year. ¶9. (SBU) Although the new constitution explicitly states that Serbia is a secular state, the attitudes espoused by the current government tend towards ever more cooperation and accommodation with the SOC. Indeed, many political analysts and constitutional scholars see a heavy SOC hand in the drafting of the constitution, especially in the areas of social/family, religion, and education law. In addition, since the ouster of Milosevic, the SOC has been permitted (as have other religions) to BELGRADE 00002065 003 OF 004 provide religious instruction in public schools, revealing the lack of commitment to secular education. Djordjevic notes that while this religious instruction has shown little results in promoting religion among young people, it has been an effective tool for spreading the church's political message, which is most frequently represented by priests who teach students that the recent Yugoslav wars were justified and that Serbia should defend its territorial claims. -------------- SOC Kosovo Policy -------------- ¶10. (C) The church's official stance is that Kosovo must remain an integral part of Serbia, with independence or autonomy out of the question. On this issue, the church has made some of its most outspoken statements. Leaders of the SOC even went as far as to call for Serbs in Kosovo to boycott elections and not participate in the Pristina government. However, there are factions in the church pushing for a more practical response to the situation. The leading figure of the moderates on this issue has been Bishop Teodosije, who pointed out that the SOC has survived in many states under many circumstances, from the Ottomans to the communists, and that it would continue to survive in Kosovo no matter what the outcome. In fact, observers say that the most likely response to an independent Kosovo would be for the SOC to gain the same kind of status it has currently in Croatia. Many now believe the SOC would accept an outcome that Kostunica and the Radicals would oppose, so long as it adequately protected SOC rights and properties in Kosovo. So far, however, the government?s cooperation with SOC hardliners has kept the church from engaging constructively with Ahtisaari on the issue, so neither the clergy not the congregation has a clear idea of what protections are being considered. -------------- SOC ICTY Policy -------------- ¶11. (C) Internally, we are told, there are bishops on both sides of the debate over whether to turn accused war criminal Ratko Mladic over to the Hague Tribunal. Damjan Krnjevic-Miskovic, an advisor in President Tadic's office for religious affairs told us that privately, most of the leading figures in the SOC are in favor of Mladic's extradition to The Hague- either on religious/moral grounds or for realpolitik reasons of moving Serbia forward. Nevertheless, the SOC publicly continues to hold the line that the Tribunal is biased against Serbs, and that "only the Serbian crimes are singled out." There has never been an official apology issued for the church's role in some of the crimes of the recent Balkan wars, despite its documented involvement. -------------- SOC on Euro-Atlantic Integration -------------- ¶12. (SBU) According to church-watchers, the SOC is fundamentally opposed to what it sees as an overly-secular Western culture, and has frequently commented that integration would threaten the very identity of Serbia. Djordjevic points out that the SOC is wary of Serbian accession to the EU due to the fact that orthodox communities make up only a tiny minority of those religious organizations represented in the EU, and the church sees the Vatican as having much more influence. The SOC considers NATO membership to be an equal threat, and takes a pointedly anti-American stance on this issue, even going as far as to initiate the canonization process for a 3-year-old victim of the 1999 NATO bombings as a public reminder. -------------- Relationship with Other Religious Communities -------------- BELGRADE 00002065 004 OF 004 ¶13. (SBU) According to Dr. Vukomanovic, the SOC at present is an inward-looking group of old men who, with the help of the current government, cling to the past and reject ideas of ecumenicalism being suggested by younger and more western-exposed clergy. Instead of working with the civil societies to increase understanding between the various ethnicities and confessional communities and build a positive new society, the SOC takes a retrograde stance, focused on building its political power base and righting historical wrongs. It has rejected the visit of the Pope to Serbia based upon old grudges from the two World Wars (in particular the Roman Catholic Church?s support of the Nazi encroachment) and the late John Paul II's desire to enfold the Orthodox Churches into the embrace of ecumenicalism. The new Pope?s expressed desire to visit Serbia is meeting continued resistance. In addition, the SOC has rejected the establishment and acceptance of other orthodox churches (i.e. the Macedonian and Montenegrin) in Serbia. -------------- Prospects for the Future -------------- ¶14. (C) The priesthood is aging. There were only 40 applicants for 300 fully-funded slots offered by the Faculty of Religion for students interested in studying for the priesthood. Church critics and some moderates believe that new ideas are stifled and those who have exposure to the West (particularly clergy drawn from the Diaspora) are shunted to areas where their voices will not be heard. Insiders and critics alike seem to agree that the church is definitely headed in a more conservative direction, especially when talking about the rising leaders. Both Vukomanovic and Djordjevic believe that the next Patriarch will most likely come from the group of more hardline Bosnian bishops, suggesting either Vladika Vasilije Kacavenda or Metropolitan Nikolaj as the two most probable successors. ¶15. (C) As long as conservative nationalists dominate the government, the GoS and SOC hardliners are likely to use each other to mutual advantage. The state helps secure a privileged place for the SOC in Serbian law and to encourage more conservative, revanchist ideology in schools and homes, which in turn builds support for a hard line from the SOC on Kosovo and ICTY, which in turn lends moral authority to the current government's policies. Should reformist democrats like the DS lead the next coalition government, though, there may be more support for moderate viewpoints in the church. Polt