KOSOVO AND SERBIAN ELECTIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 002037 SIPDIS SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O.12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SR MW YI SUBJECT: KOSOVO AND SERBIAN ELECTIONS ¶1. (U) Kosovo status is playing a major role in all political parties' campaigns. This cable assesses their Kosovo platforms and campaign statements related to Kosovo in lead up to Serbian parliamentary elections on January 21. -------------- Democratic Party (DS),Leader: President Boris Tadic -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As President, Tadic asserts that he is constitutionally obliged to defend Serbia's claim to retain Kosovo. Tadic has generally hewed to Kostunica's position on Kosovo throughout negotiations, and his party supported the new Constitution and its strong language about Kosovo being an integral part of Serbia. Recently, Tadic has publicly acknowledged that Kosovo is closer to independence than to attaining some sort of autonomy within Serbia -- explaining that it is his duty to speak the truth to Serbia's citizens. While Tadic hinted that an independent Kosovo is a likely outcome, he stressed that he "will fight until the last moment" because "no normal country just disowns a part of its territory." ¶3. (SBU) Tadic's post-status position is vague. While he pledges that he will "defend Kosovo," he stresses that he will do so through peaceful means (he will "refrain from war and endangering both Serbs and Albanians.") He has told us that it would be difficult for him to disavow an effort by Serbs in Kosovo to proclaim themselves part of Serbia. In the meantime, his public strategy is to seek to influence UNOSEK, the Contact Group (including Russia) and others to "protect Serbia's interests." Tadic has recently begun agitating for further delay of a Kosovo settlement, arguing against action before a new government is formed. -------------- Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),Leader: Cedomir Jovanovic -------------- ¶4. (SBU) The LDP coalition is claiming the mantle of the true progressives in the race, urging voters to "accept [the] political reality" that Kosovo will be independent (and that de facto it has been since 1999). Controversial party leader Ceda Jovanovic stresses that the emphasis should be on people, not territory, and that the Serbian state should seek ways to protect Kosovo Serb interests in an independent Kosovo rather than be fixated on Kosovo remaining a part of Serbia. The LDP coalition has also lent political and moral support to Goran Petrovic's fledgling Independent Liberal Party (SLS) in Kosovo. Jovanovic has been an outspoken critic of the current leadership's "losing" Kosovo policy. As he mentioned at a rally in conservative Jagodina, Jovanovic's vision for Kosovo is "independence that will enable Serbs and Albanians to live a different life" than while under Belgrade's control. LDP wants Serbia to join the international community and Kosovo Albanians in supporting Serbs in independent Kosovo. Jovanovic has cited Serb communities in Croatia and Bosnia as proof that coexistence is possible. -------------- Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO),Leader: FM Vuk Draskovic -------------- ¶5. (U) Draskovic has continued to suggest his proposal for "internal independence," suggesting some additional sovereignty-like attributes for Kosovo but no changes in Serbia's current borders. Draskovic has made international legal arguments and warned that an international recognition of Kosovo's independence would "humiliate the Serbian nation." The Foreign Minister has admitted that Serbia cannot (and should not want to) rule Kosovo again, offering instead "Serbian integrity, Albanian rule" as "the least painful" solution for Serbia. Draskovic urges protection for Kosovo Serbs through decentralization so that "95 percent of Kosovo Serbs live in the Serb-majority municipalities" and control their own education, health care, justice and law enforcement, while maintaining direct economic ties to Belgrade. -------------- G17 Plus, Leader: former FinMin Dinkic -------------- ¶6. (U) Dinkic and the G17 Plus offer themselves to voters as a practical way forward on a host of issues facing Serbia. Normally uninvolved with the Kosovo status process, Dinkic has entered the debate by seeking to frame Kosovo as a negotiation similar to those between Serbia and international financial institutions. The goal, Dinkic says, is a long-term, sustainable peace through compromise "in the interest of all the citizens who live in Kosovo." The former Finance Minister said recently that if Tadic and Kostunica agree, he is "ready to personally take over the future Kosovo status negotiations, just as I have led those with the IMF and the London Club." Dinkic has also offered to enter into direct talks with BELGRADE 00002037 002 OF 003 Kosovo Albanians. ¶7. (U) Dinkic also uses Kosovo to strengthen the case for electing the G17 Plus as part of a strong democratic bloc; Dinkic says that an SRS victory would precipitate Kosovo's immediate independence while a democratic government would lead to more negotiations and "a compromise solution...that will enable Serbia to save face." Earlier, Dinkic had publicly questioned whether it was in Serbia's economic interest to retain Kosovo. -------------- Serbian Radical Party (SRS),Leader: Vojislav Seselj -------------- ¶8. (SBU) While the SRS has never shied away from fiery rhetoric on keeping Kosovo in Serbia, so far the Radicals have focused most of their campaign on ICTY (highlighted by Seselj's hunger strike) and a general vilification of democratic parties' pro-Western stances rather than Kosovo. Until recently, the SRS appeared content to support the national unity Kosovo position suggested by Kostunica. Acting Party Secretary Nikolic at one point publicly rejected blaming Tadic or Kostunica for "losing" Kosovo since it was clear that all of Serbia's leaders were working together against what he called Marti Ahtissari's efforts to make Kosovo independent. In recent days, the SRS has begun attacking Kostunica, as well as Tadic, for planning to sell out Kosovo. Nikolic and other Radical leaders have attacked the LDP and "others" (indirect reference to Tadic) who in any way suggest an independence outcome. As to an SRS-led government's reaction to independence, Nikolic has said "We will build a wall around Kosovo, just like Germans did in Berlin...We will cut off all relations with everybody who recognizes Kosovo." -------------- Serbian Socialist Party (SPS),Leader: Ivica Dacic -------------- ¶9. (U) The SPS faces tough prospects to stay in parliament with any strength and its Kosovo platform does not differ greatly from the current government's policy. Newly elected party leader Dacic has said that Serbia must defend Kosovo "with all means," but argues that his position is "no different from what the president and prime minister of Serbia have said." Following his recent re-election, Dacic attracted much media attention for his truculent statement that "Kosovo is Serbia's cradle and no one has the right to say that it will not go to war for Kosovo." -------------- Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS),Leader: PM Kostunica -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The DSS parliamentary campaign is largely centered on Kosovo and national pride. "Kosovo was taken away once but that was not accepted by a single Serb for five centuries. And every Serb knew without a doubt that what was taken away would be returned, "This is just a continuation of the government's concerted effort over the last several months to ensure that all the parties are unified on the issue. The constitutional referendum projected a similar national unity, with Kostunica characterizing the success of the vote as a clear expression by the electorate that Kosovo is and will always be a part of Serbia. Kostunica has never wavered from his position that he "will never accept an independent Kosovo" and bases his arguments on international law, the constitution, and on the need for a negotiated (as opposed to imposed) solution. He rejects what he calls artificial timetables and has repeatedly charged Ahtisaari with failing to negotiate or seek compromise. ¶11. (SBU) Furthermore, he is emboldened by what he terms as the success of his "diplomatic offensive" of recent months, regularly citing the "growing number" of countries who support Serbia's position. He welcomed PfP in the context of retaining Kosovo, calling the invitation "a very important and encouraging fact at a time when we are fighting to preserve Serbia's integrity." Kostunica suggested that the PfP invitation was a recognition by NATO that it supported the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Kostunica has been further encouraged by strong Russian support, particularly after the Russian Ambassador to Belgrade publicly stated in the local media that Russia would veto any status proposal that did not have the support of both parties. Kostunica lauded Russia for its "principled stand" against any "breach [of] the U.N. Charter." ¶12. (SBU) Kostunica also has exploited public calls from certain EU leaders for "compromise" solutions, which have played in the Serbian media against Ahtisaari's public statements that compromise is not possible on status for Kosovo. During a recent visit to Belgrade, Italian FM D'Alema called for "a solution that is not BELGRADE 00002037 003 OF 003 humiliating for Serbia and at the same time is not negative for the expectations of the majority of Kosovars. In other words, we need a creative compromise." (Note: D'Alema was actually distancing Italy's position from Moscow's, but Kostunica counts both stances as in favor of a compromise and against an imposed solution for Kosovo. End note.) ¶13. (U) More insights into the DSS position come from DSS VP and close PM advisor Vladeta Jankovic, who told the press recently that a resolution of Kosovo's status is unlikely before mid-2007. In the case of Kosovo independence, he opined that Serbia would view Kosovo as China views Taiwan and expressed optimism that time would be on Serbia's side, citing German reunification and Hong Kong's return to China as "examples of the return of forcefully taken territory." ¶14. (SBU) Comment: We should not underestimate the careful campaign that Kostunica has organized in support of his heart-felt view that Kosovo will always be part of Serbia. While polls continue to show that a plurality of the electorate generally "expects" an independence outcome, surveys after the Constitutional referendum show a new-found public confidence that Serbia is "moving in the right direction." Meanwhile, the Russians' growing public assertiveness on the need for a "compromise solution" plays well for Kostunica against the backdrop of similar pronouncements by other European leaders. At the same time Ahtisaari's "no compromise" statement and the several-month postponement of negotiations is reinforcing the government's argument that serious negotiations are yet to begin. POLT