C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 000193

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SR YI
SUBJECT: KOSOVO- SERBS GO PUBLIC WITH PRIVATE MESSAGES

REF: 05 BELGRADE 2215

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, (Reasons 1.4 B&D)

SUMMARY
--------------
1.(C) A media uproar over an announcement by Kosovo Serbs
that visiting British Political Director John Sawers told
them the Contact Group supported Kosovo independence,
prompted a sharp reaction from Belgrade officials, and
overshadowed the constructive private messages delivered on
February 4 by U.S. Status Envoy, Frank Wisner. Though
Sawers tried to downplay the independence question in
public statements made in Belgrade on February 7, the
Kostunica and Tadic cabinets, forced into a defense
posture, portrayed the British position as being different
from the international consensus (read: Russia's position).
The freshness of the private message on independence and
the public debate sparked by disclosure of the British
position, make a focus on delivering tangible progress on
decentralization from the upcoming Vienna meetings a way to
keep Belgrade engaged. END SUMMARY.

WISNER MESSAGE BURIED, NOT LOST
--------------
2.(U) In the immediate aftermath of Ambassador Wisner's
Feb. 4 visit, by design, there was little substantive media
coverage, other than Wisner's comment that the U.S. wants
the negotiations to end on by the end of 2006. The Feb. 7
issue of the generally pro-government daily, Politika,
offered the first view of the Serbian response to the visit
with the headline: "Milosevic lost Kosovo-- Loss of the
province is not a punishment for the current leaders of
Serbia." The accompanying article claimed that, in his Feb
4 meeting with PM Kostunica, "Amb. Wisner did not
explicitly say that the American plan envisages an
independent Kosovo by the end of this year, but he clearly
stated he believes that a concept of conditional
independence is nonsense." The story went on to say that
PM Kostunica strongly agrees with Wisner's rejection of
"conditional independence," since "you are either
independent or you are not."

3.(U) The article further suggests that the U.S. "is
leaning towards full independence", since Wisner allegedly
stressed with Kostunica that "Kosovo was lost by Milosevic
and t

he Radicals." The story challenges this assertion by
quoting Tadic advisor Kojen as saying it would be
"completely illogical" to hold a negotiation on Kosovo's
future status, if Milosevic had lost Kosovo. "If such a
thing were the case," Kojen asserts, "KFOR and UNMIK should
just withdraw and leave all the power to the Albanians who
have 'earned it' for all their suffering."

4.(C) A close advisor to President Tadic told the DCM on
Feb. 8 that the President was "thankful" for Wisner's
forthright message on status. Knowing the USG view up
front would make it easier for Serbia to approach the
talks, he said.

MEDIA UPROAR OVER U.K. MEETING WITH K-SERBS
--------------
5.(C) Discussion of Wisner's message was eclipsed on
February 7, after some Kosovo Serbs told Belgrade media
following a meeting with British Foreign Office Political
Director John Sawers, that Sawers had told them the Contact
Group had decided to grant independence to Kosovo. One of
the Kosovo Serbs present at the February 6 meeting told us
that they were all completely surprised when, within the
first few minutes of the meeting, Sawers told them
explicitly that the outcome of status discussions would be
independence. Goran Bogdanovic (DS), who is a member of
the Belgrade negotiating team for Kosovo status, recounted
the meeting for the press, saying Sawers had urged Kosovo
Serbs to accept that "Kosovo is your state as well, which
will be multi-ethnic, but will be eventually independent."
Kosovo Serbs Rada Trajkovic and Momcilo Trajkovic gave
similar statements to Belgrade media, sparking widespread
public speculation about the CG position on the outcome of
status talks. Radical party deputy leader, Tomislav
Nikolic, and Kosovo Coordination Center (CCK) president
Sanda Raskovic-Ivic have called into question Serb
participation in upcoming direct talks in Vienna.

6.(C) The Kostunica and Tadic cabinets have continued to
reassure us they will participate in the Vienna talks, and
have relied on well known Belgrade talking points in their
public response-- that the status outcome must come from
the U.N. Security Council; that international law
guarantees Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, and that the
British position on Kosovo independence is not in line with
Contact Group consensus. Several of our interlocutors have
pointed to Russia's vocal stance and the lack of a CG
consensus.

SAWERS: OPTIONS ARE LIMITED
--------------
7.(U) Sawers tried to quell the uproar over the K-Serb
announcement with a high profile, in-depth interview on B-
92 TV after his Feb. 7 meeting with PM Kostunica and Tadic
advisors. Sawers said he had not told the Kosovo Serb
leaders the CG had decided on independence. Instead, he
clarified that the CG had agreed the solution for Kosovo's
status should be acceptable to the majority of the
province's citizens. "It is clear that independence is an
option, for some the only one," he told B-92 television,
"but it is not the only topic of the talks. The talks will
discuss many issues and the details will be essential as to
how common Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs, and member of
other minorities in Kosovo can live freely on that
territory." He added, "there is a large consensus in the
Contact Group on what is important, what the options are,
and which path should be taken," and that the options being
considered as possible outcomes were "very limited."

BELGRADE: BRITS PLAYING GAME, UNSC WILL DECIDE
-------------- -
8.(U) After meeting with Sawers, PM Kostunica issued a
written statement which emphasized, "the UN Security
Council alone has the mandate to change principles adopted
for talks on the future status of Kosovo." The statement
added that a "one-sided and exclusive" approach to the
status talks, before they have begun, is "totally
unacceptable," and is a direct contradiction to the CG
public statement issued on January 31. According to the
GOS statement, the PM told Sawers, "Any attempt to impose a
solution on a democratic state represents not only
inappropriate pressure, but a violation of the founding
principles of international law and the international
system."

9.(U) Advisors to the PM and President made themselves
available to the media after the meeting with Sawers,
characterizing the British position as at odds with the
consensus CG view. Slobodan Samardzic told RTS television
that the U.K. "is playing a pressure game" for Kosovo
independence, and that this is "not the first time" the
British have delivered such a message. Though Sawers had
toned down the message he had delivered in Pristina,
according to Samardzic, the British diplomat had "de facto"
called for an independent Kosovo in his meeting with
Kostunica. Tadic advisor, Leon Kojen, appearing on B-92
television, said there is disagreement in the Contact Group
about what should be the final outcome of status talks.
Kojen said the positions range between the British position
of independence and the Russian position that the outcome
must be acceptable to both sides. Kojen added that the
U.S. position offered by Ambassador Wisner was closer to
the U.K. position.

10.(U) Russian Ambassador to SaM, Aleksandr Alekseyev, also
gave an interview to B-92 television, saying, "If the
decision on Kosovo's future status were already known,
there would be no point in launching status talks."
Alekseyev stressed that Russia supported a solution that is
acceptable to both Belgrade and Pristina. At the same
time, Alekseyev rejected the idea that Russia disagreed
with its Contact Group partners and cautioned that "Serbia
should not believe Russia views Kosovo as an internal
problem," but only that the resolution of the problem
"should take into account, "universal, international
principles."

EU'S LEHNE SOFTENS MESSAGE
--------------
11.(C) The EU envoy to the Ahtisaari team, Stefan Lehne, in
Belgrade on February 8-9, told the Ambassador that he had
had a "positive meeting" with Kostunica, where he delivered
the private messages from an EU point of view. Lehne said
he sought to deliver the "tough message" to Kostunica more
softly, in terms of the EU's legitimate interest in shaping
a realistic post-settlement transition and Serbia's
European prospects.

COMMENT
--------------
12.(C) The reaction to Sawers' visit was predictable.
There has been for some time a deep-seated suspicion in the
Prime Minister's office that London has actively lobbied
inside the Contact Group for an early decision on
independence (Reftel). Belgrade expected the worst out of
Sawers' visit and may have sought to exploit it: the K-Serb
public outcry after their meetings with Sawers embarrassed
the British and presented the "tough" message not as an
emerging Contact Group consensus but as another example of
British eagerness to advance their own national position in
support of an independent Kosovo.

13.(C) It will take time for Belgrade to accommodate their
public position to the reality outlined by Ambassador
Wisner (and Sawers). They are still assessing how to
proceed and what changes, if any, they should make in their
public posture and negotiating strategy. We should
consider the whole cycle of images and reactions of the
last few days as trial balloons-- both the spin on Sawers
visit as well as the more encouraging argument in Politika
that Milosevic lost Kosovo some time ago. Belgrade will be
watching carefully to see if the IC is committed to
something real on decentralization or whether the "tough
message" is an announcement that the negotiations are over.
14.(C) As they make that determination and get accustomed
to a dose of reality, we should strive to make the first
round in Vienna a substantive step forward on
decentralization, in order to provide Belgrade a strong
rationale for staying at the table. Early progress will
demonstrate to Belgrade that there is something in this for
them. It will also help the more constructive leaders--
Tadic and Draskovic-- sell whatever package comes out of
the status settlement. END COMMENT.

15.(U) Embassy Belgrade clears this cable in its entirety
for release to U.N. envoy Marti Ahtisaari.
POLT