K1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L BELGRADE 001929 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR U/S BURNS STATE ALSO FOR EUR - A/S FRIED AND DAS DICARLO EUR/SCE PLEASE PASS STEVE GEE FOR SE WISNER E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/16 TAGS: PBTS PGOV PREL PHUM SR SUBJECT: K1: MOVING SERBIA BEYOND KOSOVO - IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT REF: BELGRADE 1719 CLASSIFIED BY: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION -------------- ¶1. (c) As part of our Mission-wide K1 (Kosovo settlement and aftermath) strategy, we have laid out in reftel our recommendations on how to manage the endgame in the status process here in Serbia. This message focuses on the next step of K1: expectations and consequence management. This involves a combination of public and private messages, along with operational preparedness that will help guide us through the most difficult upcoming moment in Serbia. That moment, in our view, is the time immediately before and after Ahtisaari, the U.S., and key Europeans declare their support for Kosovo independence and their intention to recognize. ¶2. (c) We are currently implementing phase one of our four-phase K+1 approach: a pre-electoral effort to get- out-the-vote (GOTV) and to engage and support democratic forces in the run-up to the January 21 parliamentary elections. Consequence management described in this message constitutes K+1 phase two. This message will be followed by phase three, our recommendations for rolling out the Serbian benefits package once we judge, among other things, Serbia's reaction to Kosovo settlement in the aftermath of the January elections. A final message will focus on our post-Kosovo engagement with a new democratic government that will seek to address pending ICTY obligations, strengthen democratic institutions, and propel Serbia decisively into the Euro-Atlantic community. End summary and introduction. -------------- -------------- BELGRADE ON KOSOVO: NO CHANGES FROM NOW TO ELECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶3. (c) There will be no change in Belgrade's rhetoric (from Kostunica or Tadic) from now until after the electoral votes are counted. In fact, the clamor will get only stronger as we move closer to the polling date. Given the intensity of the domestic media campaign, public opinion is likely to be affected in two ways: there will be a growing belief that the government, with Russia's help, is making progress on blocking the Ahtisaari process, and there will be ongoing pressure for all the parties to stay faithful to the nationalist line. Our GOTV campaign will at best be able to encourage political abstentionists to consider voting for their democratic party of choice and to push their future government to take a more realistic attitude on Kosovo after the election. -------------- REACTION TO AHTISAARI AND NEXT STEPS -------------- ¶4. (c) Ahtisaari's early February presentation of his proposal to the two parties will hardly affect the dynamic here. If Ahtisaari engages only privately with the parties, Belgrade will simply dismiss his plans and deny that we are any closer to an independence outcome. Pristina will acknowledge that they have received confirmation of an independence outcome and confidently look to New York. Russia will continue to suggest that the outcome is not settled and that everything is on the table. We and the Europeans will support Ahtisaari, but defer to his UN report and recommendations. ¶5. (c) There is not likely to be a new government in Serbia when Ahtisaari meets with representatives from Serbia. Even if the democrats come out on top as we suspect, the negotiations for the formation of a new government are likely to be protracted (after 2003 elections, negotiations lasted 11 weeks). Kostunica might try to push for some form of a national unity government and might even refuse to meet with Ahtisaari - on the grounds that he has no governing mandate - in an effort to put Tadic in a difficult spot. An invitation to comment on the proposal will produce at best a reiteration of previous harangues against Ahtisaari and his process. ¶6. (c) There will be little space or utility in Serbia's politically-charged and well-controlled media environment to respond publicly to any of the histrionics in the run-up to UN action in New York. We plan to focus our public statements here on full support for Ahtisaari and the process and highlight the reasons for why constructive Serb engagement in the end-game is in the best interest of Serbs here and in Kosovo. In private, we will continue to remind leaders of the personal responsibility they carry to prevent provocations and violence. Unfortunately, Serb rhetoric on the other side of the ABL will be even worse than in Belgrade, which in turn will do little or nothing to help tone it down. -------------- GOING PUBLIC ON INDEPENDENCE -------------- ¶7. (c) The formal presentation of Ahtisaari's report and recommendations on status and public announcement of our support for Kosovo's independence will be a watershed. At that point, neither Serbia nor the Russians nor certain Europeans will be able to obfuscate about the outcome. On our end, we plan to proceed on an immediate media blitz in an effort to saturate the public with a detailed explanation of our position, and to respond to the emotional and inflammatory messages that will be forthcoming. We would also include strong public assurances of our continued engagement in Kosovo, our support for Serbia's integration into the Euro-Atlantic community, our commitment to ensure full respect for all the standards provisions, and our commitment to ensuring that Serbs in Kosovo are the "most protected" minority in the world. We would also point to elements of the settlement that seek to ensure the preservation of Serbia religious and cultural heritage in Kosovo with specific benchmarks to demonstrate that commitment. We continue, and will intensify, our work with the SOC to support this. Statements by USOP on implementation, responsible governance, and respect for minority rights would help reinforce that message. ¶8. (c) Our discussion of the settlement would be grounded in our central K+1 message: Serbia's Euro- Atlantic integration and democratic future, on its need to continue economic progress and modernization, further democratization, and on our efforts to actively collaborate on those priorities. Depending on the severity of the Belgrade response, we then plan to shift the public debate wholly to bread and butter issues of greatest importance to the Serbian people. Our message would be relentlessly positive, focusing on the future, on youth, and on various elements of our benefits package. ¶9. (c) We do not plan to persuade on independence. Most parties will refuse to accept such an outcome. We won't in any way shy away from our position, but will after restating it quickly intensify a positive, Serbia- focused message. Such a message must be carried by the USG. Polls here suggest that, despite opposition to Kosovo independence, popular expectations already reflect such an outcome. Our public diplomacy approach is based on our expectation of a strong emotional reaction to the outcome that will quickly give way to a mixture of proud and stubborn refusal and tacit, black-humored acceptance. -------------- THE AFTERMATH: BEST-CASE SCENARIO -------------- ¶10. (c) We expect a range of possible developments on the ground following the announcement of independence. A best case scenario would see little more than rhetoric in Belgrade and from Kosovo Serbs, and a temporary closing down of the official border crossings. Calls for secession and partition of northern Kosovo would be encouraged by Radicals and Socialists but perhaps only tacitly supported by a new DS-DSS coalition government. Some Serbs in Kosovo would boldly decide to cooperate with the new government and participate in Kosovo's constitutional process. This might be encouraged by some in Serbia, particularly if the Albanian minority in southern Serbia participates in parliamentary elections here and acknowledges being part of Serbia. ¶11. (c) Kostunica would still call for a national unity, rejectionist, and separatist front, but Tadic, inspired by a better-than-expected democratic victory for his DS would refuse, asserting his authority over the military and actively working to lower temperatures while symbolically continuing to claim Kosovo as a part of Serbia. Military authorities would be in close touch with us and KFOR. Tensions would subside relatively quickly. Official Belgrade would quietly send instructions to Serb political and security elements in northern Kosovo not to instigate unrest, using its control over the official payroll to ensure compliance. In southern Serbia, ethnic Albanian leaders would corral their more extremist elements and agree to cooperate with the government to maintain stability. -------------- THE AFTERMATH: WORST-CASE SCENARIO -------------- ¶12. (c) Unfortunately, a worst-case scenario would be quite the opQsite, with large flows of refugees, violence in the enclaves, active Serbian support for Kosovar Serb separation, and significant tensions along the Ibar river. The injury or deaths of Serbs and Albanians would heighten passions and spur radicals and nationalists to push for tough measures: closing the border; symbolic sanctions against those states supporting Kosovo's independence; rejection of any participation in Partnership for Peace, cooperation with NATO, or even EU ambitions. Kostunica, emerging empowered by a strong showing in the elections, could push hard for some form of national unity government. Tadic would do little to resist and fail to use his limited authority to calm the nationalist fervor. Significant flows of refugees into northern Kosovo or southern Serbia would be encouraged by the government, either adding to a volatile mix on the streets of Mitrovica or raising tensions and destabilizing the situation in Albanian areas of southern Serbia. 13.(c) Contact between Serb military leaders and Embassy/KFOR would be uneven and incomplete. There would be active efforts in Belgrade to call on all patriotic Serbs not to recognize an independence outcome, and threats and violence against any Kosovo Serbs who tried to participate in the new Pristina government. The government in Belgrade would quietly, but actively, encourage nationalist mischief, particularly north of the Ibar. Albanians in southern Serbia, having boycotted the parliamentary elections, would call for secession form Serbia. While the military would not intervene in Kosovo, it would feel no such restraints on moving into southern Serbia. Gendarmerie units would take aggressive measures to put down any Albanian separatism in the region. -------------- EMBASSY CONTINGENCY PLANNING -------------- ¶14. (c) We have taken operational steps to prepare ourselves for managing events as they unfold. We have set up a dedicated space that will be used as a crisis management center in the event of an escalation of tensions, refugee flows, or even March 17-type violence. We have added extra phone lines set up a duty roster to make sure there is 24-hour staffing if necessary, ensured VOIP and web-chat capability as well as radio communications in real time if cell phones or land lines go down. ¶15. (c) Our review of the events of March 17, 2004, when violence erupted in Kosovo that spilled over into Serbia, suggests that a persistent challenge during the early moments was establishing real-time communications and sharing information with our colleagues in USOP, KFOR, and EUCOM. Cell phones went down, networks were overloaded, and we lacked established contact procedures that were sure to be available in times of emergency. Rumor control was a real challenge. ¶16. (c) In the weeks ahead, we will be coordinating plans with the desk, the ops center, USOP, and our military contacts, as well as refreshing our Serbian contact points. In the latter context, we are prepared to quickly get in touch with all senior ministers (particularly defense and interior); with appropriate military and police commanders including the head of MININT's gendarmerie, which operates special forces in southern Serbia; with appropriate KFOR and EUCOM contacts; with our AID implementers in the field; with refugee-related NGO's; with key contacts in the church and with regional leaders in southern Serbia. ¶17. (c) Our RSO will head our physical planning efforts and organize a table-top contingency management exercise in early December, together with USOP. We would also recommend a similar exercise, perhaps in mid- January, with the ops center, EUR, EUCOM, KFOR, USOP, and Embassies Belgrade, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Podgorica.