C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001810

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS PGOV SR
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY WISNER'S VISIT TO BELGRADE


Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

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SUMMARY
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1. (c) Special Envoy Wisner's messages to government,
church, and civil society leaders in Belgrade October 31 were
exceptionally clear: the USG remains committed to a status
decision by the end of 2006; contact group unity and support
for Ahtisaari is and will remain solid; and Serbia's leaders
will be expected to exercise responsible leadership at home
and with Kosovar contacts in the aftermath of a status
decision, even if that decision is unpalatable. Wisner
extolled the virtues of the emerging Ahtisaari package as
providing unprecedented rights and protections for minority
communities, and urged church leaders to engage directly with
Ahtisaari and local communities to ensure sustainable
solutions.


2. (c) Positions of key actors were unchanged ) Kostunica
remained vehemently opposed to the "loss" of Kosovo and vowed
"consequences" for any country that recognized a Kosovar
declaration of independence; Tadic was resolute on his duty
to protect Serbia's borders, but realistic on the need to
maintain relations with the US post-status; church leaders,
while still fearful and suspicious of Albanian long-term
intentions, pledged their desire to tear down walls dividing
communities ) once sufficient walls were erected for their
protection. End summary.

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KEY MESSAGES
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3. (c) Special Envoy Wisner's remarks to the key Koovo
players ) Tadic and Kostunica ) were starkly unambiguous:
the USG remains committed to a status decision by the end of
the year. It is clear to us, he said, that there is no other
option ) no return to the past, and no alternative to giving
Kosovo independence. He told both Kostunica and Tadic that
Washington was resolute in this view, and that resolving
Kosovo represented a vital U.S. national interest, owing to
the time, treasure, and troops we have already committed and
would be committing to secure the settlement and transition.
He acknowledged that we are at a point of fundame

ntal
disagreement with the Serbian leadership on principles, and
hence on the conclusions drawn from those principles. He
stressed, though, that how we manage that disagreement would
be the most important issue of the coming months.


4. (c) Wisner emphasized that Contact Group unity on this
issue remained solid. In particular, he noted that we had
started this together with the Russians, and we expected to
end it together with them. Of course there have been
disagreements and debate along the way, but consensus has
always been, and will be, maintained. In the same light, he
said the CG continued to fully support the work of UN Special
Envoy Ahtisaari, who Wisner commended as a great statesman, a
fair man, and a skilled negotiator.


5. (c) Wisner remarked that Ahtisaari's proposed package,
while still in draft, was shaping up to be an "extraordinary
document." He noted that the package would provide
unprecedented rights and protections for the minority
communities in Kosovo, particularly but not exclusively in
the area of protections for cultural and religious heritage.
This settlement, he said, would serve as a model for all of
southeast Europe, and would probably force other countries in
the region to give additional considerations to their
minority communities. It would also invalidate forever the
idea that population transfers and partitions are the only
way to create stability in multi-ethnic regions.


6. (c) Wisner also told both Tadic and Kostunica in no
uncertain terms that the international community would expect
the Serbian government and President to exercise their formal
and informal authorities to keep a lid on instability in the
aftermath of a Kosovo status decision. He emphasized that he
did not expect the Serbian leadership to embrace the
decision, and even expected them to express some opposition.
He stressed, though, that such dissent should be responsibly
expressed, and that Serbia's leadership should bear the

BELGRADE 00001810 002 OF 003


brden of responsible management of the situation on the
ground. This responsibility, he said, went beyond pledges
not to encourage or orchestrate opposition. It meant active
engagement to ensure passions did not enflame, and that a
permissive environment for mischief was not allowed.
Passivity in the face of instability, he said, would be the
same as active sponsorship.

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KOSTUNICA ) "CONSEQUENCES"
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7. (c) Kostunica's response was, in Wisner's retelling to
CG Ambassadors later in the day, "bracing." The PM began by
attacking Ahtisaari for neglecting the negotiations (noting
he had attended only the "elephant round"), and said he was
"astonished" that Ahtisaari had, without reference to the
negotiations, apparently cooked up "something out of
nothing," creating a settlement package when there had been
virtually no agreement in the negotiation process. He also
objected that there had been no real negotiation process,
only a few meetings followed by conclusions drawn by
Ahtisaari and the USG.


8. (c) Kostunica reiterated his long-held "core
conclusions": That any settlement had to conform to: 1) the
UN Charter and the inalienable right of national sovereignty
and territorial integrity; 2) the need for sufficient
political consensus in the UNSC; 3) UNSCR 1244, which
confirmed that Kosovo is a part of Serbia; and 4) the
recently-approved Serbian constitution, which recognized
Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. Kostunica then, and
again several times in the course of the 30-minute meeting,
reiterated comments he made recently in the press that there
would be "consequences" to the relations between Serbia and
any country that recognized a Kosovar declaration of
independence, or who recognized an independent Kosovo
constructed outside the boundaries of the four principles he
laid out.


9. (c) Wisner thanked the PM for being clear. He said he
had hoped to find common ground, but realized this would not
happen. He emphasized that Ahtisaari's work was fully in
line with the UN Charter and accepted practice, and noted
that 1244 made Kosovo an exceptional case in the
international framework. He noted that no previous attempt
to reconcile Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo in the
framework of autonomy had ever worked; it was impossible to
see these communities living together under a Serbian roof.
He accepted the idea of consequences from a settlement, but
said he preferred to look at the positive consequences )
Serbia moving forward into Europe and NATO, the book closing
on the Yugoslav dissolution, and security finally being
brought to the Balkan peninsula.

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TADIC ) RELATIONS STILL IMPORTANT
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10. (c) Tadic's response was far more pragmatic, though he
also reiterated his stand that the President's responsibility
is to do everything possible "within the rules" to protect
the borders and the people of Serbia. Nevertheless, he said
he realized that after Kosovo, it was critical that Serbia
maintain relations with key players like the USG. He
highlighted the difference in approach between himself and
the PM in this regard. He stressed that no one in Serbia
would push for Serbs to leave Kosovo, as that would be
counter to Serbian security interests and would endanger
democratic institutions (Note: Primarily by swelling
potential ranks of Radical Party voters and creating sympathy
for the Radical cause. End Note.) Tadic pledged he would not
encourage trouble in Kosovo, and said he had a good
cooperative relationship with Admiral Ulrich and JFC Naples
to coordinate the security situation on the ground. He
noted, though, that the best way to ensure Serbia's
responsible behavior regarding Kosovo would be to encourage
and ensure a democratic government in Serbia following
upcoming parliamentary elections. For this, Tadic said he
would need the strong support of the USG.

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MEETING WITH CHURCH LEADERS

BELGRADE 00001810 003 OF 003


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11. (c) Wisner also met with Metropolitan Amfilohije and
Bishops Irinej (of Backa) and Teodosije to discuss issues
specific to the church. He outlined the remarkable
protections for the church and church property in Kosovo he
anticipated would be in the Ahtisaari package, and encouraged
church leaders to go to Vienna and meet directly with
Ahtisaari, both to understand his proposals, and to give him
direct input regarding their concerns. Wisner cautioned, as
well, that no matter how many protective walls were built, or
good laws written, or international soldiers stationed to
protect them, the long-term peace and security of the church
and the Serbian community in Kosovo depended on the church
taking the lead to build bridges between the communities and
encourage tolerance and respect. He also encouraged church
leaders to urge participation by Serbs in Kosovo's
government, so they might have a secular champion in the
decision-making halls to defend their rights.


12. (c) The clergy broadly endorsed Wisner's approach.
Amfilohije agreed that, while building walls was good ) even
necessary ) in the short run, it had always been the policy
and the mission of the church to tear down the walls that
divide communities. He and the bishops pledged their desire
to see a long-term sustainable church and Serb community in
Kosovo whatever the political outcome. Nevertheless, all
three clergy expressed deep-seated suspicion as to the
ultimate intent of Albanian leaders. They expressed their
belief, borne of observation, that Albanians in their
communities were willing to "bide their time" until the
international community departed, but that in the interim,
many Albanians continued to plan for other uses for church
property ) from hydroelectric plants to restaurants and
hotels. Teodosije remarked that on one journey outside his
mission, his party came upon Albanian surveyors immediately
outside church grounds who were measuring for planned
construction projects. Such encounters, they said, did not
engender trust. Teodosije also passed on a current dispute
between his church and local Albanians over encroachment onto
church lands (documentation faxed to USOP and EUR/SCE).
Wisner promised to have the situation looked into.


13. (u) This cable has been cleared with SE Wisner's
office, and is cleared in its entirety for release to Special
Envoy Ahtisaari.
POLT