SERBIA: PARLIAMENT SET TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION;

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001590 SIPDIS SIPDIS EUR FOR DAS DICARLO AND SCE HOH; S/WCI FOR AMB WILLIAMSON; USUN FOR SHUFLETOWSKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/28/2006 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM SR YI MW SUBJECT: SERBIA: PARLIAMENT SET TO APPROVE CONSTITUTION; POSSIBLE ELECTIONS BEFORE YEAR END REF: BELGRADE 1556 Classified By: AMBASSADOR MICHAEL C. POLT PER REASONS 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: It appears that all major political parties in Serbia are close to agreement on a package for approving the constitution in a national referendum (late October/early November) with follow up elections before the end of the year. President Tadic is supporting the referendum, despite some misgivings, and seeking to nail down agreement for concurrent (presidential and parliamentary) elections on December 10, with a Christmas Eve second presidential round. While the election date cannot be legally set until after the results of the referendum are known, Kostunica, Tadic, and leaders of other democratic forces are intent on holding elections before year end -- i.e., before the expiry of the Contact Group's target deadline for finalizing Kosovo's final status. ¶2. (C) Given the strong constitutional language about Kosovo as an "integral part of Serbia," the referendum is likely to be cast, at least in part, as a vote on Kosovo forever remaining a part of Serbia. The GOS hopes this will inoculate it from charges of having "lost" Kosovo. The behind-closed-doors nature of the constitutional preparations has prompted condemnation from progressive political parties and NGOs about the secrecy of the discussions. The same organizations are also concerned about certain provisions (Kosovo, minority rights, regional autonomy) and are already talking about a referendum boycott. Ultimately, however, the referendum's success will depend more on consensus among the major political parties than the 50 percent plus one participation requirement. END SUMMARY. Parties Close to Agreement on Constitution -------------- ¶3. (C) An all-night session of the Serbian parliament (9/28-29) suggests that the scenario Tadic presented to A/S Fried earlier in the week -- Constitutional referendum in early November, elections in December -- may in fact be holding (reftel). In the wee hours of 9/29, all deputy groups approved (for vote) the final draft text of the constitution. Deputies also changed the house rules to allow Parliament to be in session any day of the week, preserving the possibility of a Saturday session during which the full Parliament could adopt the constitution, and pass the Constitutional Law setting a referendum for October 29. The government will have to act quickly: it will likely approve the draft in special session today, and send it back to the Constitutional Commission, headed by Speaker of the Parliament Predrag Markovic. After the Commission blesses it, fifty deputies can request Saturday's special session. ¶4. (C) While reportedly skeptical about the need and wisdom of a constitutional referendum, Tadic appears to have agreed in exchange for getting Kostunica on board for early elections. The President has been lobbying for elections for some time to place the democratic forces in a stronger position before Kosovo final status. Tadic's point man in the constitutional negotiation and one of its main drafters, Dragor Hiber (DS),has repeatedly assured us that language was being finalized and that the constitution would soon be ready for a parliamentary vote. Media and other sources have been speculating on Kostunica's efforts to work out a deal with the SRS and the DS on the final constitutional issues and the electoral timetable. While Kostunica has been publicly supportive of a constitutional referendum this year, he has said nothing specific about election dates which seemed to shift daily between December and March of next year. ¶5. (C) Kostunica's hand may have been forced by Finance Minister Dinkic and his G-17 party. Dinkic's very public pledge to leave the government on October 1, barring progress on the Mladic front that would reopen SAA talks with the EU, presented the possibility that Dinkic could suddenly bring down the government. The accelerated timetable for elections would allow the government to forestall the Dinkic problem and eliminate the need to appoint a new Foreign Minister, a key demand of the Socialist Party, which has sought to remove BELGRADE 00001590 002 OF 003 the current Minister and its personal nemesis, Vuk Draskovic. The constitutional/election package could theoretically allow Dinkic and the other G-17 ministers to remain as caretaker ministers after their resignations, which are expected to be officially sent to the government today (September 29). Minister Draskovic would also keep his position until elections, and his party's critical seats--which push the coalition over the majority threshold--would remain in Kostunica's coalition. ¶6. (C) The rules for setting the constitutional and electoral timetable are from a Milosevic-era law on changing the constitution, which requires a two-thirds majority in parliament, and majority support in a national referendum of fifty percent plus one of the voting population. Given the success of the Parliament's all-night session, Kostunica should have no problem getting the 167 votes out of the 250-seat parliament. A few small parties might complicate the session on Saturday, but in reality the key parties are reportedly on board. The DS, which has been boycotting the Parliament since the beginning of the year, will join the special session in support of the constitution. There is even an outside chance that Kostunica could accept Dinkic's resignation, and name a DS finance minister, substituting the DS for the G-17 right before the elections. (Comment: There are reports that Kostunica is fed up with Dinkic and would like nothing better than to kick him out of the government, seriously undermining the G-17 's prospects in elections. End Comment) CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND FOLLOW-ON ELECTIONS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) According to the same law, Kostunica then has 15-45 days to hold a public referendum on the constitution. Embassy sources claim that the parliament will set the referendum on October 29. In order to pass, the referendum must get support from 50 percent plus 1 of the voting population. As in the past, we expect authorities here will not count the 1.5 million voters in Kosovo in calculating the participation requirements but will court and count Serb votes in Kosovo. (Note: In past elections, Serbs in Kosovo have been allowed to vote but our recollection is that, apart from security, UNMIK and OSCE did not assist in organizing the effort. End Note) If the Constitution gets approved by at least 3.3 million voters, the results are communicated back to the parliament and the Speaker can then announce a date for elections. If the referendum fails, then the Parliament would have to take exceptional action, most likely designating the follow-on election as one for a Constitutional Assembly, which could transition immediately into a regular parliament once a new constitution was adopted. ¶8. (C) While there is increasing evidence that the parties are lining up behind a December election, reports are still drifting in that the Radicals may try to delay them until next year. (The Radicals have less of an incentive for early elections and would probably prefer that elections be held AFTER a Kosovo status decision.) We do not expect that the Constitutional law will have any provision suggesting a date for follow-on elections before the results of the referendum are known, but in today's Serbia nothing is impossible: the rules tend to be somewhat flexible (e.g., the change in the House rules last night). A joint statement by Kostunica and Tadic in support of a December timeline would, however, be a strong signal that the timetable is set. Negotiations behind the scenes continue: the Radicals are said to be demanding a change in the local election law (Mayors no longer elected directly) that would allow local elections to be held concurrently with the Presidential and Parliamentary polls or shortly thereafter. Increasingly, it looks like everything may fall in place for at least Presidential and Parliamentary elections in December. Referendum on Kosovo? -------------- ¶9. (C) Although Kosovo plays a small part in the draft Constitution, political leaders here are already ramping up public support for the constitutional referendum by implying it is a referendum on Kosovo. Some have begun to protest the BELGRADE 00001590 003 OF 003 way in which the Constitution is being adopted. Democrats in Vojvodina are reported to have lost out on a number of significant autonomy issues, with Kostunica cutting a separate deal with the Hungarian minority community. Pro-Autonomy and other minority parties probably will object to certain provisions and the lack of adequate debate, and may even call for a boycott of the referendum. It is unlikely however that a constitutional referendum supported by all of the major political parties will fail. Regardless of the final vote count it will be the parties themselves that police the balloting through the electoral commission. More than one party has pointed out the parties' shared interest in ensuring that the referendum is successful. More importantly, the accelerated timetable will likely increase voter fatigue and decrease voter turnout for follow-on elections, which could cause serious problems for the democrats and increase the importance of an aggressive Get Out The Vote (GOTV) effort. ¶10. (C) Although we have yet to see the finished draft, we have pieced together the likely language in several important provisions. Kosovo is mentioned in the preamble, which states essentially that Kosovo is an autonomous province within the sovereign state of Serbia and that all state bodies have the "constitutional obligation to represent and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo." Hiber claimed that this statement is for domestic consumption only and that because it is in the preamble, it is unlikely to be held up as legally binding by the Serbian constitutional court. In the body of the constitution, the territorial organization articles state Kosovo is an autonomous province of Serbia with substantial authority to be defined by a later law. The language also states that any changes in the status of autonomous provinces (not specifically Kosovo) must be determined by Parliament and then the people of Serbia through a referendum, similar to a constitutional amendment. Another provision now requires a supermajority and referendum to approve a change in Serbia's borders. These points leave the door open for Belgrade to claim any new resolution by the UN on Kosovo final status would need to be approved through public referendum and parliamentary resolution. ¶11. (C) COMMENT: Any announcement of a Kosovo outcome before the referendum on the new constitution (late October, early November) would focus discussion on that issue. In such a campaign, a huge turnout could be interpreted as popular support for a nationalist hard line position. The not-to-be-excluded possibility is that the referendum and the Kosovo issue could elicit a giant yawn, making the political parties' determination to achieve the 50% plus 1 threshold -- by hook or crook -- a bit harder to make believable. It is possible that the date for elections will not be formally locked in until after the referendum. ¶12. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: It appears that both Tadic and Kostunica now hope to have elections before the final decision of Kosovo final status. We are already beginning to see high level commentary trying to shape public expectations. The Foreign Minister in an interview to Belgrade daily Beta, talked about a "Plan B" for Kosovo that would include a UN resolution that would neither mention Kosovo's independence nor Serbia's sovereignty. Belgrade may be calculating that Russia will either help deliver that "non-definitive" result or at the very least delay the UNSC vote with the help of those in the international community who want to postpone the decision on Kosovo until after Serbian elections. ¶13. (C) COMMENT CONTINUED: Even if Belgrade politicians are successful in obtaining voter turnout for the referendum, getting an apathetic Serbian public out to vote again six weeks later in a general wintertime election and then two weeks later in a presidential second round could be too tall an order for the democrats. If the elections move along this timetable, Tadic and the DS may have created difficult conditions for a democratic campaign. At a minimum the accelerated timetable will increase the importance of our GOTV campaign. We will be reporting on that effort separately in the days and weeks ahead. POLT