A/S FRIED'S SEPT 25 MEETINGS WITH SERBIAN LEADERS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BELGRADE 001566 SIPDIS NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/28/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS YI SR SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S SEPT 25 MEETINGS WITH SERBIAN LEADERS Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In separate meetings on September 25 in Belgrade, Assistant Secretary Fried delivered to Prime Minister Kostunica, President Tadic and Foreign Minister Draskovic the following unambiguous messages: Kosovo will be independent, Serbs and Serbian culture in Kosovo will be protected, and the USG is committed to support Serbia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. Trying to hold on to Kosovo through destabilization will fail and derail Serbia's Euro-Atlantic integration while action on ICTY will accelerate it. As usual, Kostunica gave legal arguments against Kosovo independence and said Serbia's future in Europe is "beyond dispute." Tadic, by contrast, thinks he can avoid "losing Kosovo" in the eyes of the electorate if certain church/minority guarantees are in place and hopes we can provide him a boost (such as PfP) during elections. Draskovic, closer to Tadic on the way forward, stressed the need to arrest Mladic. The three men are already in campaign mode and expect elections before 2007. End Summary. Kostunica -------------- ¶2. (S/NF) The Prime Minister, uncharacteristically upbeat and joined by advisors Aleksandar Simic and Vladeta Jankovic, wanted to talk about the past despite the opportunity A/S Fried provided him to discuss how best the USG can help him and other democrats after Kosovo status is resolved. Kostunica said that standards were always a precondition to status (the PM cited Kai Eide's 2005 report) and a lack of returns, freedom of movement and security from ethnically motivated crime are all indications of this. The PM seemed energized in deploying his customary legal arguments, saying he "feels good, even if alone, on the side of international law." A/S Fried noted frankly that Kosovo was gone. He made clear Serbia's choice: either go Milosevic' route to "a dark nationalist place" by fomenting insurrection in Mitrovica, Republika Srpska and elsewhere or take the road to Europe and an improved economy, more jobs and a better future for all Serbs. The day after Kosovo status, A/S Fried emphasized, would be critical to determining along which path Serbia proceeds. Kostunica assessed that Serbia's European vocation was unquestioned despite reiterating his refusal to accept an independent Kosovo on legal grounds. ¶3. (S/NF) Kostunica repeated his position that "all possible things are being done" to deliver Mladic (whom he called "an obstacle" for Serbia) to The Hague and said it is simply "a matter of time" before this is attained. A/S Fried reminded the Prime Minister of the USG's recommendations of action the GOS should undertake and handed him again our 11 suggestions. Kostunica was generally dismissive, saying "we can't have two action plans." Tadic -------------- ¶4. (S/NF) The President, joined by advisors Vuk Jeremic and Branko Radujko, responded very differently from Kostunica by wanting to focus on the future after Kosovo status. Tadic told A/S Fried that Kosovo's independence does not necessarily mean a "loss" if properly defined in the minds of the electorate. He elaborated that ethnic violence, an exodus by Kosovo Serbs or the loss of rights would all certainly mean they "lost Kosovo." A/S Fried posited that protections for Kosovo Serbs and "Serbian-ness" (church, minority and other protections) might mean avoiding such a loss. A/S Fried underscored that now is the time for Tadic to discuss these arrangements with Special Envoy Ahtisaari. ¶5. (S/NF) Tadic said that he left New York with the impression that some EU countries are considering relaxing PfP conditionality if there is more evidence that the GoS is actively pursuing Mladic. A/S Fried acknowledged that clear actions by the GoS to arrest Mladic might provide a basis "for some" to argue for taking another look at PfP conditionality. ¶6. (S/NF) Tadic also raised Bosnia, affirming his opposition to redrawing borders or partition of the country. A/S Fried pushed Tadic to make that clear to RS PM Dodik and work against his calls for a referendum. Tadic commented that USG pressure on Dodik in this regard is a positive factor. Referring to the recently agreed on "special relationship" BELGRADE 00001566 002 OF 002 between RS and Serbia, Tadic said Serbia planned to offer the same to the rest of Bosnia, including a plan under consideration to offer Serbian citizenship to all Bosnians. A/S Fried strongly criticized this idea, citing similar and destabilizing offers by Russia in places like Abkhazia. Draskovic -------------- ¶6. (S/NF) Draskovic expressed his usual arguments against Kosovo independence: a new Berlin Wall between Serbia and Kosovo, instability in Albanian regions in Macedonia and Montenegro, precedence for "frozen conflicts" like Ossetia and Transdnister, and "turbulence in Bosnia." Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister responded favorably to A/S Fried's commitment of USG support for Serbia's integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Draskovic said that in Serbia the call for such integration "is no voice in the wilderness," citing overwhelming support in polls for EU membership. On ICTY, Draskovic said that Mladic is a "disgrace to his nation" and that he is committed to repair the damage. ¶7. (S/NF) Comment: A/S Fried central message -- the overriding importance of Serbia's European future -- was clearly heard in his private and public messages during this visit. Neither Serbia's leaders nor its public are really in doubt about the Kosovo outcome. What is lacking is clear communication between the leadership and the citizens about the hard truth. Ambassador Fried pushed hard on encouraging that dialogue. End Comment. ¶8. (U) A/S Fried cleared this message after departing post. POLT