SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S FRIED TO BELGRADE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BELGRADE 001534

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SCE, EUR SPECIAL ASSISTANT K. PELZ

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL YI SR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF A/S FRIED TO BELGRADE

Classified By: Ambassador Michael C. Polt for reasons 1.4b and d


Serbia Right Now
--------------


1. (C) Dan, you arrive at a politically charged time in your
old stomping grounds. No senior government official here has
any illusions about where the International Community is
generally heading in the Kosovo end-game but there is still a
belief, particularly by the Prime Minister himself, that the
Contact Group's (CG) timetable will slip. He and others,
particularly in the right-of-center camp, actually hope that
they will be able to count on Russia, along with some wobbly
EU states and concerned neighbors, to help alter the
independence outcome. Rather than figure out how to move past
Kosovo in order to focus on Serbia's future and its rightful
place in Europe, political elites here are wrapping
themselves in the flag in an effort to survive the next
elections.

Serbia Over The Coming Months
--------------


2. (C) The sequence of likely events in the run-up to the
next elections is as we have reported: negotiations on a
constitutional package are all but finished and parliamentary
elections would follow what now looks like a November
referendum on the Constitution. Elections as early as
December, next spring, or later are all in the cards. Your
head can quickly threaten to explode trying to choose among
the various arguments for early or later elections. Tadic's
failure to garner our support for a Kosovo delay to "help
beat the Radicals in the elections" may have prompted
Kostunica to move the electoral timetable up. Possible
reasons: he may want to have the election before a Kosovo
outcome is announced; he may want to capitalize on
indications in recent polls that his DSS party is doing
better, with a corresponding softening in support for the
Radicals; he may believe that a shorter time line will likely
help his DSS (as a party in power) do better against Tadic's
front-running but poorly organized Democratic Party (DS).


3. (C) Campaign prospects for the governing coalition by a
multi-billion euro public spending spree bolstered by the 1.5
billion euros in government coffers from the recent sale of
the Mobtel cell phone license to the Norwegians. (The GoS
has also just announced the unexpected sale of a third
telephone license in the next month with the starting price
at over 300 million euros, potentially earning itself yet
another pot of walking around money with the voters.)


4. (C) One major cloud on the government's electoral horizon
remains the EU's decision to suspend the SAA talks because of
lack of progress on the ICTY front. Clint Williamson was in
Belgrade last week to discuss the scant progress on the
Mladic Action Plan. It seems unlikely -- barring any
unforeseen developments -- that ICTY Prosecutor Del Ponte
will recommend that the EU change its policy when she reports
to the UNSC/EU, likely before the end of October. We expect
the government may try to pull another rabbit out of a hat to
try and persuade Brussels to reopen the EU door, but at ths
point we see nothing encouraging on the ICTY font.


5. (C) Another kink I see in the entire dmocratic camp's
campaign strategy is that its uniormly negative Kosovo
strategy and lack of ICTY esults is doing little or nothig
to motivate the estimated 2,700,000 drop-outs and abstainers
in Serbia's electorate to come out and vote. Playing only to
the anti-Kosovo independence lobby will not bring out the
large numbers of people who worry much more about the economy
and jobs than a hostile liability down south.

My Approach: The Day After Kosovo
--------------


6. (C) Given this difficult environment, I have already
begun to reallocate our message, our activities, and
resources here on promoting a discussion of the future as
opposed to a rehashing of the past. In the immediate future,
we are looking to bolster democratic forces so that an
independence outcome in the Kosovo end-game does not propel
the Radicals to power -- it does not have to, despite
Kostunica and Tadic assertions to the contrary. We are
finalizing plans for a well-funded GOTV campaign that will
encourage the lethargic democratic parties to develop a
positive, economically oriented message and to get to work on
communicating a Serbia after Kosovo message to their voters.
We have even assigned this strategy an acronym: K 1.


7. (C) I am convinced that we won't gain very much

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continuing to try to persuade Serb leaders to accept the
Kosovo outcome. They won't. But we can and should help them
to focus on K 1 as a selling point with their electorate. If
we are successful, we will encourage an increasing number of
party leaders to do what Tadic said in his public statements
from the U.S.: to set aside the Kosovo issue without
conceding their position, but to develop a future vision for
the country that gives the people hope that Europe, America,
jobs and yes, visas, are attainable in their lifetimes.

Your meetings, your messages
--------------


8. (C) I have repeatedly encouraged Kostunica and Tadic to
stay constructively engaged on the Kosovo negotiations. They
won't. Both are focused on how to come out as clean as
possible in the next parliamentary elections and are
competing with each other on who can come out looking like
the greater nationalist patriot. We should ignore complaints
about Ahtisaari or the UNOSEK team, playing footsies with the
RS and partition talk. As I recommended in my recent
message, we must stick firmly to our timetable. As you well
know from your time here, everything is not what it seems:
much of the Serb bluster is posturing. For example, the new
Constitution will have two parts related to Kosovo: a well
publicized political statement that has been inserted into
the preamble, where it will not have much legal importance,
and quite constructive language in the operative section that
recognizes UNSCR 1244 and allows for future amendments
(theoretically even eventual acceptance of independence).


9. (C) It is still unclear whether FM Draskovic will be able
to meet with you as he is returning around the time of your
visit from New York. He is no softer on Kosovo publicly or
in his "official" private conversations, but he knows what
will happen and understands better then most the need for
K 1. We are also looking to add a meeting with FinMin
Dinkic, as he holds some interesting cards on the future of
the government, given his pledge to leave the government on
October 1, if there is no restart of the EU SAA.

Private Messages
--------------


10. (C/REL Serbia) I suggest you consider sending the
following private messages:

- Frankly, we and the EU are underwhelmed by the Mladic
Action Plan. While the process seems to have improved, it
simply has yielded no results. We had hoped that tangible
progress would allow us to consider some additional helpful
steps in your direction, but the absence of any concrete
headway simply leaves us where neither you nor we want you to
be: without SAA and without PfP.

- The USG will not cut a deal regarding the Kosovo timetable.

- We are prepared to support Serbia's desired sequencing
(Constitution, referendum, elections),but it must fit within
the Contact Group's timetable, not vice versa.

- The Contact Group is on schedule with regards to Kosovo
timetable. We have been open about our plans and are sticking
to commitments made.

- We are pushing both Serbs and Albanians to make
compromises on decentralization, community rights and the
other critical issues for the lives of all citizens of
Kosovo. You will get a fair deal.

- Kosovo will only be the single most important issue in the
upcoming elections if you let it be.

- We are committed to helping the democratic forces succeed.
In our view, for that you need a positive, future oriented
message for your people, not simply a rejectionist Kosovo
line. We are ready to help you get out the vote, but you must
first jump over your own Kosovo shadow.

Public Messages
--------------


11. (U) In public, you will have a good hour with a group of
political science students at the University. They tend to
be articulate and not shy. Polls show that they are the most
disillusioned and frustrated group in Serbia. They are
hungry for assurances of at least a possibility of a better
future. They are not hearing this from their leaders. At
the press conference you will get the same old questions on
Kosovo, fueled by the illusion of possibilities created by
the politicians. ICTY will of course also be a subject. In

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general, I recommend you quickly dispense with Kosovo and
Mladic and then focus on K 1.

I suggest you consider the following public messages:

- The Kosovo talks are in excellent hands with Ahtisaari with
CG guidance. We look to a conclusion of the process by
year's end.

- Our position on Mladic is clear.

- What is important now, more than ever, is to focus what is
most important to the Serbian people -- their successful
future integrated into Europe and trans-Atlantic institutions.

- Now is the time for the groundswell of positive popular
energy to reassert itself as it did in October of 2000.
Nothing less than the prosperity and well-being of current
and future generations of Serbs are at stake.

- We are ready to help meet this desire by the vast majority
of Serbian citizens.


B92
---


12. (SBU) We have tried, with mixed success, to push B92 to
begin the transition from darling NGO to a commercially
viable media outlet. Its management has not responded
exceptionally well - often lobbying around the Embassy
instead of working on a viable business plan. Of course, B92
occupies an important place in the public debate here as an
important symbol for the democratic transition and we
continue to support important programming. Still, I am
convinced that B92 has to change. This just to prepare you
if it comes up in your conversation with Nakarada.

The Contact Group
--------------


13. (C) The CG will be eager to hear how firm we are on the
Kosovo timetable, Mladic, PfP, meetings in New York and next
steps. Most of them are with us on the Kosovo end-game plan,
except the Russians, who want a "deal," and the Italians who
are wobbly. I stay in close touch with them but your
Washington voice can make straighten them out on their
extensive theorizing over where Washington really stands.


14. (U) I really look forward to having you here. See you
next week. Mike
POLT